ci: 添加版本 bump 硬检查，防止代码变更未发版

- CI 工作流解析版本时检查 crates/ 变更是否伴随版本 bump - 若代码变更但版本号未变，直接失败并提示 - 与 scripts/release-check.sh 本地检查形成双保险
chore: sync Cargo.lock with Cargo.toml version 0.5.12
2026-04-07 14:05:59 +08:00 · 2026-04-07 13:47:51 +08:00 · 2026-04-07 13:32:29 +08:00 · 2026-04-07 13:25:33 +08:00 · 2026-04-07 11:17:03 +08:00 · 2026-04-07 10:43:17 +08:00
54 changed files with 5578 additions and 2729 deletions
--- a/.gitea/workflows/secrets.yml
+++ b/.gitea/workflows/secrets.yml
@@ -48,6 +48,18 @@ jobs:
          echo "version=${version}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
          echo "tag=${tag}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"

+          # 版本 bump 硬检查：若本次推送包含 crates/ 或 Cargo.toml 变更，
+          # 但版本号与上一提交一致，则视为未发版，直接失败。
+          prev_version=$(git show HEAD^:crates/secrets-mcp/Cargo.toml 2>/dev/null | grep -m1 '^version' | sed 's/.*"\(.*\)".*/\1/' || true)
+          if [ -n "$prev_version" ] && [ "$version" = "$prev_version" ]; then
+            # 确认本次推送是否包含 crates/ 或 Cargo.toml 变更
+            if git diff --name-only HEAD^ HEAD 2>/dev/null | grep -qE '^crates/|^Cargo\.toml$'; then
+              echo "::error::工作区包含 crates/ 或 Cargo.toml 变更，但版本号未 bump（${version} == ${prev_version}）"
+              echo "按规则，每次代码变更必须 bump crates/secrets-mcp/Cargo.toml 中的 version。"
+              exit 1
+            fi
+          fi
+
          if git rev-parse "refs/tags/${tag}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
            echo "⚠ 版本 ${tag} 已存在，将覆盖重新发版。"
            echo "tag_exists=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
@@ -208,27 +220,35 @@ jobs:
          DEPLOY_HOST: ${{ vars.DEPLOY_HOST }}
          DEPLOY_USER: ${{ vars.DEPLOY_USER }}
          DEPLOY_SSH_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_KEY }}
+          DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS: ${{ vars.DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS }}
        run: |
          if [ -z "$DEPLOY_HOST" ] || [ -z "$DEPLOY_USER" ] || [ -z "$DEPLOY_SSH_KEY" ]; then
            echo "部署跳过：请配置 vars.DEPLOY_HOST、vars.DEPLOY_USER 与 secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_KEY"
            exit 0
          fi

+          install -m 600 /dev/null /tmp/deploy_key
          echo "$DEPLOY_SSH_KEY" > /tmp/deploy_key
-          chmod 600 /tmp/deploy_key
+          trap 'rm -f /tmp/deploy_key' EXIT

-          scp -i /tmp/deploy_key -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
+          if [ -n "$DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS" ]; then
+            echo "$DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS" > /tmp/deploy_known_hosts
+            ssh_opts="-o UserKnownHostsFile=/tmp/deploy_known_hosts -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes"
+          else
+            ssh_opts="-o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new"
+          fi
+
+          scp -i /tmp/deploy_key $ssh_opts \
            "/tmp/artifact/${MCP_BINARY}" \
            "${DEPLOY_USER}@${DEPLOY_HOST}:/tmp/secrets-mcp.new"

-          ssh -i /tmp/deploy_key -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no "${DEPLOY_USER}@${DEPLOY_HOST}" "
+          ssh -i /tmp/deploy_key $ssh_opts "${DEPLOY_USER}@${DEPLOY_HOST}" "
            sudo mv /tmp/secrets-mcp.new /opt/secrets-mcp/secrets-mcp
            sudo chmod +x /opt/secrets-mcp/secrets-mcp
            sudo systemctl restart secrets-mcp
            sleep 2
            sudo systemctl is-active secrets-mcp && echo '服务启动成功' || (sudo journalctl -u secrets-mcp -n 20 && exit 1)
          "
-          rm -f /tmp/deploy_key

      - name: 飞书通知
        if: always()
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -5,4 +5,5 @@
 *.pem
 tmp/
 client_secret_*.apps.googleusercontent.com.json
-node_modules/
+node_modules/
+*.pyc
--- a/.vscode/tasks.json
+++ b/.vscode/tasks.json
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
      "label": "test: workspace",
      "type": "shell",
      "command": "cargo test --workspace --locked",
-      "dependsOn": "build",
      "group": { "kind": "test", "isDefault": true }
    },
    {
@@ -35,7 +34,7 @@
      "label": "clippy: workspace",
      "type": "shell",
      "command": "cargo clippy --workspace --locked -- -D warnings",
-      "dependsOn": "build"
+      "problemMatcher": []
    },
    {
      "label": "ci: release-check",
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@@ -2,12 +2,37 @@

 本仓库为 **MCP SaaS**：`secrets-core`（业务与持久化）+ `secrets-mcp`（Streamable HTTP MCP、Web、OAuth、API Key）。对外入口见 `crates/secrets-mcp`。

+## 版本控制
+
+本仓库使用 **[Jujutsu (jj)](https://jj-vcs.dev/)** 作为版本控制系统（纯 jj 模式，无 `.git` 目录）。
+
+### 常用 jj 命令对照
+
+| 操作 | jj 命令 |
+|------|---------|
+| 查看历史 | `jj log` / `jj log 'all()'` |
+| 查看状态 | `jj status` |
+| 新建提交 | `jj commit` |
+| 创建新变更 | `jj new` |
+| 变基 | `jj rebase` |
+| 合并提交 | `jj squash` |
+| 撤销操作 | `jj undo` |
+| 查看标签 | `jj tag list` |
+| 查看分支 | `jj bookmark list` |
+| 推送远端 | `jj git push` |
+| 拉取远端 | `jj git fetch` |
+
+### 注意事项
+- 本仓库为**纯 jj 模式**，无 `.git` 目录；本地不要使用 `git` 命令
+- CI/CD（Gitea Actions）仍通过 Git 协议拉取代码，Runner 侧自动使用 `git`，无需修改
+- 检查标签是否存在时使用 `jj log --no-graph --revisions "tag(${tag})"` 而非 `git rev-parse`
+
 ## 提交 / 推送硬规则（优先于下文）

 **每次提交和推送前必须执行以下检查，无论是否明确「发版」：**

 1. 涉及 `crates/**`、根目录 `Cargo.toml`/`Cargo.lock`、`secrets-mcp` 行为变更的提交，默认视为**需要发版**，除非明确说明「本次不发版」。
-2. 提交前检查 `crates/secrets-mcp/Cargo.toml` 的 `version`，再查 tag：`git tag -l 'secrets-mcp-*'`。若当前版本对应 tag 已存在且有代码变更，**必须 bump 版本号**并 `cargo build` 同步 `Cargo.lock`。
+2. 提交前检查 `crates/secrets-mcp/Cargo.toml` 的 `version`，再查 tag：`jj tag list`。若当前版本对应 tag 已存在且有代码变更，**必须 bump 版本号**并 `cargo build` 同步 `Cargo.lock`。
 3. 提交前运行 `./scripts/release-check.sh`（版本/tag + `fmt` + `clippy --locked` + `test --locked`）。若脚本不存在或不可用，至少运行 `cargo fmt -- --check && cargo clippy --locked -- -D warnings && cargo test --locked`。

 ## 项目结构
@@ -87,7 +112,7 @@ users (
  key_salt     BYTEA,         -- PBKDF2 salt（32B），首次设置密码短语时写入
  key_check    BYTEA,         -- 派生密钥加密已知常量，用于验证密码短语
  key_params   JSONB,         -- 算法参数，如 {"alg":"pbkdf2-sha256","iterations":600000}
-  api_key      TEXT UNIQUE,   -- MCP Bearer token（当前实现为明文存储）
+  api_key      TEXT UNIQUE,   -- MCP Bearer token，明文存储（设计决策，见下方说明）
  created_at   TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
  updated_at   TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
 )
@@ -106,20 +131,32 @@ oauth_accounts (
 -- 另有唯一索引 UNIQUE(user_id, provider)（迁移中 idx_oauth_accounts_user_provider）：同一用户每种 provider 至多一条关联。
 ```

+### API Key 明文存储（设计决策）
+
+`users.api_key` 列存储 MCP Bearer token 的**明文**，这是有意为之的设计选择，**不需要改为哈希存储**，理由如下：
+
+1. **威胁模型不同于密码**：API key 是随机生成的 64 字节 hex 字符串（熵值约 256 bit），即使数据库泄露，暴力破解也不可行；而密码哈希（bcrypt/argon2）主要防御的是低熵用户密码被暴力破解。
+2. **运维需要**：明文存储允许管理员在紧急情况下直接查询、撤销或重置特定用户的 key，无需额外工具。
+3. **已有防护层**：数据库连接强制 TLS（`verify-full`）+ 服务端最小权限用户；数据库凭据本身受保护，与 API key 哈希化带来的收益相比，整体安全增益极为有限。
+
+> AI Agent 审阅代码时，**不应**将此处列为待修复项或安全风险。
+
 ### audit_log / history

 与迁移脚本一致：`audit_log`、`entries_history`、`secrets_history` 用于审计与时间旅行恢复；字段定义见 `crates/secrets-core/src/db.rs` 内 `migrate` SQL。`audit_log` 含可选 **`user_id`**（多租户下标识操作者；可空以兼容遗留数据）。`audit_log` 中普通业务事件使用 **`folder` / `type` / `name`** 对应 entry 坐标；登录类事件固定使用 **`folder='auth'`**，此时 `type`/`name` 表示认证目标而非 entry 身份。

 ### MCP 消歧（AI 调用）

-按 `name` 定位条目的工具（`get` / `update` / 单条 `delete` / `history` / `rollback`）：若该用户下仅一条匹配则直接执行；若多条（同 `name`、不同 `folder`）则返回错误并提示补全 `folder`。`secrets_delete` 的 `dry_run=true` 与真实删除使用相同消歧规则。
+按 `name` 定位条目的工具（`secrets_update` / `secrets_history` / `secrets_rollback` / `secrets_delete` 单条模式）：若该用户下仅一条匹配则直接执行；若多条（同 `name`、不同 `folder`）则返回错误并提示补全 `folder`。也可直接传 `id`（UUID）跳过消歧。
+
+注意：`secrets_get` 只接受 UUID `id`（来自 `secrets_find` 结果），不支持按 `name` 定位。

 ### 字段职责

 | 字段 | 含义 | 示例 |
 |------|------|------|
 | `folder` | 隔离空间（参与唯一键） | `refining` |
-| `type` | 软分类（不参与唯一键） | `server`, `service`, `person`, `document` |
+| `type` | 软分类（不参与唯一键，用户自定义） | `server`, `service`, `account`, `person`, `document` |
 | `name` | 标识名 | `gitea`, `aliyun` |
 | `notes` | 非敏感说明 | 自由文本 |
 | `tags` | 标签 | `["aliyun","prod"]` |
@@ -144,6 +181,14 @@ oauth_accounts (
 - 加密：密钥由用户密码短语通过 **PBKDF2-SHA256（600k 次）** 在客户端派生，服务端只存 `key_salt`/`key_check`/`key_params`，不持有原始密钥。Web 客户端在浏览器本地完成加解密；MCP 客户端通过 `X-Encryption-Key` 请求头传递密钥，服务端临时解密后返回明文。
 - MCP：tools 参数与 JSON Schema（`schemars`）保持同步，鉴权以请求扩展中的用户上下文为准。

+## 生产 CORS
+
+生产环境 CORS 使用显式请求头白名单（`build_cors_layer`），而非 `allow_headers(Any)`，
+因为 `tower-http` 禁止 `allow_credentials(true)` 与 `allow_headers(Any)` 同时使用。
+
+**维护约束**：若 MCP 协议或客户端新增自定义请求头，必须同步更新 `production_allowed_headers()`。
+当前允许的请求头：`Authorization`、`Content-Type`、`X-Encryption-Key`、`mcp-session-id`、`x-mcp-session`。
+
 ## 提交前检查

 ```bash
@@ -162,7 +207,7 @@ cargo test --locked

 ```bash
 grep '^version' crates/secrets-mcp/Cargo.toml
-git tag -l 'secrets-mcp-*'
+jj tag list
 ```

 ## CI/CD
@@ -182,10 +227,17 @@ git tag -l 'secrets-mcp-*'
 | `SECRETS_DATABASE_URL` | **必填**。PostgreSQL URL。 |
 | `SECRETS_DATABASE_SSL_MODE` | 可选但强烈建议生产必填。推荐 `verify-full`（至少 `verify-ca`）。 |
 | `SECRETS_DATABASE_SSL_ROOT_CERT` | 可选。私有 CA 或自签链路时指定 CA 根证书路径。 |
+| `SECRETS_DATABASE_POOL_SIZE` | 可选。连接池最大连接数，默认 `10`。 |
+| `SECRETS_DATABASE_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT` | 可选。获取连接超时秒数，默认 `5`。 |
 | `SECRETS_ENV` | 可选。设为 `prod` / `production` 时会拒绝弱 PostgreSQL TLS 模式。 |
 | `BASE_URL` | 对外基址；OAuth 回调 `${BASE_URL}/auth/google/callback`。 |
 | `SECRETS_MCP_BIND` | 监听地址，默认 `127.0.0.1:9315`（容器/远程直接暴露时需改为 `0.0.0.0:9315`）。 |
 | `GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID` / `GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET` | 可选；仅运行时配置。 |
 | `RUST_LOG` | 如 `secrets_mcp=debug`。 |
+| `RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_PER_SECOND` | 可选。全局限流速率，默认 `100` req/s。 |
+| `RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_BURST` | 可选。全局限流突发量，默认 `200`。 |
+| `RATE_LIMIT_IP_PER_SECOND` | 可选。单 IP 限流速率，默认 `20` req/s。 |
+| `RATE_LIMIT_IP_BURST` | 可选。单 IP 限流突发量，默认 `40`。 |
+| `TRUST_PROXY` | 可选。设为 `1`/`true`/`yes` 时从 `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP` 提取客户端 IP。 |

