secrets/crates/secrets-mcp/src/web/account.rs

use askama::Template;
use axum::{Json, extract::State, http::StatusCode, response::Response};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use tower_sessions::Session;

use secrets_core::crypto::hex;
use secrets_core::service::{
    api_key::{ensure_api_key, regenerate_api_key},
    user::{change_user_key, get_user_by_id, update_user_key_setup},
};

use crate::AppState;

use super::{SESSION_KEY_VERSION, load_session_user_strict, render_template, require_valid_user};

#[derive(Template)]
#[template(path = "dashboard.html")]
struct DashboardTemplate {
    user_name: String,
    user_email: String,
    has_passphrase: bool,
    base_url: String,
    version: &'static str,
}

#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct KeySaltResponse {
    has_passphrase: bool,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    salt: Option<String>,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    key_check: Option<String>,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    params: Option<serde_json::Value>,
}

#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub(super) struct KeySetupRequest {
    /// Hex-encoded 32-byte random salt
    salt: String,
    /// Hex-encoded AES-256-GCM encryption of "secrets-mcp-key-check" with the derived key
    key_check: String,
    /// Key derivation parameters, e.g. {"alg":"pbkdf2-sha256","iterations":600000}
    params: serde_json::Value,
}

#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct KeySetupResponse {
    ok: bool,
}

#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub(super) struct KeyChangeRequest {
    /// Old derived key as 64-char hex — used to decrypt existing secrets
    old_key: String,
    /// New derived key as 64-char hex — used to re-encrypt secrets
    new_key: String,
    /// New 32-byte hex salt
    salt: String,
    /// New key_check: AES-256-GCM of KEY_CHECK_PLAINTEXT with the new key (hex)
    key_check: String,
    /// New key derivation parameters
    params: serde_json::Value,
}

#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct ApiKeyResponse {
    api_key: String,
}

pub(super) async fn dashboard(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    session: Session,
) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
    let user = match require_valid_user(&state.pool, &session, "dashboard").await {
        Ok(u) => u,
        Err(r) => return Ok(r),
    };

    let tmpl = DashboardTemplate {
        user_name: user.name.clone(),
        user_email: user.email.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
        has_passphrase: user.key_salt.is_some(),
        base_url: state.base_url.clone(),
        version: env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
    };

    render_template(tmpl)
}

pub(super) async fn api_key_salt(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    session: Session,
) -> Result<Json<KeySaltResponse>, StatusCode> {
    let user = match load_session_user_strict(&state.pool, &session).await {
        Ok(Some(u)) => u,
        Ok(None) => return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED),
        Err(()) => return Err(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR),
    };

    if user.key_salt.is_none() {
        return Ok(Json(KeySaltResponse {
            has_passphrase: false,
            salt: None,
            key_check: None,
            params: None,
        }));
    }

    Ok(Json(KeySaltResponse {
        has_passphrase: true,
        salt: user.key_salt.as_deref().map(hex::encode_hex),
        key_check: user.key_check.as_deref().map(hex::encode_hex),
        params: user.key_params,
    }))
}

pub(super) async fn api_key_setup(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    session: Session,
    Json(body): Json<KeySetupRequest>,
) -> Result<Json<KeySetupResponse>, StatusCode> {
    let user = match load_session_user_strict(&state.pool, &session).await {
        Ok(Some(u)) => u,
        Ok(None) => return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED),
        Err(()) => return Err(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR),
    };
    let user_id = user.id;

    // Guard: if a passphrase is already configured, reject and direct to /api/key-change
    if user.key_salt.is_some() {
        tracing::warn!(%user_id, "key-setup called but passphrase already configured; use /api/key-change");
        return Err(StatusCode::CONFLICT);
    }

    let salt = hex::decode_hex(&body.salt).map_err(|e| {
        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid hex in key-setup salt");
        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
    })?;
    let key_check = hex::decode_hex(&body.key_check).map_err(|e| {
        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid hex in key-setup key_check");
        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
    })?;

    if salt.len() != 32 {
        tracing::warn!(salt_len = salt.len(), "key-setup salt must be 32 bytes");
        return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
    }

    update_user_key_setup(&state.pool, user_id, &salt, &key_check, &body.params)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| {
            tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to update key setup");
            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
        })?;

