release(secrets-mcp): 0.5.8 — 修复更换密码短语流程

- secrets-core: change_user_key() 事务内全量解密并重加密 secrets
- web: POST /api/key-change；已有密钥时拒绝 POST /api/key-setup（409）
- dashboard: 更换密码需当前密码，调用 key-change
- 同步 Cargo.lock

.gitea/workflows/secrets.yml

@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ jobs:
           DEPLOY_HOST: ${{ vars.DEPLOY_HOST }}
           DEPLOY_USER: ${{ vars.DEPLOY_USER }}
           DEPLOY_SSH_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_KEY }}
+          DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS: ${{ vars.DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS }}
         run: |
           if [ -z "$DEPLOY_HOST" ] || [ -z "$DEPLOY_USER" ] || [ -z "$DEPLOY_SSH_KEY" ]; then
             echo "部署跳过：请配置 vars.DEPLOY_HOST、vars.DEPLOY_USER 与 secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_KEY"
@@ -216,19 +217,26 @@ jobs:
 
           echo "$DEPLOY_SSH_KEY" > /tmp/deploy_key
           chmod 600 /tmp/deploy_key
+          trap 'rm -f /tmp/deploy_key' EXIT
 
-          scp -i /tmp/deploy_key -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
+          if [ -n "$DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS" ]; then
+            echo "$DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS" > /tmp/deploy_known_hosts
+            ssh_opts="-o UserKnownHostsFile=/tmp/deploy_known_hosts -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes"
+          else
+            ssh_opts="-o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new"
+          fi
+
+          scp -i /tmp/deploy_key $ssh_opts \
             "/tmp/artifact/${MCP_BINARY}" \
             "${DEPLOY_USER}@${DEPLOY_HOST}:/tmp/secrets-mcp.new"
 
-          ssh -i /tmp/deploy_key -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no "${DEPLOY_USER}@${DEPLOY_HOST}" "
+          ssh -i /tmp/deploy_key $ssh_opts "${DEPLOY_USER}@${DEPLOY_HOST}" "
             sudo mv /tmp/secrets-mcp.new /opt/secrets-mcp/secrets-mcp
             sudo chmod +x /opt/secrets-mcp/secrets-mcp
             sudo systemctl restart secrets-mcp
             sleep 2
             sudo systemctl is-active secrets-mcp && echo '服务启动成功' || (sudo journalctl -u secrets-mcp -n 20 && exit 1)
           "
-          rm -f /tmp/deploy_key
 
       - name: 飞书通知
         if: always()

.vscode/tasks.json

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
       "label": "test: workspace",
       "type": "shell",
       "command": "cargo test --workspace --locked",
-      "dependsOn": "build",
       "group": { "kind": "test", "isDefault": true }
     },
     {
@@ -35,7 +34,7 @@
       "label": "clippy: workspace",
       "type": "shell",
       "command": "cargo clippy --workspace --locked -- -D warnings",
-      "dependsOn": "build"
+      "problemMatcher": []
     },
     {
       "label": "ci: release-check",

Cargo.lock

@@ -2066,7 +2066,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "secrets-mcp"
-version = "0.5.4"
+version = "0.5.8"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "askama",

README.md

@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ cargo build --release -p secrets-mcp
 | `SECRETS_MCP_BIND` | 监听地址，默认 `127.0.0.1:9315`。容器内或直接对外暴露端口时请改为 `0.0.0.0:9315`；反代时常为 `127.0.0.1:9315`。 |
 | `GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID` / `GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET` | 可选；不配置则无 Google 登录入口。运行时从环境读取，勿写入 CI、勿打入二进制。 |
 | `RUST_LOG` | 可选；日志级别，如 `secrets_mcp=debug`。 |
+| `SECRETS_DATABASE_POOL_SIZE` | 可选。连接池最大连接数，默认 `10`。 |
+| `SECRETS_DATABASE_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT` | 可选。获取连接超时秒数，默认 `5`。 |
+| `RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_PER_SECOND` | 可选。全局限流速率，默认 `100` req/s。 |
+| `RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_BURST` | 可选。全局限流突发量，默认 `200`。 |
+| `RATE_LIMIT_IP_PER_SECOND` | 可选。单 IP 限流速率，默认 `20` req/s。 |
+| `RATE_LIMIT_IP_BURST` | 可选。单 IP 限流突发量，默认 `40`。 |
+| `TRUST_PROXY` | 可选。设为 `1`/`true`/`yes` 时从 `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP` 提取客户端 IP；仅在反代环境下启用。 |
 
 ```bash
 cargo run -p secrets-mcp

crates/secrets-core/src/db.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 use std::str::FromStr;
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
-use serde_json::Value;
+use serde_json::{Map, Value};
 use sqlx::PgPool;
 use sqlx::postgres::{PgConnectOptions, PgPoolOptions, PgSslMode};
 
@@ -562,4 +562,75 @@ pub async fn snapshot_secret_history(
     Ok(())
 }
 
+pub const ENTRY_HISTORY_SECRETS_KEY: &str = "__secrets_snapshot_v1";
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
+pub struct EntrySecretSnapshot {
+    pub name: String,
+    #[serde(rename = "type")]
+    pub secret_type: String,
+    pub encrypted_hex: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn metadata_with_secret_snapshot(
+    tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'_, sqlx::Postgres>,
+    entry_id: uuid::Uuid,
+    metadata: &Value,
+) -> Result<Value> {
+    #[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
+    struct Row {
+        name: String,
+        #[sqlx(rename = "type")]
+        secret_type: String,
+        encrypted: Vec<u8>,
+    }
+
+    let rows: Vec<Row> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT s.name, s.type, s.encrypted \
+         FROM entry_secrets es \
+         JOIN secrets s ON s.id = es.secret_id \
+         WHERE es.entry_id = $1 \
+         ORDER BY s.name ASC",
+    )
+    .bind(entry_id)
+    .fetch_all(&mut **tx)
+    .await?;
+
+    let snapshots: Vec<EntrySecretSnapshot> = rows
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|r| EntrySecretSnapshot {
+            name: r.name,
+            secret_type: r.secret_type,
+            encrypted_hex: ::hex::encode(r.encrypted),
+        })
+        .collect();
+
+    let mut merged = match metadata.clone() {
+        Value::Object(obj) => obj,
+        _ => Map::new(),
+    };
+    merged.insert(
+        ENTRY_HISTORY_SECRETS_KEY.to_string(),
+        serde_json::to_value(snapshots)?,
+    );
+    Ok(Value::Object(merged))
+}
+
+pub fn strip_secret_snapshot_from_metadata(metadata: &Value) -> Value {
+    let mut m = match metadata.clone() {
+        Value::Object(obj) => obj,
+        _ => return metadata.clone(),
+    };
+    m.remove(ENTRY_HISTORY_SECRETS_KEY);
+    Value::Object(m)
+}
+
+pub fn entry_secret_snapshot_from_metadata(metadata: &Value) -> Option<Vec<EntrySecretSnapshot>> {
+    let Value::Object(map) = metadata else {
+        return None;
+    };
+    let raw = map.get(ENTRY_HISTORY_SECRETS_KEY)?;
+    serde_json::from_value(raw.clone()).ok()
+}
+
 // ── DB helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

crates/secrets-core/src/service/add.rs

@@ -223,8 +223,16 @@ pub async fn run(pool: &PgPool, params: AddParams<'_>, master_key: &[u8; 32]) ->
         .await?