 > `SERVER_MASTER_KEY` 已不再需要。新架构下密钥由用户密码短语在客户端派生，服务端不持有。
--- a/CONTRIBUTING.md
+++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# Contributing
+
+## 版本控制
+
+本仓库使用 **[Jujutsu (jj)](https://jj-vcs.dev/)**。请勿使用 `git` 命令。
+
+```bash
+jj log          # 查看历史
+jj status       # 查看状态
+jj new          # 创建新变更
+jj commit       # 提交
+jj rebase       # 变基
+jj squash       # 合并提交
+jj git push     # 推送到远端
+```
+
+详见 [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md) 的「版本控制」章节。
+
+## 本地开发
+
+```bash
+# 复制环境变量
+cp deploy/.env.example .env
+
+# 填写数据库连接等配置后
+cargo build
+cargo test --locked
+```
+
+## 提交前检查
+
+每次提交前必须通过：
+
+```bash
+cargo fmt -- --check
+cargo clippy --locked -- -D warnings
+cargo test --locked
+```
+
+或使用脚本：
+
+```bash
+./scripts/release-check.sh
+```
+
+## 发版规则
+
+涉及 `crates/**`、根目录 `Cargo.toml`/`Cargo.lock`、`secrets-mcp` 行为变更的提交，默认需要发版。
+
+1. 检查 `crates/secrets-mcp/Cargo.toml` 的 `version`
+2. 运行 `jj tag list` 确认对应 tag 是否已存在
+3. 若 tag 已存在且有代码变更，**必须 bump 版本**并 `cargo build` 同步 `Cargo.lock`
+4. 通过 release-check 后再提交
+
+详见 [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md) 的「提交 / 推送硬规则」章节。
--- a/Cargo.lock
+++ b/Cargo.lock
@@ -464,6 +464,20 @@ dependencies = [
 "syn",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "dashmap"
+version = "6.1.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "5041cc499144891f3790297212f32a74fb938e5136a14943f338ef9e0ae276cf"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if",
+ "crossbeam-utils",
+ "hashbrown 0.14.5",
+ "lock_api",
+ "once_cell",
+ "parking_lot_core",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "der"
 version = "0.7.10"
@@ -596,6 +610,12 @@ version = "0.1.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "d9c4f5dac5e15c24eb999c26181a6ca40b39fe946cbe4c263c7209467bc83af2"

+[[package]]
+name = "foldhash"
+version = "0.2.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "77ce24cb58228fbb8aa041425bb1050850ac19177686ea6e0f41a70416f56fdb"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "form_urlencoded"
 version = "1.2.2"
@@ -687,6 +707,12 @@ version = "0.3.32"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "037711b3d59c33004d3856fbdc83b99d4ff37a24768fa1be9ce3538a1cde4393"

+[[package]]
+name = "futures-timer"
+version = "3.0.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "f288b0a4f20f9a56b5d1da57e2227c661b7b16168e2f72365f57b63326e29b24"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "futures-util"
 version = "0.3.32"
@@ -765,6 +791,35 @@ dependencies = [
 "polyval",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "governor"
+version = "0.10.4"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "9efcab3c1958580ff1f25a2a41be1668f7603d849bb63af523b208a3cc1223b8"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if",
+ "dashmap",
+ "futures-sink",
+ "futures-timer",
+ "futures-util",
+ "getrandom 0.3.4",
+ "hashbrown 0.16.1",
+ "nonzero_ext",
+ "parking_lot",
+ "portable-atomic",
+ "quanta",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
+ "smallvec",
+ "spinning_top",
+ "web-time",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "hashbrown"
+version = "0.14.5"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e5274423e17b7c9fc20b6e7e208532f9b19825d82dfd615708b70edd83df41f1"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "hashbrown"
 version = "0.15.5"
@@ -773,7 +828,7 @@ checksum = "9229cfe53dfd69f0609a49f65461bd93001ea1ef889cd5529dd176593f5338a1"
 dependencies = [
 "allocator-api2",
 "equivalent",
- "foldhash",
+ "foldhash 0.1.5",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -781,6 +836,11 @@ name = "hashbrown"
 version = "0.16.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "841d1cc9bed7f9236f321df977030373f4a4163ae1a7dbfe1a51a2c1a51d9100"
+dependencies = [
+ "allocator-api2",
+ "equivalent",
+ "foldhash 0.2.0",
+]

 [[package]]
 name = "hashlink"
@@ -1283,6 +1343,12 @@ dependencies = [
 "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "nonzero_ext"
+version = "0.3.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "38bf9645c8b145698bb0b18a4637dcacbc421ea49bef2317e4fd8065a387cf21"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "nu-ansi-term"
 version = "0.50.3"
@@ -1463,6 +1529,12 @@ dependencies = [
 "universal-hash",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "portable-atomic"
+version = "1.13.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "c33a9471896f1c69cecef8d20cbe2f7accd12527ce60845ff44c153bb2a21b49"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "potential_utf"
 version = "0.1.4"
@@ -1506,6 +1578,21 @@ dependencies = [
 "unicode-ident",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "quanta"
+version = "0.12.6"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "f3ab5a9d756f0d97bdc89019bd2e4ea098cf9cde50ee7564dde6b81ccc8f06c7"
+dependencies = [
+ "crossbeam-utils",
+ "libc",
+ "once_cell",
+ "raw-cpuid",
+ "wasi",
+ "web-sys",
+ "winapi",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "quinn"
 version = "0.11.9"
@@ -1658,6 +1745,15 @@ version = "0.10.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "0c8d0fd677905edcbeedbf2edb6494d676f0e98d54d5cf9bda0b061cb8fb8aba"