    Ok(Json(KeySetupResponse { ok: true }))
}

// ── Change passphrase (re-encrypts all secrets) ───────────────────────────────

pub(super) async fn api_key_change(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    session: Session,
    Json(body): Json<KeyChangeRequest>,
) -> Result<Json<KeySetupResponse>, StatusCode> {
    let user = match load_session_user_strict(&state.pool, &session).await {
        Ok(Some(u)) => u,
        Ok(None) => return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED),
        Err(()) => return Err(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR),
    };
    let user_id = user.id;

    // Must have an existing passphrase to change
    let existing_key_check = user.key_check.ok_or_else(|| {
        tracing::warn!(%user_id, "key-change called but no passphrase configured; use /api/key-setup");
        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
    })?;

    // Validate and decode old key
    let old_key_bytes = secrets_core::crypto::extract_key_from_hex(&body.old_key).map_err(|e| {
        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid old_key hex in key-change");
        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
    })?;

    // Verify old_key against the stored key_check
    let plaintext = secrets_core::crypto::decrypt(&old_key_bytes, &existing_key_check).map_err(|_| {
        tracing::warn!(%user_id, "key-change rejected: old_key does not match stored key_check");
        StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
    })?;
    if plaintext != b"secrets-mcp-key-check" {
        tracing::warn!(%user_id, "key-change rejected: decrypted key_check content mismatch");
        return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
    }

    // Validate and decode new key
    let new_key_bytes = secrets_core::crypto::extract_key_from_hex(&body.new_key).map_err(|e| {
        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid new_key hex in key-change");
        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
    })?;

    // Decode new salt and key_check
    let new_salt = hex::decode_hex(&body.salt).map_err(|e| {
        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid hex in key-change salt");
        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
    })?;
    if new_salt.len() != 32 {
        tracing::warn!(
            salt_len = new_salt.len(),
            "key-change salt must be 32 bytes"
        );
        return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
    }
    let new_key_check = hex::decode_hex(&body.key_check).map_err(|e| {
        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid hex in key-change key_check");
        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
    })?;

    change_user_key(
        &state.pool,
        user_id,
        &old_key_bytes,
        &new_key_bytes,
        &new_salt,
        &new_key_check,
        &body.params,
    )
    .await
    .map_err(|e| {
        tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to change user key");
        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
    })?;

    // Refresh the session's key_version so the current session is not immediately
    // invalidated by require_valid_user on the next page load.
    match get_user_by_id(&state.pool, user_id).await {
        Ok(Some(updated_user)) => {
            if let Err(e) = session
                .insert(SESSION_KEY_VERSION, updated_user.key_version)
                .await
            {
                tracing::warn!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to update key_version in session after key change");
            }
        }
        Ok(None) => {
            tracing::warn!(%user_id, "user not found after key change; session not updated");
        }
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::warn!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to reload user after key change; session not updated");
        }
    }

    tracing::info!(%user_id, secrets_count = "(see service log)", "passphrase changed and secrets re-encrypted");
    Ok(Json(KeySetupResponse { ok: true }))
}

// ── API Key management ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

pub(super) async fn api_apikey_get(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    session: Session,
) -> Result<Json<ApiKeyResponse>, StatusCode> {
    let user = match load_session_user_strict(&state.pool, &session).await {
        Ok(Some(u)) => u,
        Ok(None) => return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED),
        Err(()) => return Err(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR),
    };
    let user_id = user.id;

    let api_key = ensure_api_key(&state.pool, user_id).await.map_err(|e| {
        tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "ensure_api_key failed");
        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
    })?;

    Ok(Json(ApiKeyResponse { api_key }))
}

pub(super) async fn api_apikey_regenerate(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    session: Session,
) -> Result<Json<ApiKeyResponse>, StatusCode> {
    let user = match load_session_user_strict(&state.pool, &session).await {
        Ok(Some(u)) => u,
        Ok(None) => return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED),
        Err(()) => return Err(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR),
    };
    let user_id = user.id;

    let api_key = regenerate_api_key(&state.pool, user_id)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| {
            tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "regenerate_api_key failed");
            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
        })?;

    Ok(Json(ApiKeyResponse { api_key }))
}