     };
 
-    if let Some(ref ex) = existing
+    if let Some(ref ex) = existing {
-        && let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
+        let history_metadata =
+            match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(&mut tx, ex.id, &ex.metadata).await {
+                Ok(v) => v,
+                Err(e) => {
+                    tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
+                    ex.metadata.clone()
+                }
+            };
+        if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
             &mut tx,
             db::EntrySnapshotParams {
                 entry_id: ex.id,
@@ -235,12 +243,13 @@ pub async fn run(pool: &PgPool, params: AddParams<'_>, master_key: &[u8; 32]) ->
                 version: ex.version,
                 action: "add",
                 tags: &ex.tags,
-                metadata: &ex.metadata,
+                metadata: &history_metadata,
             },
         )
         .await
-    {
+        {
-        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot entry history before upsert");
+            tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot entry history before upsert");
+        }
     }
 
     // Upsert the entry row. On conflict (existing entry with same user_id+folder+name),
@@ -303,26 +312,6 @@ pub async fn run(pool: &PgPool, params: AddParams<'_>, master_key: &[u8; 32]) ->
             .fetch_one(&mut *tx)
             .await?;
 
-    if existing.is_none()
-        && let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
-            &mut tx,
-            db::EntrySnapshotParams {
-                entry_id,
-                user_id: params.user_id,
-                folder: params.folder,
-                entry_type,
-                name: params.name,
-                version: current_entry_version,
-                action: "create",
-                tags: params.tags,
-                metadata: &metadata,
-            },
-        )
-        .await
-    {
-        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot entry history on create");
-    }
-
     if existing.is_some() {
         #[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
         struct ExistingField {
@@ -432,6 +421,35 @@ pub async fn run(pool: &PgPool, params: AddParams<'_>, master_key: &[u8; 32]) ->
         }
     }
 
+    if existing.is_none() {
+        let history_metadata =
+            match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(&mut tx, entry_id, &metadata).await {
+                Ok(v) => v,
+                Err(e) => {
+                    tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
+                    metadata.clone()
+                }
+            };
+        if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
+            &mut tx,
+            db::EntrySnapshotParams {
+                entry_id,
+                user_id: params.user_id,
+                folder: params.folder,
+                entry_type,
+                name: params.name,
+                version: current_entry_version,
+                action: "create",
+                tags: params.tags,
+                metadata: &history_metadata,
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        {
+            tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot entry history on create");
+        }
+    }
+
     crate::audit::log_tx(
         &mut tx,
         params.user_id,

crates/secrets-core/src/service/delete.rs

@@ -441,6 +441,15 @@ async fn snapshot_and_delete(
     row: &EntryRow,
     user_id: Option<Uuid>,
 ) -> Result<()> {
+    let history_metadata = match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(tx, row.id, &row.metadata).await
+    {
+        Ok(v) => v,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
+            row.metadata.clone()
+        }
+    };
+
     if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
         tx,
         db::EntrySnapshotParams {
@@ -452,7 +461,7 @@ async fn snapshot_and_delete(
             version: row.version,
             action: "delete",
             tags: &row.tags,
-            metadata: &row.metadata,
+            metadata: &history_metadata,
         },
     )
     .await

crates/secrets-core/src/service/history.rs

@@ -31,8 +31,11 @@ pub async fn run(
     let entry = resolve_entry(pool, name, folder, user_id).await?;
 
     let rows: Vec<Row> = sqlx::query_as(
-        "SELECT version, action, created_at FROM entries_history \
+        "SELECT DISTINCT ON (version) version, action, created_at \
-         WHERE entry_id = $1 ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT $2",
+         FROM entries_history \
+         WHERE entry_id = $1 \
+         ORDER BY version DESC, id DESC \
+         LIMIT $2",
     )
     .bind(entry.id)
     .bind(limit as i64)

crates/secrets-core/src/service/import.rs

@@ -54,7 +54,13 @@ pub async fn run(
         .bind(params.user_id)
         .fetch_one(pool)
         .await
-        .unwrap_or(false);
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            anyhow::anyhow!(
+                "Failed to check entry existence for '{}': {}",
+                entry.name,
+                e
+            )
+        })?;
 
         if exists && !params.force {
             return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(

crates/secrets-core/src/service/rollback.rs

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+use std::collections::HashSet;
+
 use anyhow::Result;
 use serde_json::Value;
 use sqlx::PgPool;
@@ -122,7 +124,7 @@ pub async fn run(
         sqlx::query_as(
             "SELECT folder, type, version, action, tags, metadata \
              FROM entries_history \
-             WHERE entry_id = $1 AND version = $2 ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1",
+             WHERE entry_id = $1 AND version = $2 ORDER BY id ASC LIMIT 1",
         )
         .bind(entry_id)
         .bind(ver)
@@ -149,6 +151,9 @@ pub async fn run(
         )
     })?;
 
+    let snap_secret_snapshot = db::entry_secret_snapshot_from_metadata(&snap.metadata);
+    let snap_metadata = db::strip_secret_snapshot_from_metadata(&snap.metadata);
+
     let _ = master_key;
 
     let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;
@@ -176,6 +181,15 @@ pub async fn run(
     .await?;
 
     let live_entry_id = if let Some(ref lr) = live {
+        let history_metadata =
+            match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(&mut tx, lr.id, &lr.metadata).await {
+                Ok(v) => v,
+                Err(e) => {
+                    tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
+                    lr.metadata.clone()
+                }
+            };
+
         if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
             &mut tx,
             db::EntrySnapshotParams {
@@ -187,7 +201,7 @@ pub async fn run(
                 version: lr.version,
                 action: "rollback",
                 tags: &lr.tags,
-                metadata: &lr.metadata,
+                metadata: &history_metadata,
             },
         )
         .await
@@ -228,11 +242,13 @@ pub async fn run(
         }
 
         sqlx::query(
-            "UPDATE entries SET tags = $1, metadata = $2, version = version + 1, \
+            "UPDATE entries SET folder = $1, type = $2, tags = $3, metadata = $4, version = version + 1, \
-             updated_at = NOW() WHERE id = $3",
+             updated_at = NOW() WHERE id = $5",
         )
+        .bind(&snap.folder)
+        .bind(&snap.entry_type)
         .bind(&snap.tags)
-        .bind(&snap.metadata)
+        .bind(&snap_metadata)
         .bind(lr.id)
         .execute(&mut *tx)
         .await?;
@@ -250,7 +266,7 @@ pub async fn run(
             .bind(&snap.entry_type)
             .bind(name)
             .bind(&snap.tags)
-            .bind(&snap.metadata)
+            .bind(&snap_metadata)
             .bind(snap.version)
             .fetch_one(&mut *tx)
             .await?
@@ -264,16 +280,16 @@ pub async fn run(
             .bind(&snap.entry_type)
             .bind(name)
             .bind(&snap.tags)
-            .bind(&snap.metadata)
+            .bind(&snap_metadata)
             .bind(snap.version)
             .fetch_one(&mut *tx)
             .await?
         }
     };
 
-    // In N:N mode, rollback restores entry metadata/tags only.
+    if let Some(secret_snapshot) = snap_secret_snapshot {
-    // Secret snapshots are kept for audit but secret linkage/content is not rewritten here.
+        restore_entry_secrets(&mut tx, live_entry_id, user_id, &secret_snapshot).await?;
-    let _ = live_entry_id;
+    }
 
     crate::audit::log_tx(
         &mut tx,
@@ -298,3 +314,144 @@ pub async fn run(
         restored_version: snap.version,
     })
 }
+
+async fn restore_entry_secrets(
+    tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'_, sqlx::Postgres>,
+    entry_id: Uuid,
+    user_id: Option<Uuid>,
+    snapshot: &[db::EntrySecretSnapshot],
+) -> Result<()> {
+    #[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
+    struct LinkedSecret {
+        id: Uuid,
+        name: String,
+        encrypted: Vec<u8>,
+    }
+
+    let linked: Vec<LinkedSecret> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT s.id, s.name, s.encrypted \
+         FROM entry_secrets es \
+         JOIN secrets s ON s.id = es.secret_id \
+         WHERE es.entry_id = $1",
+    )
+    .bind(entry_id)
+    .fetch_all(&mut **tx)
+    .await?;
+
+    let target_names: HashSet<&str> = snapshot.iter().map(|s| s.name.as_str()).collect();
+
+    for s in &linked {
+        if target_names.contains(s.name.as_str()) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_secret_history(
+            tx,
+            db::SecretSnapshotParams {
+                secret_id: s.id,
+                name: &s.name,
+                encrypted: &s.encrypted,
+                action: "rollback",
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        {
+            tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot secret before rollback unlink");
+        }
+
+        sqlx::query("DELETE FROM entry_secrets WHERE entry_id = $1 AND secret_id = $2")
+            .bind(entry_id)
+            .bind(s.id)
+            .execute(&mut **tx)
+            .await?;
+
+        sqlx::query(
+            "DELETE FROM secrets s \
+             WHERE s.id = $1 \
+               AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM entry_secrets es WHERE es.secret_id = s.id)",
+        )
+        .bind(s.id)
+        .execute(&mut **tx)
+        .await?;
+    }
+
+    for snap in snapshot {
+        let encrypted = ::hex::decode(&snap.encrypted_hex).map_err(|e| {
+            anyhow::anyhow!("invalid secret snapshot data for '{}': {}", snap.name, e)
+        })?;
+
+        #[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
+        struct ExistingSecret {
+            id: Uuid,
+            encrypted: Vec<u8>,
+        }
+
+        let existing: Option<ExistingSecret> = if let Some(uid) = user_id {
+            sqlx::query_as("SELECT id, encrypted FROM secrets WHERE user_id = $1 AND name = $2")
+                .bind(uid)
+                .bind(&snap.name)
+                .fetch_optional(&mut **tx)
+                .await?
+        } else {
+            sqlx::query_as("SELECT id, encrypted FROM secrets WHERE user_id IS NULL AND name = $1")
+                .bind(&snap.name)
+                .fetch_optional(&mut **tx)
+                .await?