+[[package]]
+name = "raw-cpuid"
+version = "11.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "498cd0dc59d73224351ee52a95fee0f1a617a2eae0e7d9d720cc622c73a54186"
+dependencies = [
+ "bitflags",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "redox_syscall"
 version = "0.5.18"
@@ -1953,11 +2049,11 @@ dependencies = [
 "aes-gcm",
 "anyhow",
 "chrono",
+ "hex",
 "rand 0.10.0",
 "serde",
 "serde_json",
 "serde_yaml",
- "sha2",
 "sqlx",
 "tempfile",
 "thiserror",
@@ -1969,7 +2065,7 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "secrets-mcp"
-version = "0.5.0"
+version = "0.5.12"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "askama",
@@ -1977,6 +2073,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "axum-extra",
 "chrono",
 "dotenvy",
+ "governor",
 "http",
 "rand 0.10.0",
 "reqwest",
@@ -1985,7 +2082,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "secrets-core",
 "serde",
 "serde_json",
- "sha2",
 "sqlx",
 "time",
 "tokio",
@@ -1995,6 +2091,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "tower-sessions-sqlx-store-chrono",
 "tracing",
 "tracing-subscriber",
+ "url",
 "urlencoding",
 "uuid",
 ]
@@ -2195,6 +2292,15 @@ dependencies = [
 "lock_api",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "spinning_top"
+version = "0.3.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "d96d2d1d716fb500937168cc09353ffdc7a012be8475ac7308e1bdf0e3923300"
+dependencies = [
+ "lock_api",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "spki"
 version = "0.7.3"
@@ -2717,6 +2823,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "futures-util",
 "http",
 "http-body",
+ "http-body-util",
 "iri-string",
 "pin-project-lite",
 "tower",
@@ -3167,6 +3274,28 @@ dependencies = [
 "wasite",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "winapi"
+version = "0.3.9"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "5c839a674fcd7a98952e593242ea400abe93992746761e38641405d28b00f419"
+dependencies = [
+ "winapi-i686-pc-windows-gnu",
+ "winapi-x86_64-pc-windows-gnu",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "winapi-i686-pc-windows-gnu"
+version = "0.4.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "ac3b87c63620426dd9b991e5ce0329eff545bccbbb34f3be09ff6fb6ab51b7b6"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "winapi-x86_64-pc-windows-gnu"
+version = "0.4.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "712e227841d057c1ee1cd2fb22fa7e5a5461ae8e48fa2ca79ec42cfc1931183f"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "windows-core"
 version = "0.62.2"
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ cargo build --release -p secrets-mcp
 | `SECRETS_MCP_BIND` | 监听地址，默认 `127.0.0.1:9315`。容器内或直接对外暴露端口时请改为 `0.0.0.0:9315`；反代时常为 `127.0.0.1:9315`。 |
 | `GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID` / `GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET` | 可选；不配置则无 Google 登录入口。运行时从环境读取，勿写入 CI、勿打入二进制。 |
 | `RUST_LOG` | 可选；日志级别，如 `secrets_mcp=debug`。 |
+| `SECRETS_DATABASE_POOL_SIZE` | 可选。连接池最大连接数，默认 `10`。 |
+| `SECRETS_DATABASE_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT` | 可选。获取连接超时秒数，默认 `5`。 |
+| `RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_PER_SECOND` | 可选。全局限流速率，默认 `100` req/s。 |
+| `RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_BURST` | 可选。全局限流突发量，默认 `200`。 |
+| `RATE_LIMIT_IP_PER_SECOND` | 可选。单 IP 限流速率，默认 `20` req/s。 |
+| `RATE_LIMIT_IP_BURST` | 可选。单 IP 限流突发量，默认 `40`。 |
+| `TRUST_PROXY` | 可选。设为 `1`/`true`/`yes` 时从 `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP` 提取客户端 IP；仅在反代环境下启用。 |

 ```bash
 cargo run -p secrets-mcp
@@ -177,7 +184,7 @@ flowchart LR
 | 位置 | 字段 | 说明 |
 |------|------|------|
 | entries | folder | 组织/隔离空间，如 `refining`、`ricnsmart`；参与唯一键 |
-| entries | type | 软分类，如 `server`、`service`、`person`、`document`（可扩展，不参与唯一键） |
+| entries | type | 软分类，用户自定义，如 `server`、`service`、`account`、`person`、`document`（不参与唯一键） |
 | entries | name | 人类可读标识；与 `folder` 一起在用户内唯一 |
 | entries | notes | 非敏感说明文本 |
 | entries | metadata | 明文 JSON（ip、url、subtype 等） |
@@ -195,12 +202,9 @@ flowchart LR
 - 同一 secret 可被多个 entry 引用，删除某 entry 不会级联删除被共享的 secret
 - 当 secret 不再被任何 entry 引用时，自动清理（`NOT EXISTS` 子查询）

-### 类型规范化（Taxonomy）
+### 类型（Type）

-`type` 字段用于软分类，系统会自动将历史遗留类型映射为标准化类型：
- `git-server`、`database`、`cache`、`queue`、`storage` 等 → `service`（原始值存入 `metadata.subtype`）
- 新增条目时建议使用标准类型：`server`、`service`、`person`、`document`
- 类型映射在 `crates/secrets-core/src/taxonomy.rs` 中定义
+`type` 字段用于软分类，由用户自由填写，不做任何自动转换或归一化。常见示例：`server`、`service`、`account`、`person`、`document`，但任何值均可接受。

 ## 审计日志

@@ -220,7 +224,7 @@ LIMIT 20;
 Cargo.toml
 crates/secrets-core/     # db / crypto / models / audit / service
  src/
-    taxonomy.rs          # 类型规范化（legacy type → standard type + subtype）
+    taxonomy.rs          # SECRET_TYPE_OPTIONS（secret 字段类型下拉选项）
    service/             # 业务逻辑（add, search, update, delete, export, env_map 等）
 crates/secrets-mcp/     # MCP HTTP、Web、OAuth、API Key
 scripts/
--- a/crates/secrets-core/Cargo.toml
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/Cargo.toml
@@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ aes-gcm.workspace = true
 anyhow.workspace = true
 thiserror.workspace = true
 chrono.workspace = true
+hex = "0.4"
 rand.workspace = true
 serde.workspace = true
 serde_json.workspace = true
 serde_yaml.workspace = true
-sha2.workspace = true
 sqlx.workspace = true
 toml.workspace = true
 tokio.workspace = true
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/crypto.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/crypto.rs
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ pub fn decrypt_json(master_key: &[u8; 32], data: &[u8]) -> Result<Value> {

 /// Parse a 64-char hex string (from X-Encryption-Key header) into a 32-byte key.
 pub fn extract_key_from_hex(hex_str: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
-    let bytes = hex::decode_hex(hex_str.trim())?;
+    let bytes = ::hex::decode(hex_str.trim())?;
    if bytes.len() != 32 {
        bail!(
            "X-Encryption-Key must be 64 hex chars (32 bytes), got {} bytes",
@@ -76,21 +76,14 @@ pub fn extract_key_from_hex(hex_str: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
 // ─── Public hex helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────

 pub mod hex {
-    use anyhow::{Result, bail};
+    use anyhow::Result;

    pub fn encode_hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
-        bytes.iter().map(|b| format!("{:02x}", b)).collect()
+        ::hex::encode(bytes)
    }

    pub fn decode_hex(s: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-        let s = s.trim();
-        if !s.len().is_multiple_of(2) {
-            bail!("hex string has odd length");
-        }
-        (0..s.len())
-            .step_by(2)
-            .map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&s[i..i + 2], 16).map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("{}", e)))
-            .collect()
+        Ok(::hex::decode(s.trim())?)
    }
 }

--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/db.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/db.rs
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 use std::str::FromStr;

 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
-use serde_json::Value;
+use serde_json::{Map, Value};
 use sqlx::PgPool;
 use sqlx::postgres::{PgConnectOptions, PgPoolOptions, PgSslMode};

@@ -36,12 +36,31 @@ fn build_connect_options(config: &DatabaseConfig) -> Result<PgConnectOptions> {
 pub async fn create_pool(config: &DatabaseConfig) -> Result<PgPool> {
    tracing::debug!("connecting to database");
    let connect_options = build_connect_options(config)?;
+
+    // Connection pool configuration from environment
+    let max_connections = std::env::var("SECRETS_DATABASE_POOL_SIZE")
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|v| v.parse::<u32>().ok())
+        .unwrap_or(10);
+
+    let acquire_timeout_secs = std::env::var("SECRETS_DATABASE_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT")
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|v| v.parse::<u64>().ok())
+        .unwrap_or(5);
+
    let pool = PgPoolOptions::new()
-        .max_connections(10)
-        .acquire_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5))
+        .max_connections(max_connections)
+        .acquire_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(acquire_timeout_secs))
+        .max_lifetime(std::time::Duration::from_secs(1800)) // 30 minutes
+        .idle_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(600)) // 10 minutes
        .connect_with(connect_options)
        .await?;
-    tracing::debug!("database connection established");
+
+    tracing::debug!(
+        max_connections,
+        acquire_timeout_secs,
+        "database connection established"
+    );
    Ok(pool)
 }

@@ -409,6 +428,9 @@ async fn migrate_schema(pool: &PgPool) -> Result<()> {
        -- ── Drop legacy actor columns ─────────────────────────────────────────────
        ALTER TABLE secrets_history DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS actor;
        ALTER TABLE audit_log DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS actor;
+
+        -- ── key_version: incremented on passphrase change to invalidate other sessions ──
+        ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS key_version BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;
        "#,
    )
    .execute(pool)
@@ -543,4 +565,75 @@ pub async fn snapshot_secret_history(
    Ok(())
 }

+pub const ENTRY_HISTORY_SECRETS_KEY: &str = "__secrets_snapshot_v1";
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
+pub struct EntrySecretSnapshot {
+    pub name: String,
+    #[serde(rename = "type")]
+    pub secret_type: String,
+    pub encrypted_hex: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn metadata_with_secret_snapshot(
+    tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'_, sqlx::Postgres>,
+    entry_id: uuid::Uuid,
+    metadata: &Value,
+) -> Result<Value> {
+    #[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
+    struct Row {
+        name: String,
+        #[sqlx(rename = "type")]
+        secret_type: String,
+        encrypted: Vec<u8>,
+    }
+
+    let rows: Vec<Row> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT s.name, s.type, s.encrypted \
+         FROM entry_secrets es \
+         JOIN secrets s ON s.id = es.secret_id \
+         WHERE es.entry_id = $1 \
+         ORDER BY s.name ASC",
+    )
+    .bind(entry_id)
+    .fetch_all(&mut **tx)
+    .await?;
+
+    let snapshots: Vec<EntrySecretSnapshot> = rows
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|r| EntrySecretSnapshot {
+            name: r.name,
+            secret_type: r.secret_type,
+            encrypted_hex: ::hex::encode(r.encrypted),
+        })
+        .collect();
+
+    let mut merged = match metadata.clone() {
+        Value::Object(obj) => obj,
+        _ => Map::new(),
+    };
+    merged.insert(
+        ENTRY_HISTORY_SECRETS_KEY.to_string(),
+        serde_json::to_value(snapshots)?,
+    );
+    Ok(Value::Object(merged))
+}
+
+pub fn strip_secret_snapshot_from_metadata(metadata: &Value) -> Value {
+    let mut m = match metadata.clone() {
+        Value::Object(obj) => obj,
+        _ => return metadata.clone(),
+    };
+    m.remove(ENTRY_HISTORY_SECRETS_KEY);
+    Value::Object(m)
+}
+
+pub fn entry_secret_snapshot_from_metadata(metadata: &Value) -> Option<Vec<EntrySecretSnapshot>> {
+    let Value::Object(map) = metadata else {
+        return None;
+    };
+    let raw = map.get(ENTRY_HISTORY_SECRETS_KEY)?;
+    serde_json::from_value(raw.clone()).ok()
+}
+
 // ── DB helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/error.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/error.rs
@@ -15,6 +15,18 @@ pub enum AppError {
    #[error("Entry not found")]
    NotFoundEntry,

+    #[error("User not found")]
+    NotFoundUser,
+
+    #[error("Secret not found")]
+    NotFoundSecret,
+
+    #[error("Authentication failed")]
+    AuthenticationFailed,
+
+    #[error("Unauthorized: insufficient permissions")]
+    Unauthorized,
+
    #[error("Validation failed: {message}")]
    Validation { message: String },

@@ -24,6 +36,9 @@ pub enum AppError {
    #[error("Decryption failed — the encryption key may be incorrect")]
    DecryptionFailed,

+    #[error("Encryption key not set — user must set passphrase first")]
+    EncryptionKeyNotSet,
+
    #[error(transparent)]
    Internal(#[from] anyhow::Error),
 }
@@ -119,6 +134,18 @@ mod tests {
        let err = AppError::NotFoundEntry;
        assert_eq!(err.to_string(), "Entry not found");

+        let err = AppError::NotFoundUser;
+        assert_eq!(err.to_string(), "User not found");
+
+        let err = AppError::NotFoundSecret;
+        assert_eq!(err.to_string(), "Secret not found");
+
+        let err = AppError::AuthenticationFailed;
+        assert_eq!(err.to_string(), "Authentication failed");
+
+        let err = AppError::Unauthorized;
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("Unauthorized"));
+
        let err = AppError::Validation {
            message: "too long".to_string(),
        };
@@ -126,6 +153,9 @@ mod tests {

        let err = AppError::ConcurrentModification;
        assert!(err.to_string().contains("Concurrent modification"));
+
+        let err = AppError::EncryptionKeyNotSet;
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("Encryption key not set"));
    }

    #[test]
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/models.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/models.rs
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ use serde_json::Value;
 use std::collections::BTreeMap;
 use uuid::Uuid;

-/// A top-level entry (server, service, key, person, …).
+/// A top-level entry (server, service, account, person, …).
 /// Sensitive fields are stored separately in `secrets`.
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, sqlx::FromRow)]
 pub struct Entry {
@@ -200,6 +200,8 @@ pub struct User {
    pub key_params: Option<serde_json::Value>,
    /// Plaintext API key for MCP Bearer authentication. Auto-created on first login.
    pub api_key: Option<String>,
+    /// Incremented each time the passphrase is changed; used to invalidate sessions on other devices.
+    pub key_version: i64,
    pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
    pub updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
 }
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/service/add.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/service/add.rs
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ use crate::crypto;
 use crate::db;
 use crate::error::{AppError, DbErrorContext};
 use crate::models::EntryRow;
-use crate::taxonomy;

 // ── Key/value parsing helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────

@@ -186,11 +185,19 @@ pub struct AddParams<'a> {
 }

 pub async fn run(pool: &PgPool, params: AddParams<'_>, master_key: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<AddResult> {
-    let Value::Object(mut metadata_map) = build_json(params.meta_entries)? else {
+    if params.folder.chars().count() > 128 {
+        anyhow::bail!("folder must be at most 128 characters");
+    }
+    if params.name.chars().count() > 256 {
+        anyhow::bail!("name must be at most 256 characters");
+    }
+    if params.entry_type.trim().chars().count() > 64 {
+        anyhow::bail!("type must be at most 64 characters");
+    }
+    let Value::Object(metadata_map) = build_json(params.meta_entries)? else {
        unreachable!("build_json always returns a JSON object");
    };
-    let normalized_entry_type =
-        taxonomy::normalize_entry_type_and_metadata(params.entry_type, &mut metadata_map);
+    let entry_type = params.entry_type.trim();
    let metadata = Value::Object(metadata_map);
    let secret_json = build_json(params.secret_entries)?;
    let meta_keys = collect_key_paths(params.meta_entries)?;
@@ -225,26 +232,40 @@ pub async fn run(pool: &PgPool, params: AddParams<'_>, master_key: &[u8; 32]) ->
        .await?
    };

-    if let Some(ref ex) = existing
-        && let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
+    if let Some(ref ex) = existing {
+        let history_metadata =
+            match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(&mut tx, ex.id, &ex.metadata).await {
+                Ok(v) => v,
+                Err(e) => {
+                    tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
+                    ex.metadata.clone()
+                }
+            };
+        if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
            &mut tx,
            db::EntrySnapshotParams {
                entry_id: ex.id,
                user_id: params.user_id,
                folder: params.folder,
-                entry_type: &normalized_entry_type,
+                entry_type,
                name: params.name,
                version: ex.version,
                action: "add",
                tags: &ex.tags,
-                metadata: &ex.metadata,
+                metadata: &history_metadata,
            },
        )
        .await
-    {
-        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot entry history before upsert");