+        };
+
+        let secret_id = if let Some(ex) = existing {
+            if ex.encrypted != encrypted
+                && let Err(e) = db::snapshot_secret_history(
+                    tx,
+                    db::SecretSnapshotParams {
+                        secret_id: ex.id,
+                        name: &snap.name,
+                        encrypted: &ex.encrypted,
+                        action: "rollback",
+                    },
+                )
+                .await
+            {
+                tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot secret before rollback restore");
+            }
+            sqlx::query(
+                "UPDATE secrets SET type = $1, encrypted = $2, version = version + 1, updated_at = NOW() \
+                 WHERE id = $3",
+            )
+            .bind(&snap.secret_type)
+            .bind(&encrypted)
+            .bind(ex.id)
+            .execute(&mut **tx)
+            .await?;
+            ex.id
+        } else if let Some(uid) = user_id {
+            sqlx::query_scalar(
+                "INSERT INTO secrets (user_id, name, type, encrypted) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4) RETURNING id",
+            )
+            .bind(uid)
+            .bind(&snap.name)
+            .bind(&snap.secret_type)
+            .bind(&encrypted)
+            .fetch_one(&mut **tx)
+            .await?
+        } else {
+            sqlx::query_scalar(
+                "INSERT INTO secrets (user_id, name, type, encrypted) VALUES (NULL, $1, $2, $3) RETURNING id",
+            )
+            .bind(&snap.name)
+            .bind(&snap.secret_type)
+            .bind(&encrypted)
+            .fetch_one(&mut **tx)
+            .await?
+        };
+
+        sqlx::query(
+            "INSERT INTO entry_secrets (entry_id, secret_id) VALUES ($1, $2) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING",
+        )
+        .bind(entry_id)
+        .bind(secret_id)
+        .execute(&mut **tx)
+        .await?;
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}

crates/secrets-core/src/service/update.rs

@@ -112,6 +112,15 @@ pub async fn run(
         }
     };
 
+    let history_metadata =
+        match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(&mut tx, row.id, &row.metadata).await {
+            Ok(v) => v,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
+                row.metadata.clone()
+            }
+        };
+
     if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
         &mut tx,
         db::EntrySnapshotParams {
@@ -123,7 +132,7 @@ pub async fn run(
             version: row.version,
             action: "update",
             tags: &row.tags,
-            metadata: &row.metadata,
+            metadata: &history_metadata,
         },
     )
     .await
@@ -481,6 +490,15 @@ pub async fn update_fields_by_id(
         }
     };
 
+    let history_metadata =
+        match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(&mut tx, row.id, &row.metadata).await {
+            Ok(v) => v,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
+                row.metadata.clone()
+            }
+        };
+
     if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
         &mut tx,
         db::EntrySnapshotParams {
@@ -492,7 +510,7 @@ pub async fn update_fields_by_id(
             version: row.version,
             action: "update",
             tags: &row.tags,
-            metadata: &row.metadata,
+            metadata: &history_metadata,
         },
     )
     .await

crates/secrets-core/src/service/user.rs

@@ -76,6 +76,52 @@ pub async fn find_or_create_user(pool: &PgPool, profile: OAuthProfile) -> Result
     Ok((user, true))
 }
 
+/// Re-encrypt all of a user's secrets from `old_key` to `new_key` and update the key metadata.
+///
+/// Runs entirely inside a single database transaction: if any secret fails to re-encrypt
+/// the whole operation is rolled back, leaving the database unchanged.
+pub async fn change_user_key(
+    pool: &PgPool,
+    user_id: Uuid,
+    old_key: &[u8; 32],
+    new_key: &[u8; 32],
+    new_salt: &[u8],
+    new_key_check: &[u8],
+    new_key_params: &Value,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;
+
+    let secrets: Vec<(uuid::Uuid, Vec<u8>)> =
+        sqlx::query_as("SELECT id, encrypted FROM secrets WHERE user_id = $1 FOR UPDATE")
+            .bind(user_id)
+            .fetch_all(&mut *tx)
+            .await?;
+
+    for (id, encrypted) in &secrets {
+        let plaintext = crate::crypto::decrypt(old_key, encrypted)?;
+        let new_encrypted = crate::crypto::encrypt(new_key, &plaintext)?;
+        sqlx::query("UPDATE secrets SET encrypted = $1, updated_at = NOW() WHERE id = $2")
+            .bind(&new_encrypted)
+            .bind(id)
+            .execute(&mut *tx)
+            .await?;
+    }
+
+    sqlx::query(
+        "UPDATE users SET key_salt = $1, key_check = $2, key_params = $3, updated_at = NOW() \
+         WHERE id = $4",
+    )
+    .bind(new_salt)
+    .bind(new_key_check)
+    .bind(new_key_params)
+    .bind(user_id)
+    .execute(&mut *tx)
+    .await?;
+
+    tx.commit().await?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 /// Store the PBKDF2 salt, key_check, and params for a user's passphrase setup.
 pub async fn update_user_key_setup(
     pool: &PgPool,
@@ -200,10 +246,14 @@ pub async fn unbind_oauth_account(
         );
     }
 
-    let count: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1")
+    let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;
-        .bind(user_id)
+
-        .fetch_one(pool)
+    let locked_accounts: Vec<(String,)> =
-        .await?;
+        sqlx::query_as("SELECT provider FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1 FOR UPDATE")
+            .bind(user_id)
+            .fetch_all(&mut *tx)
+            .await?;
+    let count = locked_accounts.len();
 
     if count <= 1 {
         anyhow::bail!("Cannot unbind the last OAuth account. Please link another account first.");
@@ -212,8 +262,87 @@ pub async fn unbind_oauth_account(
     sqlx::query("DELETE FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1 AND provider = $2")
         .bind(user_id)
         .bind(provider)
-        .execute(pool)
+        .execute(&mut *tx)
         .await?;
 
+    tx.commit().await?;
+
     Ok(())
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    async fn maybe_test_pool() -> Option<PgPool> {
+        let database_url = match std::env::var("SECRETS_DATABASE_URL") {
+            Ok(v) => v,
+            Err(_) => {
+                eprintln!("skip user service tests: SECRETS_DATABASE_URL not set");
+                return None;
+            }
+        };
+        let pool = match sqlx::PgPool::connect(&database_url).await {
+            Ok(pool) => pool,
+            Err(e) => {
+                eprintln!("skip user service tests: cannot connect to database: {e}");
+                return None;
+            }
+        };
+        if let Err(e) = crate::db::migrate(&pool).await {
+            eprintln!("skip user service tests: migrate failed: {e}");
+            return None;
+        }
+        Some(pool)
+    }
+
+    async fn cleanup_user_rows(pool: &PgPool, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<()> {
+        sqlx::query("DELETE FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1")
+            .bind(user_id)
+            .execute(pool)
+            .await?;
+        sqlx::query("DELETE FROM users WHERE id = $1")
+            .bind(user_id)
+            .execute(pool)
+            .await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn unbind_oauth_account_removes_only_requested_provider() -> Result<()> {
+        let Some(pool) = maybe_test_pool().await else {
+            return Ok(());
+        };
+        let user_id = Uuid::from_u128(rand::random());
+
+        cleanup_user_rows(&pool, user_id).await?;
+
+        sqlx::query("INSERT INTO users (id, name) VALUES ($1, '')")
+            .bind(user_id)
+            .execute(&pool)
+            .await?;
+        sqlx::query(
+            "INSERT INTO oauth_accounts (user_id, provider, provider_id, email, name, avatar_url) \
+             VALUES ($1, 'google', $2, NULL, NULL, NULL), \
+                    ($1, 'github', $3, NULL, NULL, NULL)",
+        )
+        .bind(user_id)
+        .bind(format!("google-{user_id}"))
+        .bind(format!("github-{user_id}"))
+        .execute(&pool)
+        .await?;
+
+        unbind_oauth_account(&pool, user_id, "github", Some("google")).await?;
+
+        let remaining: Vec<(String,)> = sqlx::query_as(
+            "SELECT provider FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1 ORDER BY provider",
+        )
+        .bind(user_id)
+        .fetch_all(&pool)
+        .await?;
+        assert_eq!(remaining, vec![("google".to_string(),)]);
+
+        cleanup_user_rows(&pool, user_id).await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}

crates/secrets-mcp/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "secrets-mcp"
-version = "0.5.4"
+version = "0.5.8"
 edition.workspace = true
 
 [[bin]]

crates/secrets-mcp/src/logging.rs

@@ -1,25 +1,28 @@
-use std::net::SocketAddr;
 use std::time::Instant;
 
 use axum::{
     body::{Body, Bytes, to_bytes},
-    extract::{ConnectInfo, Request},
+    extract::Request,
     http::{
         HeaderMap, Method, StatusCode,
-        header::{CONTENT_LENGTH, CONTENT_TYPE, USER_AGENT},
+        header::{AUTHORIZATION, CONTENT_LENGTH, CONTENT_TYPE, USER_AGENT},
     },
     middleware::Next,
     response::{IntoResponse, Response},
 };
 
+use crate::auth::AuthUser;
+
 /// Axum middleware that logs structured info for every HTTP request.