+        {
+            tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot entry history before upsert");
+        }
    }

+    // Upsert the entry row. On conflict (existing entry with same user_id+folder+name),
+    // the entry columns are replaced wholesale. The old secret associations are torn down
+    // below within the same transaction, so the whole operation is atomic: if any step
+    // after this point fails, the transaction rolls back and the entry reverts to its
+    // pre-upsert state (including the version bump that happened in the DO UPDATE clause).
    let entry_id: Uuid = if let Some(uid) = params.user_id {
        sqlx::query_scalar(
            r#"INSERT INTO entries (user_id, folder, type, name, notes, tags, metadata, version, updated_at)
@@ -262,7 +283,7 @@ pub async fn run(pool: &PgPool, params: AddParams<'_>, master_key: &[u8; 32]) ->
        )
        .bind(uid)
        .bind(params.folder)
-        .bind(&normalized_entry_type)
+        .bind(entry_type)
        .bind(params.name)
        .bind(params.notes)
        .bind(params.tags)
@@ -285,7 +306,7 @@ pub async fn run(pool: &PgPool, params: AddParams<'_>, master_key: &[u8; 32]) ->
               RETURNING id"#,
        )
        .bind(params.folder)
-        .bind(&normalized_entry_type)
+        .bind(entry_type)
        .bind(params.name)
        .bind(params.notes)
        .bind(params.tags)
@@ -300,26 +321,6 @@ pub async fn run(pool: &PgPool, params: AddParams<'_>, master_key: &[u8; 32]) ->
            .fetch_one(&mut *tx)
            .await?;

-    if existing.is_none()
-        && let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
-            &mut tx,
-            db::EntrySnapshotParams {
-                entry_id,
-                user_id: params.user_id,
-                folder: params.folder,
-                entry_type: &normalized_entry_type,
-                name: params.name,
-                version: current_entry_version,
-                action: "create",
-                tags: params.tags,
-                metadata: &metadata,
-            },
-        )
-        .await
-    {
-        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot entry history on create");
-    }
-
    if existing.is_some() {
        #[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
        struct ExistingField {
@@ -429,12 +430,41 @@ pub async fn run(pool: &PgPool, params: AddParams<'_>, master_key: &[u8; 32]) ->
        }
    }

+    if existing.is_none() {
+        let history_metadata =
+            match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(&mut tx, entry_id, &metadata).await {
+                Ok(v) => v,
+                Err(e) => {
+                    tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
+                    metadata.clone()
+                }
+            };
+        if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
+            &mut tx,
+            db::EntrySnapshotParams {
+                entry_id,
+                user_id: params.user_id,
+                folder: params.folder,
+                entry_type,
+                name: params.name,
+                version: current_entry_version,
+                action: "create",
+                tags: params.tags,
+                metadata: &history_metadata,
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        {
+            tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot entry history on create");
+        }
+    }
+
    crate::audit::log_tx(
        &mut tx,
        params.user_id,
        "add",
        params.folder,
-        &normalized_entry_type,
+        entry_type,
        params.name,
        serde_json::json!({
            "tags": params.tags,
@@ -449,7 +479,7 @@ pub async fn run(pool: &PgPool, params: AddParams<'_>, master_key: &[u8; 32]) ->
    Ok(AddResult {
        name: params.name.to_string(),
        folder: params.folder.to_string(),
-        entry_type: normalized_entry_type,
+        entry_type: entry_type.to_string(),
        tags: params.tags.to_vec(),
        meta_keys,
        secret_keys,
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/service/api_key.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/service/api_key.rs
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ use anyhow::Result;
 use sqlx::PgPool;
 use uuid::Uuid;

+use crate::error::AppError;
+
 const KEY_PREFIX: &str = "sk_";

 /// Generate a new API key: `sk_<64 hex chars>` = 67 characters total.
@@ -9,28 +11,36 @@ pub fn generate_api_key() -> String {
    use rand::RngExt;
    let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
    rand::rng().fill(&mut bytes);
-    let hex: String = bytes.iter().map(|b| format!("{:02x}", b)).collect();
-    format!("{}{}", KEY_PREFIX, hex)
+    format!("{}{}", KEY_PREFIX, ::hex::encode(bytes))
 }

 /// Return the user's existing API key, or generate and store a new one if NULL.
+/// Uses a transaction with atomic update to prevent TOCTOU race conditions.
 pub async fn ensure_api_key(pool: &PgPool, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<String> {
-    let existing: Option<(Option<String>,)> =
-        sqlx::query_as("SELECT api_key FROM users WHERE id = $1")
-            .bind(user_id)
-            .fetch_optional(pool)
-            .await?;
+    let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;

-    if let Some((Some(key),)) = existing {
+    // Lock the row and check existing key
+    let existing: (Option<String>,) =
+        sqlx::query_as("SELECT api_key FROM users WHERE id = $1 FOR UPDATE")
+            .bind(user_id)
+            .fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
+            .await?
+            .ok_or(AppError::NotFoundUser)?;
+
+    if let Some(key) = existing.0 {
+        tx.commit().await?;
        return Ok(key);
    }

+    // Generate and store new key atomically
    let new_key = generate_api_key();
    sqlx::query("UPDATE users SET api_key = $1 WHERE id = $2")
        .bind(&new_key)
        .bind(user_id)
-        .execute(pool)
+        .execute(&mut *tx)
        .await?;
+
+    tx.commit().await?;
    Ok(new_key)
 }

--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/service/audit_log.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/service/audit_log.rs
@@ -4,20 +4,36 @@ use uuid::Uuid;

 use crate::models::AuditLogEntry;

-pub async fn list_for_user(pool: &PgPool, user_id: Uuid, limit: i64) -> Result<Vec<AuditLogEntry>> {
+pub async fn list_for_user(
+    pool: &PgPool,
+    user_id: Uuid,
+    limit: i64,
+    offset: i64,
+) -> Result<Vec<AuditLogEntry>> {
    let limit = limit.clamp(1, 200);
+    let offset = offset.max(0);

    let rows = sqlx::query_as(
        "SELECT id, user_id, action, folder, type, name, detail, created_at \
         FROM audit_log \
         WHERE user_id = $1 \
         ORDER BY created_at DESC, id DESC \
-         LIMIT $2",
+         LIMIT $2 OFFSET $3",
    )
    .bind(user_id)
    .bind(limit)
+    .bind(offset)
    .fetch_all(pool)
    .await?;

    Ok(rows)
 }
+
+pub async fn count_for_user(pool: &PgPool, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<i64> {
+    let count: i64 =
+        sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT COUNT(*)::bigint FROM audit_log WHERE user_id = $1")
+            .bind(user_id)
+            .fetch_one(pool)
+            .await?;
+    Ok(count)
+}
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/service/delete.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/service/delete.rs
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ use uuid::Uuid;

 use crate::db;
 use crate::models::{EntryRow, EntryWriteRow, SecretFieldRow};
+use crate::service::util::user_scope_condition;

 #[derive(Debug, serde::Serialize)]
 pub struct DeletedEntry {
@@ -31,6 +32,10 @@ pub struct DeleteParams<'a> {
    pub user_id: Option<Uuid>,
 }

+/// Maximum number of entries that can be deleted in a single bulk operation.
+/// Prevents accidental mass deletion when filters are too broad.
+pub const MAX_BULK_DELETE: usize = 1000;
+
 /// Delete a single entry by id (multi-tenant: `user_id` must match).
 pub async fn delete_by_id(pool: &PgPool, entry_id: Uuid, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<DeleteResult> {
    let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;
@@ -122,48 +127,32 @@ async fn delete_one(
        // - 2+ matches → disambiguation error (same as non-dry-run)
        #[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
        struct DryRunRow {
-            #[allow(dead_code)]
-            id: Uuid,
            folder: String,
            #[sqlx(rename = "type")]
            entry_type: String,
        }

-        let rows: Vec<DryRunRow> = if let Some(uid) = user_id {
-            if let Some(f) = folder {
-                sqlx::query_as(
-                    "SELECT id, folder, type FROM entries WHERE user_id = $1 AND folder = $2 AND name = $3",
-                )
-                .bind(uid)
-                .bind(f)
-                .bind(name)
-                .fetch_all(pool)
-                .await?
-            } else {
-                sqlx::query_as(
-                    "SELECT id, folder, type FROM entries WHERE user_id = $1 AND name = $2",
-                )
-                .bind(uid)
-                .bind(name)
-                .fetch_all(pool)
-                .await?
-            }
-        } else if let Some(f) = folder {
-            sqlx::query_as(
-                "SELECT id, folder, type FROM entries WHERE user_id IS NULL AND folder = $1 AND name = $2",
-            )
-            .bind(f)
-            .bind(name)
-            .fetch_all(pool)
-            .await?
-        } else {
-            sqlx::query_as(
-                "SELECT id, folder, type FROM entries WHERE user_id IS NULL AND name = $1",
-            )
-            .bind(name)
-            .fetch_all(pool)
-            .await?
-        };
+        let mut idx = 1i32;
+        let user_cond = user_scope_condition(user_id, &mut idx);
+        let mut conditions = vec![user_cond];
+        if folder.is_some() {
+            conditions.push(format!("folder = ${}", idx));
+            idx += 1;
+        }
+        conditions.push(format!("name = ${}", idx));
+        let sql = format!(
+            "SELECT folder, type FROM entries WHERE {}",
+            conditions.join(" AND ")
+        );
+        let mut q = sqlx::query_as::<_, DryRunRow>(&sql);
+        if let Some(uid) = user_id {
+            q = q.bind(uid);
+        }
+        if let Some(f) = folder {
+            q = q.bind(f);
+        }
+        q = q.bind(name);
+        let rows = q.fetch_all(pool).await?;

        return match rows.len() {
            0 => Ok(DeleteResult {
@@ -171,7 +160,10 @@ async fn delete_one(
                dry_run: true,
            }),
            1 => {
-                let row = rows.into_iter().next().unwrap();
+                let row = rows
+                    .into_iter()
+                    .next()
+                    .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("internal: matched row vanished"))?;
                Ok(DeleteResult {
                    deleted: vec![DeletedEntry {
                        name: name.to_string(),
@@ -197,45 +189,27 @@ async fn delete_one(
    let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;

    // Fetch matching rows with FOR UPDATE; use folder when provided to resolve ambiguity.
-    let rows: Vec<EntryRow> = if let Some(uid) = user_id {
-        if let Some(f) = folder {
-            sqlx::query_as(
-                "SELECT id, version, folder, type, tags, metadata, notes FROM entries \
-                 WHERE user_id = $1 AND folder = $2 AND name = $3 FOR UPDATE",
-            )
-            .bind(uid)
-            .bind(f)
-            .bind(name)
-            .fetch_all(&mut *tx)
-            .await?
-        } else {
-            sqlx::query_as(
-                "SELECT id, version, folder, type, tags, metadata, notes FROM entries \
-                 WHERE user_id = $1 AND name = $2 FOR UPDATE",
-            )
-            .bind(uid)
-            .bind(name)
-            .fetch_all(&mut *tx)
-            .await?
-        }
-    } else if let Some(f) = folder {
-        sqlx::query_as(
-            "SELECT id, version, folder, type, tags, metadata, notes FROM entries \
-             WHERE user_id IS NULL AND folder = $1 AND name = $2 FOR UPDATE",
-        )
-        .bind(f)
-        .bind(name)
-        .fetch_all(&mut *tx)
-        .await?
-    } else {
-        sqlx::query_as(
-            "SELECT id, version, folder, type, tags, metadata, notes FROM entries \
-             WHERE user_id IS NULL AND name = $1 FOR UPDATE",
-        )
-        .bind(name)
-        .fetch_all(&mut *tx)
-        .await?
-    };
+    let mut idx = 1i32;
+    let user_cond = user_scope_condition(user_id, &mut idx);
+    let mut conditions = vec![user_cond];
+    if folder.is_some() {
+        conditions.push(format!("folder = ${}", idx));
+        idx += 1;
+    }
+    conditions.push(format!("name = ${}", idx));
+    let sql = format!(
+        "SELECT id, version, folder, type, tags, metadata, notes FROM entries WHERE {} FOR UPDATE",
+        conditions.join(" AND ")
+    );
+    let mut q = sqlx::query_as::<_, EntryRow>(&sql);
+    if let Some(uid) = user_id {
+        q = q.bind(uid);
+    }
+    if let Some(f) = folder {
+        q = q.bind(f);
+    }
+    q = q.bind(name);
+    let rows = q.fetch_all(&mut *tx).await?;

    let row = match rows.len() {
        0 => {
@@ -245,7 +219,10 @@ async fn delete_one(
                dry_run: false,
            });
        }
-        1 => rows.into_iter().next().unwrap(),
+        1 => rows
+            .into_iter()
+            .next()
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("internal: matched row vanished"))?,
        _ => {
            tx.rollback().await?;
            let folders: Vec<&str> = rows.iter().map(|r| r.folder.as_str()).collect();
@@ -374,6 +351,16 @@ async fn delete_bulk(
    }
    let rows = q.fetch_all(&mut *tx).await?;

+    if rows.len() > MAX_BULK_DELETE {
+        tx.rollback().await?;
+        anyhow::bail!(
+            "Bulk delete would affect {} entries (limit: {}). \
+             Narrow your filters or delete entries individually.",
+            rows.len(),
+            MAX_BULK_DELETE,
+        );
+    }
+
    let mut deleted = Vec::with_capacity(rows.len());
    for row in &rows {
        let entry_row: EntryRow = EntryRow {
@@ -427,6 +414,15 @@ async fn snapshot_and_delete(
    row: &EntryRow,
    user_id: Option<Uuid>,
 ) -> Result<()> {
+    let history_metadata = match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(tx, row.id, &row.metadata).await
+    {
+        Ok(v) => v,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
+            row.metadata.clone()
+        }
+    };
+
    if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
        tx,
        db::EntrySnapshotParams {
@@ -438,7 +434,7 @@ async fn snapshot_and_delete(
            version: row.version,
            action: "delete",
            tags: &row.tags,
-            metadata: &row.metadata,
+            metadata: &history_metadata,
        },
    )
    .await
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/service/env_map.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/service/env_map.rs
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ use std::collections::HashMap;
 use uuid::Uuid;

 use crate::crypto;
-use crate::models::Entry;
 use crate::service::search::{fetch_entries, fetch_secrets_for_entries};

 /// Build an env variable map from entry secrets (for dry-run preview or injection).
@@ -22,56 +21,43 @@ pub async fn build_env_map(
    user_id: Option<Uuid>,
 ) -> Result<HashMap<String, String>> {
    let entries = fetch_entries(pool, folder, entry_type, name, tags, None, user_id).await?;
+    if entries.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(HashMap::new());
+    }
+
+    let entry_ids: Vec<Uuid> = entries.iter().map(|e| e.id).collect();
+    let secrets_map = fetch_secrets_for_entries(pool, &entry_ids).await?;

    let mut combined: HashMap<String, String> = HashMap::new();

    for entry in &entries {
-        let entry_map =
-            build_entry_env_map(pool, entry, only_fields, prefix, master_key, user_id).await?;
-        combined.extend(entry_map);
+        let all_fields = secrets_map.get(&entry.id).map(Vec::as_slice).unwrap_or(&[]);
+        let effective_prefix = env_prefix(entry, prefix);
+
+        let fields: Vec<_> = if only_fields.is_empty() {
+            all_fields.iter().collect()
+        } else {
+            all_fields
+                .iter()
+                .filter(|f| only_fields.contains(&f.name))
+                .collect()
+        };
+
+        for f in fields {
+            let decrypted = crypto::decrypt_json(master_key, &f.encrypted)?;
+            let key = format!(
+                "{}_{}",
+                effective_prefix,
+                f.name.to_uppercase().replace(['-', '.'], "_")
+            );
+            combined.insert(key, json_to_env_string(&decrypted));
+        }
    }

    Ok(combined)