 ///
 /// All requests: method, path, status, latency_ms, client_ip, user_agent.
 /// POST /mcp requests: additionally parses JSON-RPC body for jsonrpc_method,
-/// tool_name, jsonrpc_id, mcp_session, batch_size.
+/// tool_name, jsonrpc_id, mcp_session, batch_size, tool_args (non-sensitive
+/// arguments only), plus masked auth_key / enc_key fingerprints and user_id
+/// for diagnosing header forwarding issues.
 ///
-/// Sensitive headers (Authorization, X-Encryption-Key) and secret values
+/// Sensitive headers (Authorization, X-Encryption-Key) are never logged in
-/// are never logged.
+/// full — only short fingerprints are emitted.
 pub async fn request_logging_middleware(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
     let method = req.method().clone();
     let path = req.uri().path().to_string();
@@ -33,6 +36,10 @@ pub async fn request_logging_middleware(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
         .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
         .map(|s| s.to_string());
 
+    // Capture header fingerprints before consuming the request.
+    let auth_key = mask_bearer(req.headers());
+    let enc_key = mask_enc_key(req.headers());
+
     let is_mcp_post = path.starts_with("/mcp") && method == Method::POST;
     let is_json = header_str(req.headers(), CONTENT_TYPE)
         .map(|ct| ct.contains("application/json"))
@@ -46,6 +53,11 @@ pub async fn request_logging_middleware(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
         let cap = content_len.unwrap_or(0);
         if cap <= 512 * 1024 {
             let (parts, body) = req.into_parts();
+            // user_id is available after auth middleware has run (injected into extensions).
+            let user_id = parts
+                .extensions
+                .get::<AuthUser>()
+                .map(|a| a.user_id.to_string());
             match to_bytes(body, 512 * 1024).await {
                 Ok(bytes) => {
                     let rpc = parse_jsonrpc_meta(&bytes);
@@ -62,6 +74,9 @@ pub async fn request_logging_middleware(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
                         ua.as_deref(),
                         content_len,
                         mcp_session.as_deref(),
+                        auth_key.as_deref(),
+                        &enc_key,
+                        user_id.as_deref(),
                         &rpc,
                     );
                     return resp;
@@ -78,6 +93,9 @@ pub async fn request_logging_middleware(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
                         ua = ua.as_deref(),
                         content_length = content_len,
                         mcp_session = mcp_session.as_deref(),
+                        auth_key = auth_key.as_deref(),
+                        enc_key = enc_key.as_str(),
+                        user_id = user_id.as_deref(),
                         "mcp request",
                     );
                     return (
@@ -160,6 +178,9 @@ fn log_mcp_request(
     ua: Option<&str>,
     content_length: Option<u64>,
     mcp_session: Option<&str>,
+    auth_key: Option<&str>,
+    enc_key: &str,
+    user_id: Option<&str>,
     rpc: &JsonRpcMeta,
 ) {
     tracing::info!(
@@ -175,18 +196,94 @@ fn log_mcp_request(
         tool = rpc.tool_name.as_deref(),
         jsonrpc_id = rpc.request_id.as_deref(),
         batch_size = rpc.batch_size,
+        tool_args = rpc.tool_args.as_deref(),
+        auth_key,
+        enc_key,
+        user_id,
         "mcp request",
     );
 }
 
+// ── Sensitive header masking ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/// Mask a Bearer token: emit only the first 12 characters followed by `…`.
+/// Returns `None` if the Authorization header is absent or not a Bearer token.
+/// Example: `sk_90c88844e4e5…`
+fn mask_bearer(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Option<String> {
+    let val = headers.get(AUTHORIZATION)?.to_str().ok()?;
+    let token = val.strip_prefix("Bearer ")?.trim();
+    if token.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    if token.len() > 12 {
+        Some(format!("{}…", &token[..12]))
+    } else {
+        Some(token.to_string())
+    }
+}
+
+/// Fingerprint the X-Encryption-Key header.
+///
+/// Emits first 4 chars, last 4 chars, and raw byte length, e.g. `146b…5516(64)`.
+/// Returns `"absent"` when the header is missing. Reveals enough to confirm
+/// which key arrived and whether it was truncated or padded, without revealing
+/// the full value.
+fn mask_enc_key(headers: &HeaderMap) -> String {
+    match headers
+        .get("x-encryption-key")
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+    {
+        Some(val) => {
+            let raw_len = val.len();
+            let t = val.trim();
+            let len = t.len();
+            if len >= 8 {
+                let prefix = &t[..4];
+                let suffix = &t[len - 4..];
+                if raw_len != len {
+                    // Trailing/leading whitespace detected — extra diagnostic.
+                    format!("{prefix}…{suffix}({len}, raw={raw_len})")
+                } else {
+                    format!("{prefix}…{suffix}({len})")
+                }
+            } else {
+                format!("…({len})")
+            }
+        }
+        None => "absent".to_string(),
+    }
+}
+
 // ── JSON-RPC body parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
+/// Safe (non-sensitive) argument keys that may be included verbatim in logs.
+/// Keys NOT in this list (e.g. `secrets`, `secrets_obj`, `meta_obj`,
+/// `encryption_key`) are silently dropped.
+const SAFE_ARG_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
+    "id",
+    "name",
+    "name_query",
+    "folder",
+    "type",
+    "entry_type",
+    "field",
+    "query",
+    "tags",
+    "limit",
+    "offset",
+    "format",
+    "dry_run",
+    "prefix",
+];
+
 #[derive(Debug, Default)]
 struct JsonRpcMeta {
     request_id: Option<String>,
     rpc_method: Option<String>,
     tool_name: Option<String>,
     batch_size: Option<usize>,
+    /// Non-sensitive tool call arguments for diagnostic logging.
+    tool_args: Option<String>,
 }
 
 fn parse_jsonrpc_meta(bytes: &Bytes) -> JsonRpcMeta {
@@ -216,12 +313,47 @@ fn parse_single(value: &serde_json::Value) -> JsonRpcMeta {
         .pointer("/params/name")
         .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
         .map(|s| s.to_string());
+    let tool_args = extract_tool_args(value);
 
     JsonRpcMeta {
         request_id,
         rpc_method,
         tool_name,
         batch_size: None,
+        tool_args,
+    }
+}
+
+/// Extract a compact summary of non-sensitive tool arguments for logging.
+/// Only keys listed in `SAFE_ARG_KEYS` are included.
+fn extract_tool_args(value: &serde_json::Value) -> Option<String> {
+    let args = value.pointer("/params/arguments")?;
+    let obj = args.as_object()?;
+    let pairs: Vec<String> = obj
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|(k, v)| SAFE_ARG_KEYS.contains(&k.as_str()) && !v.is_null())
+        .map(|(k, v)| format!("{}={}", k, summarize_value(v)))
+        .collect();
+    if pairs.is_empty() {
+        None
+    } else {
+        Some(pairs.join(" "))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Produce a short, log-safe representation of a JSON value.
+fn summarize_value(v: &serde_json::Value) -> String {
+    match v {
+        serde_json::Value::String(s) => {
+            if s.len() > 64 {
+                format!("\"{}…\"", &s[..64])
+            } else {
+                format!("\"{s}\"")
+            }
+        }
+        serde_json::Value::Array(arr) => format!("[…{}]", arr.len()),
+        serde_json::Value::Object(_) => "{…}".to_string(),
+        other => other.to_string(),
     }
 }
 
@@ -245,18 +377,5 @@ fn header_str(headers: &HeaderMap, name: impl axum::http::header::AsHeaderName)
 }
 
 fn client_ip(req: &Request) -> Option<String> {
-    if let Some(first) = req
+    crate::client_ip::extract_client_ip(req).into()
-        .headers()
-        .get("x-forwarded-for")
-        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-        .and_then(|s| s.split(',').next())
-    {
-        let s = first.trim();
-        if !s.is_empty() {
-            return Some(s.to_string());
-        }
-    }
-    req.extensions()
-        .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
-        .map(|c| c.ip().to_string())
 }

crates/secrets-mcp/src/main.rs

@@ -187,6 +187,9 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         ))
         .layer(session_layer)
         .layer(cors)
+        .layer(tower_http::limit::RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(
+            10 * 1024 * 1024,
+        ))
         .with_state(app_state);
 
     // ── Start server ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -250,12 +253,26 @@ fn production_allowed_headers() -> [axum::http::HeaderName; 5] {
     ]
 }
 
+/// Production CORS allowed methods.
+///
+/// Keep this list explicit because tower-http rejects
+/// `allow_credentials(true)` together with `allow_methods(Any)`.
+fn production_allowed_methods() -> [axum::http::Method; 5] {
+    [
+        axum::http::Method::GET,
+        axum::http::Method::POST,
+        axum::http::Method::PATCH,
+        axum::http::Method::DELETE,
+        axum::http::Method::OPTIONS,
+    ]
+}
+
 /// Build the CORS layer for the application.
 ///
 /// In production mode the origin is restricted to the BASE_URL origin
 /// (scheme://host:port, path stripped) and credentials are allowed.
-/// `allow_headers` uses an explicit whitelist to avoid the tower-http
+/// `allow_headers` and `allow_methods` use explicit whitelists to avoid the
-/// restriction on `allow_credentials(true)` + `allow_headers(Any)`.
+/// tower-http restriction on `allow_credentials(true)` + wildcards.
 ///
 /// In development mode all origins, methods and headers are allowed.
 fn build_cors_layer(base_url: &str, is_production: bool) -> CorsLayer {
@@ -272,7 +289,7 @@ fn build_cors_layer(base_url: &str, is_production: bool) -> CorsLayer {
         };
         CorsLayer::new()
             .allow_origin(allowed_origin)
-            .allow_methods(Any)
+            .allow_methods(production_allowed_methods())
             .allow_headers(production_allowed_headers())
             .allow_credentials(true)
     } else {
@@ -304,6 +321,16 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(names.contains(&"x-mcp-session"));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn production_cors_methods_include_all_required() {
+        let methods = production_allowed_methods();
+        assert!(methods.contains(&axum::http::Method::GET));
+        assert!(methods.contains(&axum::http::Method::POST));
+        assert!(methods.contains(&axum::http::Method::PATCH));
+        assert!(methods.contains(&axum::http::Method::DELETE));
+        assert!(methods.contains(&axum::http::Method::OPTIONS));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn production_cors_normalizes_base_url_with_path() {
         let url = url::Url::parse("https://secrets.example.com/secrets/app").unwrap();

crates/secrets-mcp/src/tools.rs

@@ -230,15 +230,6 @@ impl SecretsService {
         }
     }
 
-    /// Extract user_id from the HTTP request parts injected by auth middleware.
-    fn user_id_from_ctx(ctx: &RequestContext<RoleServer>) -> Result<Option<Uuid>, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let parts = ctx
-            .extensions
-            .get::<http::request::Parts>()
-            .ok_or_else(mcp_err_missing_http_parts)?;
-        Ok(parts.extensions.get::<AuthUser>().map(|a| a.user_id))
-    }
-
     /// Get the authenticated user_id (returns error if not authenticated).
     fn require_user_id(ctx: &RequestContext<RoleServer>) -> Result<Uuid, rmcp::ErrorData> {
         let parts = ctx
@@ -274,6 +265,18 @@ impl SecretsService {
                 rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_request("Invalid X-Encryption-Key header value", None)
             })?;
         let trimmed = hex_str.trim();
+        // Debug-level fingerprint: helps diagnose header forwarding issues
+        // (e.g. Cursor Chat MCP truncating or transforming the key value)
+        // without revealing the full secret.
+        tracing::debug!(
+            raw_len = hex_str.len(),
+            trimmed_len = trimmed.len(),
+            key_prefix = trimmed.get(..8).unwrap_or(trimmed),
+            key_suffix = trimmed
+                .get(trimmed.len().saturating_sub(8)..)
+                .unwrap_or(trimmed),
+            "X-Encryption-Key received",
+        );
         if trimmed.len() != 64 {
             tracing::warn!(
                 got_len = trimmed.len(),
@@ -298,7 +301,51 @@ impl SecretsService {
             .map_err(mcp_err_invalid_encryption_key_logged)
     }
 
-    /// Require both user_id and encryption key.
+    /// Extract the encryption key, preferring an explicit argument value over
+    /// the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header.
+    ///
+    /// `arg_key` is the optional `encryption_key` field from the tool's input
+    /// struct. When present, it is used directly and the header is ignored.
+    /// This allows MCP clients that cannot reliably forward custom HTTP headers
+    /// (e.g. Cursor Chat) to pass the key as a normal tool argument.
+    fn extract_enc_key_or_arg(
+        ctx: &RequestContext<RoleServer>,
+        arg_key: Option<&str>,
+    ) -> Result<[u8; 32], rmcp::ErrorData> {
+        if let Some(hex_str) = arg_key {
+            let trimmed = hex_str.trim();
+            tracing::debug!(
+                source = "argument",
+                raw_len = hex_str.len(),
+                trimmed_len = trimmed.len(),
+                key_prefix = trimmed.get(..8).unwrap_or(trimmed),
+                key_suffix = trimmed
+                    .get(trimmed.len().saturating_sub(8)..)
+                    .unwrap_or(trimmed),
+                "X-Encryption-Key received",
+            );
+            if trimmed.len() != 64 {
+                return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_request(
+                    format!(
+                        "encryption_key must be exactly 64 hex characters (32-byte key), got {}.",
+                        trimmed.len()
+                    ),
+                    None,
+                ));
+            }
+            if !trimmed.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
+                return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_request(
+                    "encryption_key contains non-hexadecimal characters.",
+                    None,
+                ));
+            }
+            return secrets_core::crypto::extract_key_from_hex(trimmed)
+                .map_err(mcp_err_invalid_encryption_key_logged);
+        }
+        Self::extract_enc_key(ctx)
+    }
+
+    /// Require both user_id and encryption key (header only, no arg fallback).
     fn require_user_and_key(
         ctx: &RequestContext<RoleServer>,
     ) -> Result<(Uuid, [u8; 32]), rmcp::ErrorData> {
@@ -306,6 +353,17 @@ impl SecretsService {
         let key = Self::extract_enc_key(ctx)?;
         Ok((user_id, key))
     }
+
+    /// Require both user_id and encryption key, preferring an explicit argument
+    /// value over the X-Encryption-Key header.
+    fn require_user_and_key_or_arg(
+        ctx: &RequestContext<RoleServer>,
+        arg_key: Option<&str>,
+    ) -> Result<(Uuid, [u8; 32]), rmcp::ErrorData> {
+        let user_id = Self::require_user_id(ctx)?;
+        let key = Self::extract_enc_key_or_arg(ctx, arg_key)?;
+        Ok((user_id, key))
+    }
 }
 
 // ── Tool parameter types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -379,6 +437,10 @@ struct GetSecretInput {
     id: String,
     #[schemars(description = "Specific field to retrieve. If omitted, returns all fields.")]
     field: Option<String>,
+    #[schemars(description = "Encryption key as a 64-char hex string. \
+        If provided, takes priority over the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header. \
+        Use this when the MCP client cannot reliably forward custom headers.")]
+    encryption_key: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
@@ -425,6 +487,10 @@ struct AddInput {
     )]
     #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
     link_secret_names: Option<Vec<String>>,
+    #[schemars(description = "Encryption key as a 64-char hex string. \
+        If provided, takes priority over the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header. \
+        Use this when the MCP client cannot reliably forward custom headers.")]
+    encryption_key: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
@@ -486,6 +552,10 @@ struct UpdateInput {
     )]
     #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
     unlink_secret_names: Option<Vec<String>>,
+    #[schemars(description = "Encryption key as a 64-char hex string. \
+        If provided, takes priority over the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header. \
+        Use this when the MCP client cannot reliably forward custom headers.")]
+    encryption_key: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
@@ -558,6 +628,10 @@ struct ExportInput {
     query: Option<String>,
     #[schemars(description = "Export format: 'json' (default), 'toml', 'yaml'")]
     format: Option<String>,
+    #[schemars(description = "Encryption key as a 64-char hex string. \
+        If provided, takes priority over the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header. \
+        Use this when the MCP client cannot reliably forward custom headers.")]
+    encryption_key: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
@@ -581,6 +655,10 @@ struct EnvMapInput {
         Example: entry 'aliyun', field 'access_key_id' → ALIYUN_ACCESS_KEY_ID \
         (or PREFIX_ALIYUN_ACCESS_KEY_ID with prefix set).")]
     prefix: Option<String>,
+    #[schemars(description = "Encryption key as a 64-char hex string. \
+        If provided, takes priority over the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header. \
+        Use this when the MCP client cannot reliably forward custom headers.")]