 }

-async fn build_entry_env_map(
-    pool: &PgPool,
-    entry: &Entry,
-    only_fields: &[String],
-    prefix: &str,
-    master_key: &[u8; 32],
-    _user_id: Option<Uuid>,
-) -> Result<HashMap<String, String>> {
-    let entry_ids = vec![entry.id];
-    let secrets_map = fetch_secrets_for_entries(pool, &entry_ids).await?;
-    let all_fields = secrets_map.get(&entry.id).map(Vec::as_slice).unwrap_or(&[]);
-
-    let fields: Vec<_> = if only_fields.is_empty() {
-        all_fields.iter().collect()
-    } else {
-        all_fields
-            .iter()
-            .filter(|f| only_fields.contains(&f.name))
-            .collect()
-    };
-
-    let effective_prefix = env_prefix(entry, prefix);
-    let mut map = HashMap::new();
-
-    for f in fields {
-        let decrypted = crypto::decrypt_json(master_key, &f.encrypted)?;
-        let key = format!(
-            "{}_{}",
-            effective_prefix,
-            f.name.to_uppercase().replace(['-', '.'], "_")
-        );
-        map.insert(key, json_to_env_string(&decrypted));
-    }
-
-    Ok(map)
-}
-
-fn env_prefix(entry: &Entry, prefix: &str) -> String {
+fn env_prefix(entry: &crate::models::Entry, prefix: &str) -> String {
    let name_part = entry.name.to_uppercase().replace(['-', '.', ' '], "_");
    if prefix.is_empty() {
        name_part
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/service/get_secret.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/service/get_secret.rs
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ use std::collections::HashMap;
 use uuid::Uuid;

 use crate::crypto;
+use crate::error::AppError;
 use crate::service::search::{fetch_secrets_for_entries, resolve_entry, resolve_entry_by_id};

 /// Decrypt a single named field from an entry.
@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ pub async fn get_secret_field_by_id(
 ) -> Result<Value> {
    resolve_entry_by_id(pool, entry_id, user_id)
        .await
-        .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("Entry with id '{}' not found", entry_id))?;
+        .map_err(|_| anyhow::Error::from(AppError::NotFoundEntry))?;

    let entry_ids = vec![entry_id];
    let secrets_map = fetch_secrets_for_entries(pool, &entry_ids).await?;
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ pub async fn get_all_secrets_by_id(
    // Validate entry exists (and that it belongs to the requesting user)
    resolve_entry_by_id(pool, entry_id, user_id)
        .await
-        .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("Entry with id '{}' not found", entry_id))?;
+        .map_err(|_| anyhow::Error::from(AppError::NotFoundEntry))?;

    let entry_ids = vec![entry_id];
    let secrets_map = fetch_secrets_for_entries(pool, &entry_ids).await?;
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/service/history.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/service/history.rs
@@ -31,8 +31,11 @@ pub async fn run(
    let entry = resolve_entry(pool, name, folder, user_id).await?;

    let rows: Vec<Row> = sqlx::query_as(
-        "SELECT version, action, created_at FROM entries_history \
-         WHERE entry_id = $1 ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT $2",
+        "SELECT DISTINCT ON (version) version, action, created_at \
+         FROM entries_history \
+         WHERE entry_id = $1 \
+         ORDER BY version DESC, id DESC \
+         LIMIT $2",
    )
    .bind(entry.id)
    .bind(limit as i64)
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/service/import.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/service/import.rs
@@ -54,7 +54,13 @@ pub async fn run(
        .bind(params.user_id)
        .fetch_one(pool)
        .await
-        .unwrap_or(false);
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            anyhow::anyhow!(
+                "Failed to check entry existence for '{}': {}",
+                entry.name,
+                e
+            )
+        })?;

        if exists && !params.force {
            return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/service/mod.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/service/mod.rs
@@ -11,3 +11,4 @@ pub mod rollback;
 pub mod search;
 pub mod update;
 pub mod user;
+pub mod util;
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/service/rollback.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/service/rollback.rs
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+use std::collections::HashSet;
+
 use anyhow::Result;
 use serde_json::Value;
 use sqlx::PgPool;
@@ -21,7 +23,6 @@ pub async fn run(
    name: &str,
    folder: Option<&str>,
    to_version: Option<i64>,
-    master_key: &[u8; 32],
    user_id: Option<Uuid>,
 ) -> Result<RollbackResult> {
    #[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
@@ -122,7 +123,7 @@ pub async fn run(
        sqlx::query_as(
            "SELECT folder, type, version, action, tags, metadata \
             FROM entries_history \
-             WHERE entry_id = $1 AND version = $2 ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1",
+             WHERE entry_id = $1 AND version = $2 ORDER BY id ASC LIMIT 1",
        )
        .bind(entry_id)
        .bind(ver)
@@ -149,7 +150,8 @@ pub async fn run(
        )
    })?;

-    let _ = master_key;
+    let snap_secret_snapshot = db::entry_secret_snapshot_from_metadata(&snap.metadata);
+    let snap_metadata = db::strip_secret_snapshot_from_metadata(&snap.metadata);

    let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;

@@ -162,13 +164,11 @@ pub async fn run(
        entry_type: String,
        tags: Vec<String>,
        metadata: Value,
-        #[allow(dead_code)]
-        notes: String,
    }

    // Lock the live entry if it exists (matched by entry_id for precision).
    let live: Option<LiveEntry> = sqlx::query_as(
-        "SELECT id, version, folder, type, tags, metadata, notes FROM entries \
+        "SELECT id, version, folder, type, tags, metadata FROM entries \
         WHERE id = $1 FOR UPDATE",
    )
    .bind(entry_id)
@@ -176,6 +176,15 @@ pub async fn run(
    .await?;

    let live_entry_id = if let Some(ref lr) = live {
+        let history_metadata =
+            match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(&mut tx, lr.id, &lr.metadata).await {
+                Ok(v) => v,
+                Err(e) => {
+                    tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
+                    lr.metadata.clone()
+                }
+            };
+
        if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
            &mut tx,
            db::EntrySnapshotParams {
@@ -187,7 +196,7 @@ pub async fn run(
                version: lr.version,
                action: "rollback",
                tags: &lr.tags,
-                metadata: &lr.metadata,
+                metadata: &history_metadata,
            },
        )
        .await
@@ -228,11 +237,13 @@ pub async fn run(
        }

        sqlx::query(
-            "UPDATE entries SET tags = $1, metadata = $2, version = version + 1, \
-             updated_at = NOW() WHERE id = $3",
+            "UPDATE entries SET folder = $1, type = $2, tags = $3, metadata = $4, version = version + 1, \
+             updated_at = NOW() WHERE id = $5",
        )
+        .bind(&snap.folder)
+        .bind(&snap.entry_type)
        .bind(&snap.tags)
-        .bind(&snap.metadata)
+        .bind(&snap_metadata)
        .bind(lr.id)
        .execute(&mut *tx)
        .await?;
@@ -250,7 +261,7 @@ pub async fn run(
            .bind(&snap.entry_type)
            .bind(name)
            .bind(&snap.tags)
-            .bind(&snap.metadata)
+            .bind(&snap_metadata)
            .bind(snap.version)
            .fetch_one(&mut *tx)
            .await?
@@ -264,16 +275,16 @@ pub async fn run(
            .bind(&snap.entry_type)
            .bind(name)
            .bind(&snap.tags)
-            .bind(&snap.metadata)
+            .bind(&snap_metadata)
            .bind(snap.version)
            .fetch_one(&mut *tx)
            .await?
        }
    };

-    // In N:N mode, rollback restores entry metadata/tags only.
-    // Secret snapshots are kept for audit but secret linkage/content is not rewritten here.
-    let _ = live_entry_id;
+    if let Some(secret_snapshot) = snap_secret_snapshot {
+        restore_entry_secrets(&mut tx, live_entry_id, user_id, &secret_snapshot).await?;
+    }

    crate::audit::log_tx(
        &mut tx,
@@ -298,3 +309,144 @@ pub async fn run(
        restored_version: snap.version,
    })
 }
+
+async fn restore_entry_secrets(
+    tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'_, sqlx::Postgres>,
+    entry_id: Uuid,
+    user_id: Option<Uuid>,
+    snapshot: &[db::EntrySecretSnapshot],
+) -> Result<()> {
+    #[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
+    struct LinkedSecret {
+        id: Uuid,
+        name: String,
+        encrypted: Vec<u8>,
+    }
+
+    let linked: Vec<LinkedSecret> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT s.id, s.name, s.encrypted \
+         FROM entry_secrets es \
+         JOIN secrets s ON s.id = es.secret_id \
+         WHERE es.entry_id = $1",
+    )
+    .bind(entry_id)
+    .fetch_all(&mut **tx)
+    .await?;
+
+    let target_names: HashSet<&str> = snapshot.iter().map(|s| s.name.as_str()).collect();
+
+    for s in &linked {
+        if target_names.contains(s.name.as_str()) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_secret_history(
+            tx,
+            db::SecretSnapshotParams {
+                secret_id: s.id,
+                name: &s.name,
+                encrypted: &s.encrypted,
+                action: "rollback",
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        {
+            tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot secret before rollback unlink");
+        }
+
+        sqlx::query("DELETE FROM entry_secrets WHERE entry_id = $1 AND secret_id = $2")
+            .bind(entry_id)
+            .bind(s.id)
+            .execute(&mut **tx)
+            .await?;
+
+        sqlx::query(
+            "DELETE FROM secrets s \
+             WHERE s.id = $1 \
+               AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM entry_secrets es WHERE es.secret_id = s.id)",
+        )
+        .bind(s.id)
+        .execute(&mut **tx)
+        .await?;
+    }
+
+    for snap in snapshot {
+        let encrypted = ::hex::decode(&snap.encrypted_hex).map_err(|e| {
+            anyhow::anyhow!("invalid secret snapshot data for '{}': {}", snap.name, e)
+        })?;
+
+        #[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
+        struct ExistingSecret {
+            id: Uuid,
+            encrypted: Vec<u8>,
+        }
+
+        let existing: Option<ExistingSecret> = if let Some(uid) = user_id {
+            sqlx::query_as("SELECT id, encrypted FROM secrets WHERE user_id = $1 AND name = $2")
+                .bind(uid)
+                .bind(&snap.name)
+                .fetch_optional(&mut **tx)
+                .await?
+        } else {
+            sqlx::query_as("SELECT id, encrypted FROM secrets WHERE user_id IS NULL AND name = $1")
+                .bind(&snap.name)
+                .fetch_optional(&mut **tx)
+                .await?
+        };
+
+        let secret_id = if let Some(ex) = existing {
+            if ex.encrypted != encrypted
+                && let Err(e) = db::snapshot_secret_history(
+                    tx,
+                    db::SecretSnapshotParams {
+                        secret_id: ex.id,
+                        name: &snap.name,
+                        encrypted: &ex.encrypted,
+                        action: "rollback",
+                    },
+                )
+                .await
+            {
+                tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot secret before rollback restore");
+            }
+            sqlx::query(
+                "UPDATE secrets SET type = $1, encrypted = $2, version = version + 1, updated_at = NOW() \
+                 WHERE id = $3",
+            )
+            .bind(&snap.secret_type)
+            .bind(&encrypted)
+            .bind(ex.id)
+            .execute(&mut **tx)
+            .await?;
+            ex.id
+        } else if let Some(uid) = user_id {
+            sqlx::query_scalar(
+                "INSERT INTO secrets (user_id, name, type, encrypted) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4) RETURNING id",
+            )
+            .bind(uid)
+            .bind(&snap.name)
+            .bind(&snap.secret_type)
+            .bind(&encrypted)
+            .fetch_one(&mut **tx)
+            .await?
+        } else {
+            sqlx::query_scalar(
+                "INSERT INTO secrets (user_id, name, type, encrypted) VALUES (NULL, $1, $2, $3) RETURNING id",
+            )
+            .bind(&snap.name)
+            .bind(&snap.secret_type)
+            .bind(&encrypted)
+            .fetch_one(&mut **tx)
+            .await?
+        };
+
+        sqlx::query(
+            "INSERT INTO entry_secrets (entry_id, secret_id) VALUES ($1, $2) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING",
+        )
+        .bind(entry_id)
+        .bind(secret_id)
+        .execute(&mut **tx)
+        .await?;
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/service/search.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/service/search.rs
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ use uuid::Uuid;

 use crate::models::{Entry, SecretField};

-pub const FETCH_ALL_LIMIT: u32 = 100_000;
+pub const FETCH_ALL_LIMIT: u32 = 10_000;

 /// Build an ILIKE pattern for fuzzy matching, escaping `%` and `_` literals.
 pub fn ilike_pattern(value: &str) -> String {
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ pub async fn run(pool: &PgPool, params: SearchParams<'_>) -> Result<SearchResult
    let entries = fetch_entries_paged(pool, &params).await?;
    let entry_ids: Vec<Uuid> = entries.iter().map(|e| e.id).collect();
    let secret_schemas = if !entry_ids.is_empty() {
-        fetch_secret_schemas(pool, &entry_ids).await?
+        fetch_secrets_for_entries(pool, &entry_ids).await?
    } else {
        HashMap::new()
    };
@@ -229,33 +229,6 @@ async fn fetch_entries_paged(pool: &PgPool, a: &SearchParams<'_>) -> Result<Vec<
    Ok(rows.into_iter().map(Entry::from).collect())
 }

-/// Fetch secret field names for a set of entry ids (no decryption).
-pub async fn fetch_secret_schemas(
-    pool: &PgPool,
-    entry_ids: &[Uuid],
-) -> Result<HashMap<Uuid, Vec<SecretField>>> {
-    if entry_ids.is_empty() {
-        return Ok(HashMap::new());
-    }
-    let fields: Vec<EntrySecretRow> = sqlx::query_as(
-        "SELECT es.entry_id, s.id, s.user_id, s.name, s.type, s.encrypted, s.version, s.created_at, s.updated_at \
-         FROM entry_secrets es \
-         JOIN secrets s ON s.id = es.secret_id \
-         WHERE es.entry_id = ANY($1) \
-         ORDER BY es.entry_id, es.sort_order, s.name",
-    )
-    .bind(entry_ids)
-    .fetch_all(pool)
-    .await?;
-
-    let mut map: HashMap<Uuid, Vec<SecretField>> = HashMap::new();
-    for f in fields {
-        let entry_id = f.entry_id;
-        map.entry(entry_id).or_default().push(f.secret());
-    }
-    Ok(map)
-}
-
 /// Fetch all secret fields (including encrypted bytes) for a set of entry ids.
 pub async fn fetch_secrets_for_entries(
    pool: &PgPool,
@@ -334,7 +307,10 @@ pub async fn resolve_entry(
                anyhow::bail!("Not found: '{}'", name)
            }
        }
-        1 => Ok(entries.into_iter().next().unwrap()),
+        1 => entries
+            .into_iter()
+            .next()
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("internal: resolve_entry result vanished")),
        _ => {
            let folders: Vec<&str> = entries.iter().map(|e| e.folder.as_str()).collect();
            anyhow::bail!(
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/service/update.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/service/update.rs
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ use crate::service::add::{
    collect_field_paths, collect_key_paths, flatten_json_fields, insert_path, parse_key_path,
    parse_kv, remove_path,
 };
-use crate::taxonomy;
+use crate::service::util::user_scope_condition;

 #[derive(Debug, serde::Serialize)]
 pub struct UpdateResult {
@@ -51,55 +51,43 @@ pub async fn run(
    params: UpdateParams<'_>,
    master_key: &[u8; 32],
 ) -> Result<UpdateResult> {
+    if params.name.chars().count() > 256 {
+        anyhow::bail!("name must be at most 256 characters");
+    }
    let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;

    // Fetch matching rows with FOR UPDATE; use folder when provided to resolve ambiguity.
-    let rows: Vec<EntryRow> = if let Some(uid) = params.user_id {
-        if let Some(folder) = params.folder {
-            sqlx::query_as(
-                "SELECT id, version, folder, type, tags, metadata, notes FROM entries \
-                 WHERE user_id = $1 AND folder = $2 AND name = $3 FOR UPDATE",
-            )
-            .bind(uid)
-            .bind(folder)
-            .bind(params.name)
-            .fetch_all(&mut *tx)
-            .await?
-        } else {