+    encryption_key: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
@@ -885,7 +963,8 @@ impl SecretsService {
         ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
         let t = Instant::now();
-        let (user_id, user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
+        let (user_id, user_key) =
+            Self::require_user_and_key_or_arg(&ctx, input.encryption_key.as_deref())?;
         let entry_id = parse_uuid(&input.id)?;
         tracing::info!(
             tool = "secrets_get",
@@ -939,7 +1018,8 @@ impl SecretsService {
         ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
         let t = Instant::now();
-        let (user_id, user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
+        let (user_id, user_key) =
+            Self::require_user_and_key_or_arg(&ctx, input.encryption_key.as_deref())?;
         tracing::info!(
             tool = "secrets_add",
             ?user_id,
@@ -1033,7 +1113,8 @@ impl SecretsService {
         ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
         let t = Instant::now();
-        let (user_id, user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
+        let (user_id, user_key) =
+            Self::require_user_and_key_or_arg(&ctx, input.encryption_key.as_deref())?;
         tracing::info!(
             tool = "secrets_update",
             ?user_id,
@@ -1142,7 +1223,7 @@ impl SecretsService {
         ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
         let t = Instant::now();
-        let user_id = Self::user_id_from_ctx(&ctx)?;
+        let user_id = Self::require_user_id(&ctx)?;
 
         // Safety: require at least one filter.
         if input.id.is_none()
@@ -1172,9 +1253,9 @@ impl SecretsService {
             if let Some(ref id_str) = input.id {
                 let eid = parse_uuid(id_str)?;
                 let uid = user_id;
-                let entry = resolve_entry_by_id(&self.pool, eid, uid)
+                let entry = resolve_entry_by_id(&self.pool, eid, Some(uid))
                     .await
-                    .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_delete", uid, e))?;
+                    .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_delete", Some(uid), e))?;
                 (Some(entry.name), Some(entry.folder))
             } else {
                 (input.name.clone(), input.folder.clone())
@@ -1187,11 +1268,11 @@ impl SecretsService {
                 folder: effective_folder.as_deref(),
                 entry_type: input.entry_type.as_deref(),
                 dry_run: input.dry_run.unwrap_or(false),
-                user_id,
+                user_id: Some(user_id),
             },
         )
         .await
-        .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_delete", user_id, e))?;
+        .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_delete", Some(user_id), e))?;
 
         tracing::info!(
             tool = "secrets_delete",
@@ -1218,7 +1299,7 @@ impl SecretsService {
         ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
         let t = Instant::now();
-        let user_id = Self::user_id_from_ctx(&ctx)?;
+        let user_id = Self::require_user_id(&ctx)?;
         tracing::info!(
             tool = "secrets_history",
             ?user_id,
@@ -1230,9 +1311,9 @@ impl SecretsService {
         let (resolved_name, resolved_folder): (String, Option<String>) =
             if let Some(ref id_str) = input.id {
                 let eid = parse_uuid(id_str)?;
-                let entry = resolve_entry_by_id(&self.pool, eid, user_id)
+                let entry = resolve_entry_by_id(&self.pool, eid, Some(user_id))
                     .await
-                    .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_history", user_id, e))?;
+                    .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_history", Some(user_id), e))?;
                 (entry.name, Some(entry.folder))
             } else {
                 (input.name.clone(), input.folder.clone())
@@ -1243,10 +1324,10 @@ impl SecretsService {
             &resolved_name,
             resolved_folder.as_deref(),
             input.limit.unwrap_or(20),
-            user_id,
+            Some(user_id),
         )
         .await
-        .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_history", user_id, e))?;
+        .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_history", Some(user_id), e))?;
 
         tracing::info!(
             tool = "secrets_history",
@@ -1327,7 +1408,8 @@ impl SecretsService {
         ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
         let t = Instant::now();
-        let (user_id, user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
+        let (user_id, user_key) =
+            Self::require_user_and_key_or_arg(&ctx, input.encryption_key.as_deref())?;
         let tags = input.tags.unwrap_or_default();
         let format = input.format.as_deref().unwrap_or("json");
         tracing::info!(
@@ -1396,7 +1478,8 @@ impl SecretsService {
         ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
         let t = Instant::now();
-        let (user_id, user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
+        let (user_id, user_key) =
+            Self::require_user_and_key_or_arg(&ctx, input.encryption_key.as_deref())?;
         let tags = input.tags.unwrap_or_default();
         let only_fields = input.only_fields.unwrap_or_default();
         tracing::info!(

crates/secrets-mcp/src/web.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 use askama::Template;
 use chrono::SecondsFormat;
-use std::net::SocketAddr;
+use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr};
 
 use axum::{
     Json, Router,
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ use secrets_core::service::{
     search::{SearchParams, count_entries, fetch_secret_schemas, ilike_pattern, list_entries},
     update::{UpdateEntryFieldsByIdParams, update_fields_by_id},
     user::{
-        OAuthProfile, bind_oauth_account, find_or_create_user, get_user_by_id,
+        OAuthProfile, bind_oauth_account, change_user_key, find_or_create_user, get_user_by_id,
         unbind_oauth_account, update_user_key_setup,
     },
 };
@@ -176,14 +176,33 @@ async fn current_user_id(session: &Session) -> Option<Uuid> {
 }
 
 fn request_client_ip(headers: &HeaderMap, connect_info: ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>) -> Option<String> {
-    if let Some(first) = headers
+    let trust_proxy = std::env::var("TRUST_PROXY")
-        .get("x-forwarded-for")
+        .as_deref()
-        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .is_ok_and(|v| matches!(v, "1" | "true" | "yes"));
-        .and_then(|s| s.split(',').next())
+    request_client_ip_with_trust_proxy(headers, connect_info, trust_proxy)
-    {
+}
-        let value = first.trim();
+
-        if !value.is_empty() {
+fn request_client_ip_with_trust_proxy(
-            return Some(value.to_string());
+    headers: &HeaderMap,
+    connect_info: ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
+    trust_proxy: bool,
+) -> Option<String> {
+    if trust_proxy {
+        if let Some(first) = headers
+            .get("x-forwarded-for")
+            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+            .and_then(|s| s.split(',').next())
+        {
+            let value = first.trim();
+            if let Ok(ip) = value.parse::<IpAddr>() {
+                return Some(ip.to_string());
+            }
+        }
+        if let Some(value) = headers.get("x-real-ip").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()) {
+            let value = value.trim();
+            if let Ok(ip) = value.parse::<IpAddr>() {
+                return Some(ip.to_string());
+            }
         }
     }
 
@@ -234,13 +253,10 @@ pub fn web_router() -> Router<AppState> {
         .route("/entries", get(entries_page))
         .route("/audit", get(audit_page))
         .route("/account/bind/google", get(account_bind_google))
-        .route(
-            "/account/bind/google/callback",
-            get(account_bind_google_callback),
-        )
         .route("/account/unbind/{provider}", post(account_unbind))
         .route("/api/key-salt", get(api_key_salt))
         .route("/api/key-setup", post(api_key_setup))
+        .route("/api/key-change", post(api_key_change))
         .route("/api/apikey", get(api_apikey_get))
         .route("/api/apikey/regenerate", post(api_apikey_regenerate))
         .route(
@@ -909,14 +925,9 @@ async fn account_bind_google(
             StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
         })?;
 
-    let redirect_uri = format!("{}/account/bind/google/callback", state.base_url);
+    let config = google_cfg(&state).ok_or(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE)?;
-    let mut cfg = state
+    let oauth_state = random_state();
-        .google_config
+    if let Err(e) = session.insert(SESSION_OAUTH_STATE, &oauth_state).await {
-        .clone()
-        .ok_or(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE)?;
-    cfg.redirect_uri = redirect_uri;
-    let st = random_state();
-    if let Err(e) = session.insert(SESSION_OAUTH_STATE, &st).await {
         tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to insert oauth_state for account bind flow");
         if let Err(rm) = session.remove::<bool>(SESSION_OAUTH_BIND_MODE).await {
             tracing::warn!(error = %rm, "failed to roll back oauth_bind_mode after oauth_state insert failure");
@@ -924,34 +935,8 @@ async fn account_bind_google(
         return Err(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR);
     }
 
-    Ok(Redirect::to(&google_auth_url(&cfg, &st)).into_response())
+    let url = google_auth_url(config, &oauth_state);
-}
+    Ok(Redirect::to(&url).into_response())
-
-async fn account_bind_google_callback(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    connect_info: ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
-    headers: HeaderMap,
-    session: Session,
-    Query(params): Query<OAuthCallbackQuery>,
-) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
-    let client_ip = request_client_ip(&headers, connect_info);
-    let user_agent = request_user_agent(&headers);
-    handle_oauth_callback(
-        &state,
-        &session,
-        params,
-        "google",
-        client_ip.as_deref(),
-        user_agent.as_deref(),
-        |s, cfg, code| {
-            Box::pin(crate::oauth::google::exchange_code(
-                &s.http_client,
-                cfg,
-                code,
-            ))
-        },
-    )
-    .await
 }
 
 async fn account_unbind(
@@ -1056,6 +1041,20 @@ async fn api_key_setup(
         .await
         .ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
 
+    // Guard: if a passphrase is already configured, reject and direct to /api/key-change
+    let user = get_user_by_id(&state.pool, user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to load user for key-setup guard");
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?