-            sqlx::query_as(
-                "SELECT id, version, folder, type, tags, metadata, notes FROM entries \
-                 WHERE user_id = $1 AND name = $2 FOR UPDATE",
-            )
-            .bind(uid)
-            .bind(params.name)
-            .fetch_all(&mut *tx)
-            .await?
-        }
-    } else if let Some(folder) = params.folder {
-        sqlx::query_as(
-            "SELECT id, version, folder, type, tags, metadata, notes FROM entries \
-             WHERE user_id IS NULL AND folder = $1 AND name = $2 FOR UPDATE",
-        )
-        .bind(folder)
-        .bind(params.name)
-        .fetch_all(&mut *tx)
-        .await?
-    } else {
-        sqlx::query_as(
-            "SELECT id, version, folder, type, tags, metadata, notes FROM entries \
-             WHERE user_id IS NULL AND name = $1 FOR UPDATE",
-        )
-        .bind(params.name)
-        .fetch_all(&mut *tx)
-        .await?
-    };
+    let mut idx = 1i32;
+    let user_cond = user_scope_condition(params.user_id, &mut idx);
+    let mut conditions = vec![user_cond];
+    if params.folder.is_some() {
+        conditions.push(format!("folder = ${}", idx));
+        idx += 1;
+    }
+    conditions.push(format!("name = ${}", idx));
+    let sql = format!(
+        "SELECT id, version, folder, type, tags, metadata, notes FROM entries WHERE {} FOR UPDATE",
+        conditions.join(" AND ")
+    );
+    let mut q = sqlx::query_as::<_, EntryRow>(&sql);
+    if let Some(uid) = params.user_id {
+        q = q.bind(uid);
+    }
+    if let Some(folder) = params.folder {
+        q = q.bind(folder);
+    }
+    q = q.bind(params.name);
+    let rows = q.fetch_all(&mut *tx).await?;

    let row = match rows.len() {
        0 => {
            tx.rollback().await?;
            return Err(AppError::NotFoundEntry.into());
        }
-        1 => rows.into_iter().next().unwrap(),
+        1 => rows
+            .into_iter()
+            .next()
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("internal: matched row vanished"))?,
        _ => {
            tx.rollback().await?;
            let folders: Vec<&str> = rows.iter().map(|r| r.folder.as_str()).collect();
@@ -113,6 +101,15 @@ pub async fn run(
        }
    };

+    let history_metadata =
+        match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(&mut tx, row.id, &row.metadata).await {
+            Ok(v) => v,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
+                row.metadata.clone()
+            }
+        };
+
    if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
        &mut tx,
        db::EntrySnapshotParams {
@@ -124,7 +121,7 @@ pub async fn run(
            version: row.version,
            action: "update",
            tags: &row.tags,
-            metadata: &row.metadata,
+            metadata: &history_metadata,
        },
    )
    .await
@@ -403,8 +400,8 @@ pub async fn run(
        &mut tx,
        params.user_id,
        "update",
-        "",
-        "",
+        &row.folder,
+        &row.entry_type,
        params.name,
        serde_json::json!({
            "add_tags": params.add_tags,
@@ -482,6 +479,15 @@ pub async fn update_fields_by_id(
        }
    };

+    let history_metadata =
+        match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(&mut tx, row.id, &row.metadata).await {
+            Ok(v) => v,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
+                row.metadata.clone()
+            }
+        };
+
    if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
        &mut tx,
        db::EntrySnapshotParams {
@@ -493,7 +499,7 @@ pub async fn update_fields_by_id(
            version: row.version,
            action: "update",
            tags: &row.tags,
-            metadata: &row.metadata,
+            metadata: &history_metadata,
        },
    )
    .await
@@ -501,13 +507,7 @@ pub async fn update_fields_by_id(
        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot entry history before web update");
    }

-    let mut metadata_map = match params.metadata {
-        Value::Object(m) => m.clone(),
-        _ => Map::new(),
-    };
-    let normalized_type =
-        taxonomy::normalize_entry_type_and_metadata(params.entry_type, &mut metadata_map);
-    let normalized_metadata = Value::Object(metadata_map);
+    let entry_type = params.entry_type.trim();

    let res = sqlx::query(
        "UPDATE entries SET folder = $1, type = $2, name = $3, notes = $4, tags = $5, metadata = $6, \
@@ -515,11 +515,11 @@ pub async fn update_fields_by_id(
         WHERE id = $7 AND version = $8",
    )
    .bind(params.folder)
-    .bind(&normalized_type)
+    .bind(entry_type)
    .bind(params.name)
    .bind(params.notes)
    .bind(params.tags)
-    .bind(&normalized_metadata)
+    .bind(params.metadata)
    .bind(row.id)
    .bind(row.version)
    .execute(&mut *tx)
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ pub async fn update_fields_by_id(
        Some(user_id),
        "update",
        params.folder,
-        &normalized_type,
+        entry_type,
        params.name,
        serde_json::json!({
            "source": "web",
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/service/user.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/service/user.rs
@@ -16,24 +16,28 @@ pub struct OAuthProfile {
 /// Find or create a user from an OAuth profile.
 /// Returns (user, is_new) where is_new indicates first-time registration.
 pub async fn find_or_create_user(pool: &PgPool, profile: OAuthProfile) -> Result<(User, bool)> {
-    // Check if this OAuth account already exists
+    // Use a transaction with FOR UPDATE to prevent TOCTOU race conditions
+    let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;
+
+    // Check if this OAuth account already exists (with row lock)
    let existing: Option<OauthAccount> = sqlx::query_as(
        "SELECT id, user_id, provider, provider_id, email, name, avatar_url, created_at \
-         FROM oauth_accounts WHERE provider = $1 AND provider_id = $2",
+         FROM oauth_accounts WHERE provider = $1 AND provider_id = $2 FOR UPDATE",
    )
    .bind(&profile.provider)
    .bind(&profile.provider_id)
-    .fetch_optional(pool)
+    .fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
    .await?;

    if let Some(oa) = existing {
        let user: User = sqlx::query_as(
-            "SELECT id, email, name, avatar_url, key_salt, key_check, key_params, api_key, created_at, updated_at \
+            "SELECT id, email, name, avatar_url, key_salt, key_check, key_params, api_key, key_version, created_at, updated_at \
             FROM users WHERE id = $1",
        )
        .bind(oa.user_id)
-        .fetch_one(pool)
+        .fetch_one(&mut *tx)
        .await?;
+        tx.commit().await?;
        return Ok((user, false));
    }

@@ -43,12 +47,10 @@ pub async fn find_or_create_user(pool: &PgPool, profile: OAuthProfile) -> Result
        .clone()
        .unwrap_or_else(|| profile.email.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| "User".to_string()));

-    let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;
-
    let user: User = sqlx::query_as(
        "INSERT INTO users (email, name, avatar_url) \
         VALUES ($1, $2, $3) \
-         RETURNING id, email, name, avatar_url, key_salt, key_check, key_params, api_key, created_at, updated_at",
+         RETURNING id, email, name, avatar_url, key_salt, key_check, key_params, api_key, key_version, created_at, updated_at",
    )
    .bind(&profile.email)
    .bind(&display_name)
@@ -74,6 +76,53 @@ pub async fn find_or_create_user(pool: &PgPool, profile: OAuthProfile) -> Result
    Ok((user, true))
 }

+/// Re-encrypt all of a user's secrets from `old_key` to `new_key` and update the key metadata.
+///
+/// Runs entirely inside a single database transaction: if any secret fails to re-encrypt
+/// the whole operation is rolled back, leaving the database unchanged.
+pub async fn change_user_key(
+    pool: &PgPool,
+    user_id: Uuid,
+    old_key: &[u8; 32],
+    new_key: &[u8; 32],
+    new_salt: &[u8],
+    new_key_check: &[u8],
+    new_key_params: &Value,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;
+
+    let secrets: Vec<(uuid::Uuid, Vec<u8>)> =
+        sqlx::query_as("SELECT id, encrypted FROM secrets WHERE user_id = $1 FOR UPDATE")
+            .bind(user_id)
+            .fetch_all(&mut *tx)
+            .await?;
+
+    for (id, encrypted) in &secrets {
+        let plaintext = crate::crypto::decrypt(old_key, encrypted)?;
+        let new_encrypted = crate::crypto::encrypt(new_key, &plaintext)?;
+        sqlx::query("UPDATE secrets SET encrypted = $1, updated_at = NOW() WHERE id = $2")
+            .bind(&new_encrypted)
+            .bind(id)
+            .execute(&mut *tx)
+            .await?;
+    }
+
+    sqlx::query(
+        "UPDATE users SET key_salt = $1, key_check = $2, key_params = $3, \
+         key_version = key_version + 1, updated_at = NOW() \
+         WHERE id = $4",
+    )
+    .bind(new_salt)
+    .bind(new_key_check)
+    .bind(new_key_params)
+    .bind(user_id)
+    .execute(&mut *tx)
+    .await?;
+
+    tx.commit().await?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 /// Store the PBKDF2 salt, key_check, and params for a user's passphrase setup.
 pub async fn update_user_key_setup(
    pool: &PgPool,
@@ -98,7 +147,7 @@ pub async fn update_user_key_setup(
 /// Fetch a user by ID.
 pub async fn get_user_by_id(pool: &PgPool, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<Option<User>> {
    let user = sqlx::query_as(
-        "SELECT id, email, name, avatar_url, key_salt, key_check, key_params, api_key, created_at, updated_at \
+        "SELECT id, email, name, avatar_url, key_salt, key_check, key_params, api_key, key_version, created_at, updated_at \
         FROM users WHERE id = $1",
    )
    .bind(user_id)
@@ -125,13 +174,16 @@ pub async fn bind_oauth_account(
    user_id: Uuid,
    profile: OAuthProfile,
 ) -> Result<OauthAccount> {
-    // Check if this provider_id is already linked to someone else
+    // Use a transaction with FOR UPDATE to prevent TOCTOU race conditions
+    let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;
+
+    // Check if this provider_id is already linked to someone else (with row lock)
    let conflict: Option<(Uuid,)> = sqlx::query_as(
-        "SELECT user_id FROM oauth_accounts WHERE provider = $1 AND provider_id = $2",
+        "SELECT user_id FROM oauth_accounts WHERE provider = $1 AND provider_id = $2 FOR UPDATE",
    )
    .bind(&profile.provider)
    .bind(&profile.provider_id)
-    .fetch_optional(pool)
+    .fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
    .await?;

    if let Some((existing_user_id,)) = conflict {
@@ -148,11 +200,11 @@ pub async fn bind_oauth_account(
    }

    let existing_provider_for_user: Option<(String,)> = sqlx::query_as(
-        "SELECT provider_id FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1 AND provider = $2",
+        "SELECT provider_id FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1 AND provider = $2 FOR UPDATE",
    )
    .bind(user_id)
    .bind(&profile.provider)
-    .fetch_optional(pool)
+    .fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
    .await?;

    if existing_provider_for_user.is_some() {
@@ -174,9 +226,10 @@ pub async fn bind_oauth_account(
    .bind(&profile.email)
    .bind(&profile.name)
    .bind(&profile.avatar_url)
-    .fetch_one(pool)
+    .fetch_one(&mut *tx)
    .await?;

+    tx.commit().await?;
    Ok(account)
 }

@@ -194,10 +247,14 @@ pub async fn unbind_oauth_account(
        );
    }

-    let count: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1")
-        .bind(user_id)
-        .fetch_one(pool)
-        .await?;
+    let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;
+
+    let locked_accounts: Vec<(String,)> =
+        sqlx::query_as("SELECT provider FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1 FOR UPDATE")
+            .bind(user_id)
+            .fetch_all(&mut *tx)
+            .await?;
+    let count = locked_accounts.len();

    if count <= 1 {
        anyhow::bail!("Cannot unbind the last OAuth account. Please link another account first.");
@@ -206,8 +263,87 @@ pub async fn unbind_oauth_account(
    sqlx::query("DELETE FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1 AND provider = $2")
        .bind(user_id)
        .bind(provider)
-        .execute(pool)
+        .execute(&mut *tx)
        .await?;

+    tx.commit().await?;
+
    Ok(())
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    async fn maybe_test_pool() -> Option<PgPool> {
+        let database_url = match std::env::var("SECRETS_DATABASE_URL") {
+            Ok(v) => v,
+            Err(_) => {
+                eprintln!("skip user service tests: SECRETS_DATABASE_URL not set");
+                return None;
+            }
+        };
+        let pool = match sqlx::PgPool::connect(&database_url).await {
+            Ok(pool) => pool,
+            Err(e) => {
+                eprintln!("skip user service tests: cannot connect to database: {e}");
+                return None;
+            }
+        };
+        if let Err(e) = crate::db::migrate(&pool).await {
+            eprintln!("skip user service tests: migrate failed: {e}");
+            return None;
+        }
+        Some(pool)
+    }
+
+    async fn cleanup_user_rows(pool: &PgPool, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<()> {
+        sqlx::query("DELETE FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1")
+            .bind(user_id)
+            .execute(pool)
+            .await?;
+        sqlx::query("DELETE FROM users WHERE id = $1")
+            .bind(user_id)
+            .execute(pool)
+            .await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn unbind_oauth_account_removes_only_requested_provider() -> Result<()> {
+        let Some(pool) = maybe_test_pool().await else {
+            return Ok(());
+        };
+        let user_id = Uuid::from_u128(rand::random());
+
+        cleanup_user_rows(&pool, user_id).await?;
+
+        sqlx::query("INSERT INTO users (id, name) VALUES ($1, '')")
+            .bind(user_id)
+            .execute(&pool)
+            .await?;
+        sqlx::query(
+            "INSERT INTO oauth_accounts (user_id, provider, provider_id, email, name, avatar_url) \
+             VALUES ($1, 'google', $2, NULL, NULL, NULL), \
+                    ($1, 'github', $3, NULL, NULL, NULL)",
+        )
+        .bind(user_id)
+        .bind(format!("google-{user_id}"))
+        .bind(format!("github-{user_id}"))
+        .execute(&pool)
+        .await?;
+
+        unbind_oauth_account(&pool, user_id, "github", Some("google")).await?;
+
+        let remaining: Vec<(String,)> = sqlx::query_as(
+            "SELECT provider FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1 ORDER BY provider",
+        )
+        .bind(user_id)
+        .fetch_all(&pool)
+        .await?;
+        assert_eq!(remaining, vec![("google".to_string(),)]);
+
+        cleanup_user_rows(&pool, user_id).await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/service/util.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/service/util.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+use uuid::Uuid;
+
+/// Returns a WHERE condition fragment for user scope and advances `idx` if `user_id` is Some.
+///
+/// - `Some(uid)` → `"user_id = $N"` with idx incremented.
+/// - `None`      → `"user_id IS NULL"` with idx unchanged.
+///
+/// # Usage
+///
+/// ```rust,ignore
+/// let mut idx = 1i32;
+/// let user_cond = user_scope_condition(user_id, &mut idx);
+/// // idx is now 2 if user_id is Some, still 1 if None
+/// let sql = format!("SELECT ... FROM entries WHERE {user_cond} AND name = ${idx}");
+/// let mut q = sqlx::query_as::<_, Row>(&sql);
+/// if let Some(uid) = user_id { q = q.bind(uid); }
+/// q = q.bind(name);
+/// ```
+pub fn user_scope_condition(user_id: Option<Uuid>, idx: &mut i32) -> String {
+    if user_id.is_some() {
+        let s = format!("user_id = ${}", *idx);
+        *idx += 1;
+        s
+    } else {
+        "user_id IS NULL".to_string()
+    }
+}
--- a/crates/secrets-core/src/taxonomy.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-core/src/taxonomy.rs
@@ -1,111 +1,4 @@
-use serde_json::{Map, Value};
-
-fn normalize_token(input: &str) -> String {
-    input.trim().to_lowercase().replace('_', "-")
-}
-
-fn normalize_subtype_token(input: &str) -> String {
-    normalize_token(input)
-}
-
-fn map_legacy_entry_type(input: &str) -> Option<(&'static str, &'static str)> {
-    match input {
-        "log-ingestion-endpoint" => Some(("service", "log-ingestion")),
-        "cloud-api" => Some(("service", "cloud-api")),
-        "git-server" => Some(("service", "git")),
-        "mqtt-broker" => Some(("service", "mqtt-broker")),
-        "database" => Some(("service", "database")),
-        "monitoring-dashboard" => Some(("service", "monitoring")),
-        "dns-api" => Some(("service", "dns-api")),
-        "notification-webhook" => Some(("service", "webhook")),
-        "api-endpoint" => Some(("service", "api-endpoint")),
-        "credential" | "credential-key" => Some(("service", "credential")),