+        .ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
+
+    if user.key_salt.is_some() {
+        tracing::warn!(%user_id, "key-setup called but passphrase already configured; use /api/key-change");
+        return Err(StatusCode::CONFLICT);
+    }
+
     let salt = hex::decode_hex(&body.salt).map_err(|e| {
         tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid hex in key-setup salt");
         StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
@@ -1080,6 +1079,103 @@ async fn api_key_setup(
     Ok(Json(KeySetupResponse { ok: true }))
 }
 
+// ── Change passphrase (re-encrypts all secrets) ───────────────────────────────
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+struct KeyChangeRequest {
+    /// Old derived key as 64-char hex — used to decrypt existing secrets
+    old_key: String,
+    /// New derived key as 64-char hex — used to re-encrypt secrets
+    new_key: String,
+    /// New 32-byte hex salt
+    salt: String,
+    /// New key_check: AES-256-GCM of KEY_CHECK_PLAINTEXT with the new key (hex)
+    key_check: String,
+    /// New key derivation parameters
+    params: serde_json::Value,
+}
+
+async fn api_key_change(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+    Json(body): Json<KeyChangeRequest>,
+) -> Result<Json<KeySetupResponse>, StatusCode> {
+    let user_id = current_user_id(&session)
+        .await
+        .ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
+
+    let user = get_user_by_id(&state.pool, user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to load user for key-change");
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?
+        .ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
+
+    // Must have an existing passphrase to change
+    let existing_key_check = user.key_check.ok_or_else(|| {
+        tracing::warn!(%user_id, "key-change called but no passphrase configured; use /api/key-setup");
+        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
+    })?;
+
+    // Validate and decode old key
+    let old_key_bytes = secrets_core::crypto::extract_key_from_hex(&body.old_key).map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid old_key hex in key-change");
+        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
+    })?;
+
+    // Verify old_key against the stored key_check
+    let plaintext = secrets_core::crypto::decrypt(&old_key_bytes, &existing_key_check).map_err(|_| {
+        tracing::warn!(%user_id, "key-change rejected: old_key does not match stored key_check");
+        StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
+    })?;
+    if plaintext != b"secrets-mcp-key-check" {
+        tracing::warn!(%user_id, "key-change rejected: decrypted key_check content mismatch");
+        return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+    }
+
+    // Validate and decode new key
+    let new_key_bytes = secrets_core::crypto::extract_key_from_hex(&body.new_key).map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid new_key hex in key-change");
+        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
+    })?;
+
+    // Decode new salt and key_check
+    let new_salt = hex::decode_hex(&body.salt).map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid hex in key-change salt");
+        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
+    })?;
+    if new_salt.len() != 32 {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            salt_len = new_salt.len(),
+            "key-change salt must be 32 bytes"
+        );
+        return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+    }
+    let new_key_check = hex::decode_hex(&body.key_check).map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid hex in key-change key_check");
+        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
+    })?;
+
+    change_user_key(
+        &state.pool,
+        user_id,
+        &old_key_bytes,
+        &new_key_bytes,
+        &new_salt,
+        &new_key_check,
+        &body.params,
+    )
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to change user key");
+        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+    })?;
+
+    tracing::info!(%user_id, secrets_count = "(see service log)", "passphrase changed and secrets re-encrypted");
+    Ok(Json(KeySetupResponse { ok: true }))
+}
+
 // ── API Key management ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 #[derive(Serialize)]
@@ -1742,6 +1838,34 @@ fn format_audit_target(folder: &str, entry_type: &str, name: &str) -> String {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    #[test]
+    fn request_client_ip_ignores_forwarded_headers_without_trusted_proxy() {
+        let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+        headers.insert("x-forwarded-for", "203.0.113.10".parse().unwrap());
+
+        let ip = request_client_ip_with_trust_proxy(
+            &headers,
+            ConnectInfo(SocketAddr::from(([127, 0, 0, 1], 9315))),
+            false,
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(ip.as_deref(), Some("127.0.0.1"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn request_client_ip_uses_valid_forwarded_header_with_trusted_proxy() {
+        let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+        headers.insert("x-forwarded-for", "203.0.113.10, 10.0.0.1".parse().unwrap());
+
+        let ip = request_client_ip_with_trust_proxy(
+            &headers,
+            ConnectInfo(SocketAddr::from(([127, 0, 0, 1], 9315))),
+            true,
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(ip.as_deref(), Some("203.0.113.10"));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn request_ui_lang_prefers_zh_cn_over_en_fallback() {
         let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();

crates/secrets-mcp/templates/dashboard.html

@@ -305,6 +305,17 @@
 <div class="modal-bd" id="change-modal">
     <div class="modal">
         <h3 data-i18n="changeTitle">更换密码</h3>
+        <div class="field">
+            <label data-i18n="labelCurrent">当前密码</label>
+            <div class="pw-field">
+                <input type="password" id="change-pass-old" data-i18n-ph="phCurrent" autocomplete="current-password">
+                <button type="button" class="pw-toggle" data-target="change-pass-old" aria-pressed="false"
+                        onclick="togglePwVisibility(this)" aria-label="">
+                    <span class="pw-icon pw-icon-show" aria-hidden="true"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="18" height="18" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><path d="M1 12s4-8 11-8 11 8 11 8-4 8-11 8-11-8-11-8z"/><circle cx="12" cy="12" r="3"/></svg></span>
+                    <span class="pw-icon pw-icon-hide hidden" aria-hidden="true"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="18" height="18" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><path d="M17.94 17.94A10.07 10.07 0 0 1 12 20c-7 0-11-8-11-8a18.45 18.45 0 0 1 5.06-5.94M9.9 4.24A9.12 9.12 0 0 1 12 4c7 0 11 8 11 8a18.5 18.5 0 0 1-2.16 3.19m-6.72-1.07a3 3 0 1 1-4.24-4.24"/><line x1="1" y1="1" x2="23" y2="23"/></svg></span>
+                </button>
+            </div>
+        </div>
         <div class="field">
             <label data-i18n="labelNew">新密码</label>
             <div class="pw-field">
@@ -345,8 +356,10 @@ const T = {
         labelPassphrase: '加密密码',
         labelConfirm: '确认密码',
         labelNew: '新密码',
+        labelCurrent: '当前密码',
         phPassphrase: '输入密码…',
         phConfirm: '再次输入…',
+        phCurrent: '输入当前密码…',
         btnSetup: '设置并获取配置',
         btnUnlock: '解锁并获取配置',
         setupNote: '密码不会上传服务器。遗忘后数据将无法恢复。',
@@ -354,6 +367,7 @@ const T = {
         errShort: '密码至少需要 8 个字符。',
         errMismatch: '两次输入不一致。',
         errWrong: '密码错误，请重试。',
+        errWrongOld: '当前密码错误，请重试。',
         unlockedTitle: 'MCP 配置',
         tabMcp: 'Cursor、Claude Code、Codex、Gemini CLI',
         tabOpencode: 'OpenCode',
@@ -379,8 +393,10 @@ const T = {
         labelPassphrase: '加密密碼',
         labelConfirm: '確認密碼',
         labelNew: '新密碼',
+        labelCurrent: '目前密碼',
         phPassphrase: '輸入密碼…',
         phConfirm: '再次輸入…',
+        phCurrent: '輸入目前密碼…',
         btnSetup: '設定並取得設定',
         btnUnlock: '解鎖並取得設定',
         setupNote: '密碼不會上傳伺服器。遺忘後資料將無法復原。',
@@ -388,6 +404,7 @@ const T = {
         errShort: '密碼至少需要 8 個字元。',
         errMismatch: '兩次輸入不一致。',
         errWrong: '密碼錯誤，請重試。',
+        errWrongOld: '目前密碼錯誤，請重試。',
         unlockedTitle: 'MCP 設定',
         tabMcp: 'Cursor、Claude Code、Codex、Gemini CLI',
         tabOpencode: 'OpenCode',
@@ -413,8 +430,10 @@ const T = {
         labelPassphrase: 'Encryption password',
         labelConfirm: 'Confirm password',
         labelNew: 'New password',
+        labelCurrent: 'Current password',
         phPassphrase: 'Enter password…',
         phConfirm: 'Repeat password…',
+        phCurrent: 'Enter current password…',
         btnSetup: 'Set up & get config',
         btnUnlock: 'Unlock & get config',
         setupNote: 'Your password never leaves this device. If forgotten, encrypted data cannot be recovered.',
@@ -422,6 +441,7 @@ const T = {
         errShort: 'Password must be at least 8 characters.',
         errMismatch: 'Passwords do not match.',
         errWrong: 'Incorrect password, please try again.',
+        errWrongOld: 'Current password is incorrect, please try again.',
         unlockedTitle: 'MCP Config',
         tabMcp: 'Cursor, Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI',
         tabOpencode: 'OpenCode',
@@ -832,14 +852,16 @@ async function confirmRegenerate() {
 // ── Change passphrase modal ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 function openChangeModal() {
+    document.getElementById('change-pass-old').value = '';
     document.getElementById('change-pass1').value = '';
     document.getElementById('change-pass2').value = '';
+    document.getElementById('change-pass-old').type = 'password';
     document.getElementById('change-pass1').type = 'password';
     document.getElementById('change-pass2').type = 'password';
     document.getElementById('change-error').style.display = 'none';
     document.getElementById('change-modal').classList.add('open');
     syncPwToggleI18n();
-    setTimeout(() => document.getElementById('change-pass1').focus(), 50);
+    setTimeout(() => document.getElementById('change-pass-old').focus(), 50);
 }
 
 function closeChangeModal() {
@@ -847,11 +869,13 @@ function closeChangeModal() {
 }
 
 async function doChange() {
+    const passOld = document.getElementById('change-pass-old').value;
     const pass1 = document.getElementById('change-pass1').value;
     const pass2 = document.getElementById('change-pass2').value;
     const errEl = document.getElementById('change-error');
     errEl.style.display = 'none';
 
+    if (!passOld) { showErr(errEl, t('errEmpty')); return; }
     if (!pass1) { showErr(errEl, t('errEmpty')); return; }
     if (pass1.length < 8) { showErr(errEl, t('errShort')); return; }
     if (pass1 !== pass2) { showErr(errEl, t('errMismatch')); return; }
@@ -860,24 +884,39 @@ async function doChange() {
     btn.disabled = true;
     btn.innerHTML = '<span class="spinner" style="border-top-color:#0d1117"></span>';
     try {
-        const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));
+        // Fetch current salt to derive old key for verification
-        const cryptoKey = await deriveKey(pass1, salt, true);
+        const saltResp = await fetchAuth('/api/key-salt');
-        const keyCheckHex = await encryptKeyCheck(cryptoKey);
+        if (!saltResp.ok) throw new Error('HTTP ' + saltResp.status);
-        const hexKey = await exportKeyHex(cryptoKey);
+        const saltData = await saltResp.json();
+        if (!saltData.has_passphrase) throw new Error('No passphrase configured');
 
-        const resp = await fetchAuth('/api/key-setup', {
+        // Derive old key and verify it
+        const oldCryptoKey = await deriveKey(passOld, hexToBytes(saltData.salt), true);
+        const validOld = await verifyKeyCheck(oldCryptoKey, saltData.key_check);
+        if (!validOld) { showErr(errEl, t('errWrongOld')); return; }
+        const oldHexKey = await exportKeyHex(oldCryptoKey);
+
+        // Derive new key
+        const newSalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));
+        const newCryptoKey = await deriveKey(pass1, newSalt, true);
+        const newKeyCheckHex = await encryptKeyCheck(newCryptoKey);
+        const newHexKey = await exportKeyHex(newCryptoKey);
+
+        const resp = await fetchAuth('/api/key-change', {
             method: 'POST',
             headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
             body: JSON.stringify({
-                salt: bytesToHex(salt),
+                old_key: oldHexKey,
-                key_check: keyCheckHex,
+                new_key: newHexKey,
+                salt: bytesToHex(newSalt),
+                key_check: newKeyCheckHex,
                 params: { alg: 'pbkdf2-sha256', iterations: PBKDF2_ITERATIONS }
             })
         });
         if (!resp.ok) throw new Error('HTTP ' + resp.status);
 
-        currentEncKey = hexKey;
+        currentEncKey = newHexKey;
-        sessionStorage.setItem('enc_key', hexKey);
+        sessionStorage.setItem('enc_key', newHexKey);
         renderRealConfig();
         closeChangeModal();
     } catch (e) {

deploy/.env.example

@@ -30,3 +30,24 @@ GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=
 
 # ─── 日志（可选）──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # RUST_LOG=secrets_mcp=debug
+
+# ─── 数据库连接池（可选）──────────────────────────────────────────────
+# 最大连接数，默认 10
+# SECRETS_DATABASE_POOL_SIZE=10
+# 获取连接超时秒数，默认 5
+# SECRETS_DATABASE_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT=5
+
+# ─── 限流（可选）──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# 全局限流速率（req/s），默认 100
+# RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_PER_SECOND=100
+# 全局限流突发量，默认 200
+# RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_BURST=200
+# 单 IP 限流速率（req/s），默认 20
+# RATE_LIMIT_IP_PER_SECOND=20
+# 单 IP 限流突发量，默认 40
+# RATE_LIMIT_IP_BURST=40
+
+# ─── 代理信任（可选）─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# 设为 1/true/yes 时从 X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP 提取客户端 IP
+# 仅在反代环境下启用，否则客户端可伪造 IP 绕过限流
+# TRUST_PROXY=1

scripts/sync-test-to-prod.sh

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# 同步测试环境数据到生产环境
-# 用法: ./scripts/sync-test-to-prod.sh
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-# PostgreSQL 客户端工具路径 (Homebrew libpq)
-export PATH="/opt/homebrew/opt/libpq/bin:$PATH"
-
-# SSL 配置
-export PGSSLMODE=verify-full
-export PGSSLROOTCERT=/etc/ssl/cert.pem
-
-# 测试环境
-TEST_DB="postgres://postgres:Voson_2026_Pg18!@db.refining.ltd:5432/secrets-nn-test"
-
-# 生产环境
-PROD_DB="postgres://postgres:Voson_2026_Pg18!@db.refining.ltd:5432/secrets-nn-prod"
-
-echo "========================================="
-echo "  测试环境 -> 生产环境 数据同步"
-echo "========================================="
-echo ""
-
-# 确认操作
-read -p "⚠️  此操作将覆盖生产环境数据,确认继续? (yes/no): " confirm
-if [ "$confirm" != "yes" ]; then
-    echo "已取消"
-    exit 0
-fi
-
-echo ""
-echo "步骤 1/4: 导出测试环境数据..."
-TEMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
-trap "rm -rf $TEMP_DIR" EXIT
-
-# 导出测试环境数据(不含审计日志和历史记录)
-pg_dump "$TEST_DB" \
-    --table=entries \
-    --table=secrets \
-    --table=entry_secrets \
-    --table=users \
-    --table=oauth_accounts \
-    --data-only \
-    --column-inserts \
-    --no-owner \
-    --no-privileges \
-    > "$TEMP_DIR/test_data.sql"
-
-echo "✓ 测试数据已导出到临时文件"
-echo "  文件大小: $(du -h "$TEMP_DIR/test_data.sql" | cut -f1)"
-
-echo ""
-echo "步骤 2/4: 备份当前生产数据..."
-pg_dump "$PROD_DB" \
-    --table=entries \
-    --table=secrets \
-    --table=entry_secrets \
-    --table=users \
-    --table=oauth_accounts \
-    --data-only \
-    --column-inserts \
-    --no-owner \
-    --no-privileges \
-    > "$TEMP_DIR/prod_backup_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S).sql"
-
-echo "✓ 生产数据已备份"
-
-echo ""
-echo "步骤 3/4: 清空生产环境目标表..."
-psql "$PROD_DB" <<'SQL'
-TRUNCATE TABLE entry_secrets CASCADE;
-TRUNCATE TABLE secrets CASCADE;
-TRUNCATE TABLE entries CASCADE;
-SQL
-
-echo "✓ 生产环境目标表已清空"
-
-echo ""
-echo "步骤 4/4: 导入测试数据到生产环境..."
-psql "$PROD_DB" -f "$TEMP_DIR/test_data.sql" 2>&1 | tail -20
-
-echo ""
-echo "验证数据..."
-echo "生产环境数据统计:"
-psql "$PROD_DB" -c "SELECT 'users' as table_name, count(*) FROM users UNION ALL SELECT 'entries', count(*) FROM entries UNION ALL SELECT 'secrets', count(*) FROM secrets UNION ALL SELECT 'entry_secrets', count(*) FROM entry_secrets UNION ALL SELECT 'oauth_accounts', count(*) FROM oauth_accounts ORDER BY table_name;"
-
-echo ""
-echo "========================================="
-echo "  ✓ 数据同步完成!"
-echo "========================================="
-echo ""
-echo "提示:"
-echo "  - 生产数据备份已保存在临时目录"
-echo "  - 临时文件将在脚本退出后自动删除"