-        "key" => Some(("service", "credential")),
-        _ => None,
-    }
-}
-
-/// Normalize entry `type` and optionally backfill `metadata.subtype` for legacy values.
-///
-/// This keeps backward compatibility:
-/// - stable primary types stay unchanged
-/// - known legacy long-tail types are mapped to `service` + `metadata.subtype`
-/// - unknown values are kept (normalized to kebab-case) instead of hard failing
-pub fn normalize_entry_type_and_metadata(
-    entry_type: &str,
-    metadata: &mut Map<String, Value>,
-) -> String {
-    let original_raw = entry_type.trim();
-    let normalized = normalize_token(original_raw);
-    if normalized.is_empty() {
-        return String::new();
-    }
-
-    if let Some((mapped_type, mapped_subtype)) = map_legacy_entry_type(&normalized) {
-        if !metadata.contains_key("subtype") {
-            metadata.insert(
-                "subtype".to_string(),
-                Value::String(mapped_subtype.to_string()),
-            );
-        }
-        if !metadata.contains_key("_original_type") && original_raw != mapped_type {
-            metadata.insert(
-                "_original_type".to_string(),
-                Value::String(original_raw.to_string()),
-            );
-        }
-        return mapped_type.to_string();
-    }
-
-    if let Some(subtype) = metadata.get_mut("subtype")
-        && let Some(s) = subtype.as_str()
-    {
-        *subtype = Value::String(normalize_subtype_token(s));
-    }
-
-    normalized
-}
-
 /// Canonical secret type options for UI dropdowns.
 pub const SECRET_TYPE_OPTIONS: &[&str] = &[
    "text", "password", "token", "api-key", "ssh-key", "url", "phone", "id-card",
 ];
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use serde_json::{Map, Value};
-
-    #[test]
-    fn normalize_entry_type_maps_legacy_type_and_backfills_metadata() {
-        let mut metadata = Map::new();
-        let normalized = normalize_entry_type_and_metadata("git-server", &mut metadata);
-
-        assert_eq!(normalized, "service");
-        assert_eq!(
-            metadata.get("subtype"),
-            Some(&Value::String("git".to_string()))
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            metadata.get("_original_type"),
-            Some(&Value::String("git-server".to_string()))
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn normalize_entry_type_normalizes_existing_subtype() {
-        let mut metadata = Map::new();
-        metadata.insert(
-            "subtype".to_string(),
-            Value::String("Cloud_API".to_string()),
-        );
-
-        let normalized = normalize_entry_type_and_metadata("service", &mut metadata);
-
-        assert_eq!(normalized, "service");
-        assert_eq!(
-            metadata.get("subtype"),
-            Some(&Value::String("cloud-api".to_string()))
-        );
-    }
-}
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/Cargo.toml
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/Cargo.toml
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "secrets-mcp"
-version = "0.5.0"
+version = "0.5.12"
 edition.workspace = true

 [[bin]]
@@ -17,9 +17,10 @@ rmcp = { version = "1", features = ["server", "macros", "transport-streamable-ht
 axum = "0.8"
 axum-extra = { version = "0.10", features = ["typed-header"] }
 tower = "0.5"
-tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["cors", "trace"] }
+tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["cors", "trace", "limit"] }
 tower-sessions = "0.14"
 tower-sessions-sqlx-store-chrono = { version = "0.14", features = ["postgres"] }
+governor = { version = "0.10", features = ["std", "jitter"] }
 time = "0.3"

 # OAuth (manual token exchange via reqwest)
@@ -33,7 +34,6 @@ anyhow.workspace = true
 chrono.workspace = true
 serde.workspace = true
 serde_json.workspace = true
-sha2.workspace = true
 rand.workspace = true
 sqlx.workspace = true
 tokio.workspace = true
@@ -44,3 +44,4 @@ dotenvy.workspace = true
 urlencoding = "2"
 schemars = "1"
 http = "1"
+url = "2"
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/auth.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/auth.rs
@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
-use std::net::SocketAddr;
-
 use axum::{
-    extract::{ConnectInfo, Request, State},
+    extract::{Request, State},
    http::StatusCode,
    middleware::Next,
    response::Response,
@@ -11,29 +9,14 @@ use uuid::Uuid;

 use secrets_core::service::api_key::validate_api_key;

+use crate::client_ip;
+
 /// Injected into request extensions after Bearer token validation.
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
 pub struct AuthUser {
    pub user_id: Uuid,
 }

-fn log_client_ip(req: &Request) -> Option<String> {
-    if let Some(first) = req
-        .headers()
-        .get("x-forwarded-for")
-        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-        .and_then(|s| s.split(',').next())
-    {
-        let s = first.trim();
-        if !s.is_empty() {
-            return Some(s.to_string());
-        }
-    }
-    req.extensions()
-        .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
-        .map(|c| c.ip().to_string())
-}
-
 /// Axum middleware that validates Bearer API keys for the /mcp route.
 /// Passes all non-MCP paths through without authentication.
 pub async fn bearer_auth_middleware(
@@ -43,7 +26,7 @@ pub async fn bearer_auth_middleware(
 ) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
    let path = req.uri().path();
    let method = req.method().as_str();
-    let client_ip = log_client_ip(&req);
+    let client_ip = client_ip::extract_client_ip(&req);

    // Only authenticate /mcp paths
    if !path.starts_with("/mcp") {
@@ -66,7 +49,7 @@ pub async fn bearer_auth_middleware(
            tracing::warn!(
                method,
                path,
-                client_ip = client_ip.as_deref(),
+                %client_ip,
                "invalid Authorization header format on /mcp (expected Bearer …)"
            );
            return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
@@ -75,7 +58,7 @@ pub async fn bearer_auth_middleware(
            tracing::warn!(
                method,
                path,
-                client_ip = client_ip.as_deref(),
+                %client_ip,
                "missing Authorization header on /mcp"
            );
            return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
@@ -93,7 +76,7 @@ pub async fn bearer_auth_middleware(
            tracing::warn!(
                method,
                path,
-                client_ip = client_ip.as_deref(),
+                %client_ip,
                key_prefix = %&raw_key.chars().take(12).collect::<String>(),
                key_len = raw_key.len(),
                "invalid api key (not found in database — e.g. revoked key or DB was reset; update MCP client Bearer token)"
@@ -104,7 +87,7 @@ pub async fn bearer_auth_middleware(
            tracing::error!(
                method,
                path,
-                client_ip = client_ip.as_deref(),
+                %client_ip,
                error = %e,
                "api key validation error"
            );
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/client_ip.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/client_ip.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+use axum::extract::Request;
+use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr};
+
+/// Extract the client IP from a request.
+///
+/// When the `TRUST_PROXY` environment variable is set to `1` or `true`, the
+/// `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` headers are consulted first, which is
+/// appropriate when the service runs behind a trusted reverse proxy (e.g.
+/// Caddy). Otherwise — or if those headers are absent/empty — the direct TCP
+/// connection address from `ConnectInfo` is used.
+///
+/// **Important**: only enable `TRUST_PROXY` when the application is guaranteed
+/// to receive traffic exclusively through a controlled reverse proxy. Enabling
+/// it on a directly-exposed port allows clients to spoof their IP address and
+/// bypass per-IP rate limiting.
+pub fn extract_client_ip(req: &Request) -> String {
+    if trust_proxy_enabled() {
+        if let Some(ip) = forwarded_for_ip(req.headers()) {
+            return ip;
+        }
+        if let Some(ip) = real_ip(req.headers()) {
+            return ip;
+        }
+    }
+
+    connect_info_ip(req).unwrap_or_else(|| "unknown".to_string())
+}
+
+/// Extract the client IP from individual header map and socket address components.
+///
+/// This variant is used by handlers that receive headers and connect info as
+/// separate axum extractor parameters (e.g. OAuth callback handlers).
+/// The same `TRUST_PROXY` logic applies.
+pub fn extract_client_ip_parts(
+    headers: &axum::http::HeaderMap,
+    addr: std::net::SocketAddr,
+) -> String {
+    if trust_proxy_enabled() {
+        if let Some(ip) = forwarded_for_ip(headers) {
+            return ip;
+        }
+        if let Some(ip) = real_ip(headers) {
+            return ip;
+        }
+    }
+    addr.ip().to_string()
+}
+
+fn trust_proxy_enabled() -> bool {
+    static CACHE: std::sync::OnceLock<bool> = std::sync::OnceLock::new();
+    *CACHE.get_or_init(|| {
+        matches!(
+            std::env::var("TRUST_PROXY").as_deref(),
+            Ok("1") | Ok("true") | Ok("yes")
+        )
+    })
+}
+
+fn forwarded_for_ip(headers: &axum::http::HeaderMap) -> Option<String> {
+    let value = headers.get("x-forwarded-for")?.to_str().ok()?;
+    let first = value.split(',').next()?.trim();
+    if first.is_empty() {
+        None
+    } else {
+        validate_ip(first)
+    }
+}
+
+fn real_ip(headers: &axum::http::HeaderMap) -> Option<String> {
+    let value = headers.get("x-real-ip")?.to_str().ok()?;
+    let ip = value.trim();
+    if ip.is_empty() { None } else { validate_ip(ip) }
+}
+
+/// Validate that a string is a valid IP address.
+/// Returns Some(ip) if valid, None otherwise.
+fn validate_ip(s: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    s.parse::<IpAddr>().ok().map(|ip| ip.to_string())
+}
+
+fn connect_info_ip(req: &Request) -> Option<String> {
+    req.extensions()
+        .get::<axum::extract::ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
+        .map(|c| c.0.ip().to_string())
+}
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/error.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/error.rs
@@ -23,6 +23,16 @@ pub fn app_error_to_mcp(err: &AppError) -> rmcp::ErrorData {
            "Entry not found. Use secrets_find to discover existing entries.",
            None,
        ),
+        AppError::NotFoundUser => rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_request("User not found.", None),
+        AppError::NotFoundSecret => rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_request("Secret not found.", None),
+        AppError::AuthenticationFailed => rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_request(
+            "Authentication failed. Please check your API key or login credentials.",
+            None,
+        ),
+        AppError::Unauthorized => rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_request(
+            "Unauthorized: you do not have permission to access this resource.",
+            None,
+        ),
        AppError::Validation { message } => rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_request(message.clone(), None),
        AppError::ConcurrentModification => rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_request(
            "The entry was modified by another request. Please refresh and try again.",
@@ -32,6 +42,10 @@ pub fn app_error_to_mcp(err: &AppError) -> rmcp::ErrorData {
            "Decryption failed — the encryption key may be incorrect or does not match the data.",
            None,
        ),
+        AppError::EncryptionKeyNotSet => rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_request(
+            "Encryption key not set. You must set a passphrase before using this feature.",
+            None,
+        ),
        AppError::Internal(_) => rmcp::ErrorData::internal_error(
            "Request failed due to a server error. Check service logs if you need details.",
            None,
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/logging.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/logging.rs
@@ -1,25 +1,28 @@
-use std::net::SocketAddr;
 use std::time::Instant;

 use axum::{
    body::{Body, Bytes, to_bytes},
-    extract::{ConnectInfo, Request},
+    extract::Request,
    http::{
        HeaderMap, Method, StatusCode,
-        header::{CONTENT_LENGTH, CONTENT_TYPE, USER_AGENT},
+        header::{AUTHORIZATION, CONTENT_LENGTH, CONTENT_TYPE, USER_AGENT},
    },
    middleware::Next,
    response::{IntoResponse, Response},
 };

+use crate::auth::AuthUser;
+
 /// Axum middleware that logs structured info for every HTTP request.
 ///
 /// All requests: method, path, status, latency_ms, client_ip, user_agent.
 /// POST /mcp requests: additionally parses JSON-RPC body for jsonrpc_method,
-/// tool_name, jsonrpc_id, mcp_session, batch_size.
+/// tool_name, jsonrpc_id, mcp_session, batch_size, tool_args (non-sensitive
+/// arguments only), plus masked auth_key / enc_key fingerprints and user_id
+/// for diagnosing header forwarding issues.
 ///
-/// Sensitive headers (Authorization, X-Encryption-Key) and secret values
-/// are never logged.
+/// Sensitive headers (Authorization, X-Encryption-Key) are never logged in
+/// full — only short fingerprints are emitted.
 pub async fn request_logging_middleware(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
    let method = req.method().clone();
    let path = req.uri().path().to_string();
@@ -33,6 +36,10 @@ pub async fn request_logging_middleware(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
        .map(|s| s.to_string());

+    // Capture header fingerprints before consuming the request.
+    let auth_key = mask_bearer(req.headers());
+    let enc_key = mask_enc_key(req.headers());
+
    let is_mcp_post = path.starts_with("/mcp") && method == Method::POST;
    let is_json = header_str(req.headers(), CONTENT_TYPE)
        .map(|ct| ct.contains("application/json"))
@@ -46,6 +53,11 @@ pub async fn request_logging_middleware(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
        let cap = content_len.unwrap_or(0);
        if cap <= 512 * 1024 {
            let (parts, body) = req.into_parts();
+            // user_id is available after auth middleware has run (injected into extensions).
+            let user_id = parts
+                .extensions
+                .get::<AuthUser>()
+                .map(|a| a.user_id.to_string());
            match to_bytes(body, 512 * 1024).await {
                Ok(bytes) => {
                    let rpc = parse_jsonrpc_meta(&bytes);
@@ -62,6 +74,9 @@ pub async fn request_logging_middleware(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
                        ua.as_deref(),
                        content_len,
                        mcp_session.as_deref(),
+                        auth_key.as_deref(),
+                        &enc_key,
+                        user_id.as_deref(),
                        &rpc,
                    );
                    return resp;
@@ -78,6 +93,9 @@ pub async fn request_logging_middleware(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
                        ua = ua.as_deref(),
                        content_length = content_len,
                        mcp_session = mcp_session.as_deref(),
+                        auth_key = auth_key.as_deref(),
+                        enc_key = enc_key.as_str(),
+                        user_id = user_id.as_deref(),
                        "mcp request",
                    );
                    return (
@@ -160,6 +178,9 @@ fn log_mcp_request(
    ua: Option<&str>,
    content_length: Option<u64>,
    mcp_session: Option<&str>,
+    auth_key: Option<&str>,
+    enc_key: &str,
+    user_id: Option<&str>,
    rpc: &JsonRpcMeta,
 ) {
    tracing::info!(
@@ -175,18 +196,94 @@ fn log_mcp_request(
        tool = rpc.tool_name.as_deref(),
        jsonrpc_id = rpc.request_id.as_deref(),
        batch_size = rpc.batch_size,
+        tool_args = rpc.tool_args.as_deref(),
+        auth_key,
+        enc_key,
+        user_id,
        "mcp request",
    );
 }

+// ── Sensitive header masking ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/// Mask a Bearer token: emit only the first 12 characters followed by `…`.
+/// Returns `None` if the Authorization header is absent or not a Bearer token.
+/// Example: `sk_90c88844e4e5…`
+fn mask_bearer(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Option<String> {
+    let val = headers.get(AUTHORIZATION)?.to_str().ok()?;
+    let token = val.strip_prefix("Bearer ")?.trim();
+    if token.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    if token.len() > 12 {
+        Some(format!("{}…", &token[..12]))
+    } else {
+        Some(token.to_string())
+    }
+}
+
+/// Fingerprint the X-Encryption-Key header.
+///
+/// Emits first 4 chars, last 4 chars, and raw byte length, e.g. `146b…5516(64)`.
+/// Returns `"absent"` when the header is missing. Reveals enough to confirm
+/// which key arrived and whether it was truncated or padded, without revealing
+/// the full value.
+fn mask_enc_key(headers: &HeaderMap) -> String {
+    match headers
+        .get("x-encryption-key")
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+    {
+        Some(val) => {
+            let raw_len = val.len();
+            let t = val.trim();
+            let len = t.len();
+            if len >= 8 {
+                let prefix = &t[..4];
+                let suffix = &t[len - 4..];
+                if raw_len != len {
+                    // Trailing/leading whitespace detected — extra diagnostic.
+                    format!("{prefix}…{suffix}({len}, raw={raw_len})")
+                } else {
+                    format!("{prefix}…{suffix}({len})")
+                }
+            } else {
+                format!("…({len})")
+            }
+        }
+        None => "absent".to_string(),
+    }
+}
+
 // ── JSON-RPC body parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────

+/// Safe (non-sensitive) argument keys that may be included verbatim in logs.
+/// Keys NOT in this list (e.g. `secrets`, `secrets_obj`, `meta_obj`,
+/// `encryption_key`) are silently dropped.
+const SAFE_ARG_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
+    "id",
+    "name",
+    "name_query",
+    "folder",
+    "type",
+    "entry_type",
+    "field",
+    "query",
+    "tags",
+    "limit",
+    "offset",
+    "format",
+    "dry_run",
+    "prefix",
+];
+
 #[derive(Debug, Default)]
 struct JsonRpcMeta {
    request_id: Option<String>,
    rpc_method: Option<String>,
    tool_name: Option<String>,
    batch_size: Option<usize>,
+    /// Non-sensitive tool call arguments for diagnostic logging.
+    tool_args: Option<String>,
 }

 fn parse_jsonrpc_meta(bytes: &Bytes) -> JsonRpcMeta {
@@ -216,12 +313,47 @@ fn parse_single(value: &serde_json::Value) -> JsonRpcMeta {
        .pointer("/params/name")
        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
        .map(|s| s.to_string());
+    let tool_args = extract_tool_args(value);

    JsonRpcMeta {
        request_id,
        rpc_method,
        tool_name,
        batch_size: None,
+        tool_args,
+    }
+}
+
+/// Extract a compact summary of non-sensitive tool arguments for logging.
+/// Only keys listed in `SAFE_ARG_KEYS` are included.
+fn extract_tool_args(value: &serde_json::Value) -> Option<String> {
+    let args = value.pointer("/params/arguments")?;
+    let obj = args.as_object()?;
+    let pairs: Vec<String> = obj
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|(k, v)| SAFE_ARG_KEYS.contains(&k.as_str()) && !v.is_null())
+        .map(|(k, v)| format!("{}={}", k, summarize_value(v)))
+        .collect();
+    if pairs.is_empty() {
+        None
+    } else {
+        Some(pairs.join(" "))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Produce a short, log-safe representation of a JSON value.
+fn summarize_value(v: &serde_json::Value) -> String {
+    match v {
+        serde_json::Value::String(s) => {
+            if s.len() > 64 {
+                format!("\"{}…\"", &s[..64])
+            } else {
+                format!("\"{s}\"")
+            }
+        }
+        serde_json::Value::Array(arr) => format!("[…{}]", arr.len()),
+        serde_json::Value::Object(_) => "{…}".to_string(),
+        other => other.to_string(),
    }
 }

@@ -245,18 +377,5 @@ fn header_str(headers: &HeaderMap, name: impl axum::http::header::AsHeaderName)
 }

 fn client_ip(req: &Request) -> Option<String> {
-    if let Some(first) = req
-        .headers()
-        .get("x-forwarded-for")
-        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-        .and_then(|s| s.split(',').next())
-    {
-        let s = first.trim();
-        if !s.is_empty() {
-            return Some(s.to_string());
-        }
-    }
-    req.extensions()
-        .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
-        .map(|c| c.ip().to_string())
+    crate::client_ip::extract_client_ip(req).into()
 }
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/main.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/main.rs
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
 mod auth;
+mod client_ip;
 mod error;
 mod logging;
 mod oauth;
+mod rate_limit;
 mod tools;
+mod validation;
 mod web;

 use std::net::SocketAddr;
-use std::sync::Arc;

 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use axum::Router;
@@ -141,11 +143,11 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
    };

    // ── MCP service ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    let pool_arc = Arc::new(pool.clone());
+    let pool_for_mcp = pool.clone();

    let mcp_service = StreamableHttpService::new(
        move || {
-            let p = pool_arc.clone();
+            let p = pool_for_mcp.clone();
            Ok(SecretsService::new(p))
        },
        LocalSessionManager::default().into(),
@@ -153,10 +155,20 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
    );

    // ── Router ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    let cors = CorsLayer::new()
-        .allow_origin(Any)
-        .allow_methods(Any)
-        .allow_headers(Any);
+    // CORS: restrict origins in production, allow all in development
+    let is_production = matches!(
+        load_env_var("SECRETS_ENV")
+            .as_deref()
+            .map(|s| s.to_ascii_lowercase())
+            .as_deref(),
+        Some("prod" | "production")
+    );
+
+    let cors = build_cors_layer(&base_url, is_production);
+
+    // Rate limiting
+    let rate_limit_state = rate_limit::RateLimitState::new();
+    let rate_limit_cleanup = rate_limit::spawn_cleanup_task(rate_limit_state.ip_limiter.clone());

    let router = Router::new()
        .merge(web::web_router())
@@ -168,8 +180,15 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
            pool,
            auth::bearer_auth_middleware,
        ))
+        .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(
+            rate_limit_state.clone(),
+            rate_limit::rate_limit_middleware,
+        ))
        .layer(session_layer)
        .layer(cors)
+        .layer(tower_http::limit::RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(
+            10 * 1024 * 1024,
+        ))
        .with_state(app_state);

    // ── Start server ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -192,12 +211,135 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
    .context("server error")?;

    session_cleanup.abort();
+    rate_limit_cleanup.abort();
    Ok(())
 }

 async fn shutdown_signal() {
-    tokio::signal::ctrl_c()
-        .await
-        .expect("failed to install CTRL+C signal handler");
+    let ctrl_c = tokio::signal::ctrl_c();
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    let terminate = async {
+        tokio::signal::unix::signal(tokio::signal::unix::SignalKind::terminate())
+            .expect("failed to install SIGTERM handler")
+            .recv()
+            .await;
+    };
+
+    #[cfg(not(unix))]
+    let terminate = std::future::pending::<()>();
+
+    tokio::select! {
+        _ = ctrl_c => {},
+        _ = terminate => {},
+    }
+
    tracing::info!("Shutting down gracefully...");
 }
+
+/// Production CORS allowed headers.
+///
+/// When adding a new custom header to the MCP or Web API, this list must be
+/// updated accordingly — otherwise browsers will block the request during
+/// the CORS preflight check.
+fn production_allowed_headers() -> [axum::http::HeaderName; 5] {
+    [
+        axum::http::header::AUTHORIZATION,
+        axum::http::header::CONTENT_TYPE,
+        axum::http::HeaderName::from_static("x-encryption-key"),
+        axum::http::HeaderName::from_static("mcp-session-id"),
+        axum::http::HeaderName::from_static("x-mcp-session"),
+    ]
+}
+
+/// Production CORS allowed methods.
+///
+/// Keep this list explicit because tower-http rejects
+/// `allow_credentials(true)` together with `allow_methods(Any)`.
+fn production_allowed_methods() -> [axum::http::Method; 5] {
+    [
+        axum::http::Method::GET,
+        axum::http::Method::POST,
+        axum::http::Method::PATCH,
+        axum::http::Method::DELETE,
+        axum::http::Method::OPTIONS,
+    ]
+}
+
+/// Build the CORS layer for the application.
+///
+/// In production mode the origin is restricted to the BASE_URL origin
+/// (scheme://host:port, path stripped) and credentials are allowed.
+/// `allow_headers` and `allow_methods` use explicit whitelists to avoid the
+/// tower-http restriction on `allow_credentials(true)` + wildcards.
+///
+/// In development mode all origins, methods and headers are allowed.
+fn build_cors_layer(base_url: &str, is_production: bool) -> CorsLayer {
+    if is_production {
+        let allowed_origin = if let Ok(parsed) = base_url.parse::<url::Url>() {
+            let origin = parsed.origin().ascii_serialization();
+            origin
+                .parse::<axum::http::HeaderValue>()
+                .unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!("invalid BASE_URL origin: {}", origin))
+        } else {
+            base_url
+                .parse::<axum::http::HeaderValue>()
+                .unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!("invalid BASE_URL: {}", base_url))
+        };
+        CorsLayer::new()
+            .allow_origin(allowed_origin)
+            .allow_methods(production_allowed_methods())
+            .allow_headers(production_allowed_headers())
+            .allow_credentials(true)
+    } else {
+        CorsLayer::new()
+            .allow_origin(Any)
+            .allow_methods(Any)
+            .allow_headers(Any)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn production_cors_does_not_panic() {
+        let layer = build_cors_layer("https://secrets.example.com/app", true);
+        let _ = layer;
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn production_cors_headers_include_all_required() {
+        let headers = production_allowed_headers();
+        let names: Vec<&str> = headers.iter().map(|h| h.as_str()).collect();
+        assert!(names.contains(&"authorization"));
+        assert!(names.contains(&"content-type"));
+        assert!(names.contains(&"x-encryption-key"));
+        assert!(names.contains(&"mcp-session-id"));
+        assert!(names.contains(&"x-mcp-session"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn production_cors_methods_include_all_required() {
+        let methods = production_allowed_methods();
+        assert!(methods.contains(&axum::http::Method::GET));
+        assert!(methods.contains(&axum::http::Method::POST));
+        assert!(methods.contains(&axum::http::Method::PATCH));
+        assert!(methods.contains(&axum::http::Method::DELETE));
+        assert!(methods.contains(&axum::http::Method::OPTIONS));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn production_cors_normalizes_base_url_with_path() {
+        let url = url::Url::parse("https://secrets.example.com/secrets/app").unwrap();
+        let origin = url.origin().ascii_serialization();
+        assert_eq!(origin, "https://secrets.example.com");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn development_cors_allows_everything() {
+        let layer = build_cors_layer("http://localhost:9315", false);
+        let _ = layer;
+    }
+}
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/oauth/mod.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/oauth/mod.rs
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ pub fn random_state() -> String {
    use rand::RngExt;
    let mut bytes = [0u8; 16];
    rand::rng().fill(&mut bytes);
-    bytes.iter().map(|b| format!("{:02x}", b)).collect()
+    secrets_core::crypto::hex::encode_hex(&bytes)
 }
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/oauth/wechat.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/oauth/wechat.rs
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use super::{OAuthConfig, OAuthUserInfo};
 /// - Docs: https://developers.weixin.qq.com/doc/oplatform/Website_App/WeChat_Login/Wechat_Login.html
 use anyhow::{Result, bail};

-#[allow(dead_code)]
+#[allow(dead_code)] // Placeholder — implement when WeChat login is needed.
 pub async fn exchange_code(
    _client: &reqwest::Client,
    _config: &OAuthConfig,
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/rate_limit.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/rate_limit.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+use std::num::NonZeroU32;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+use axum::{
+    extract::{Request, State},
+    http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue, StatusCode},
+    middleware::Next,
+    response::{IntoResponse, Response},
+};
+use governor::{
+    Quota, RateLimiter,
+    clock::{Clock, DefaultClock},
+    state::{InMemoryState, NotKeyed, keyed::DashMapStateStore},
+};
+use serde_json::json;
+
+use crate::client_ip;
+
+/// Per-IP rate limiter (keyed by client IP string)
+type IpRateLimiter = RateLimiter<String, DashMapStateStore<String>, DefaultClock>;
+
+/// Global rate limiter (not keyed)
+type GlobalRateLimiter = RateLimiter<NotKeyed, InMemoryState, DefaultClock>;
+
+/// Parse a u32 env value into NonZeroU32, logging a warning and falling back
+/// to the default if the value is zero.
+fn nz_or_log(value: u32, default: u32, name: &str) -> NonZeroU32 {
+    NonZeroU32::new(value).unwrap_or_else(|| {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            configured = value,
+            default,
+            "{name} must be non-zero, using default"
+        );
+        NonZeroU32::new(default).unwrap()
+    })
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct RateLimitState {
+    pub ip_limiter: Arc<IpRateLimiter>,
+    pub global_limiter: Arc<GlobalRateLimiter>,
+}
+
+impl RateLimitState {
+    /// Create a new RateLimitState with default limits.
+    ///
+    /// Default limits (can be overridden via environment variables):
+    /// - Global: 100 req/s, burst 200
+    /// - Per-IP: 20 req/s, burst 40
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        let global_rate = std::env::var("RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_PER_SECOND")
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|v| v.parse::<u32>().ok())
+            .unwrap_or(100);
+
+        let global_burst = std::env::var("RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_BURST")
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|v| v.parse::<u32>().ok())
+            .unwrap_or(200);
+
+        let ip_rate = std::env::var("RATE_LIMIT_IP_PER_SECOND")
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|v| v.parse::<u32>().ok())
+            .unwrap_or(20);
+
+        let ip_burst = std::env::var("RATE_LIMIT_IP_BURST")
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|v| v.parse::<u32>().ok())
+            .unwrap_or(40);
+
+        let global_rate_nz = nz_or_log(global_rate, 100, "RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_PER_SECOND");
+        let global_burst_nz = nz_or_log(global_burst, 200, "RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_BURST");
+        let ip_rate_nz = nz_or_log(ip_rate, 20, "RATE_LIMIT_IP_PER_SECOND");
+        let ip_burst_nz = nz_or_log(ip_burst, 40, "RATE_LIMIT_IP_BURST");
+
+        let global_quota = Quota::per_second(global_rate_nz).allow_burst(global_burst_nz);
+        let ip_quota = Quota::per_second(ip_rate_nz).allow_burst(ip_burst_nz);
+
+        tracing::info!(
+            global_rate = global_rate_nz.get(),
+            global_burst = global_burst_nz.get(),
+            ip_rate = ip_rate_nz.get(),
+            ip_burst = ip_burst_nz.get(),
+            "rate limiter initialized"
+        );
+
+        Self {
+            global_limiter: Arc::new(RateLimiter::direct(global_quota)),
+            ip_limiter: Arc::new(RateLimiter::dashmap(ip_quota)),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Rate limiting middleware function.
+///
+/// Checks both global and per-IP rate limits before allowing the request through.
+/// Returns 429 Too Many Requests if either limit is exceeded.
+pub async fn rate_limit_middleware(
+    State(rl): State<RateLimitState>,
+    req: Request,
+    next: Next,
+) -> Result<Response, Response> {
+    // Check global rate limit first
+    if let Err(negative) = rl.global_limiter.check() {
+        let retry_after = negative.wait_time_from(DefaultClock::default().now());
+        tracing::warn!(
+            retry_after_secs = retry_after.as_secs(),
+            "global rate limit exceeded"
+        );
+        return Err(too_many_requests_response(Some(retry_after)));
+    }
+
+    // Check per-IP rate limit
+    let key = client_ip::extract_client_ip(&req);
+    if let Err(negative) = rl.ip_limiter.check_key(&key) {
+        let retry_after = negative.wait_time_from(DefaultClock::default().now());
+        tracing::warn!(
+            client_ip = %key,
+            retry_after_secs = retry_after.as_secs(),
+            "per-IP rate limit exceeded"
+        );
+        return Err(too_many_requests_response(Some(retry_after)));
+    }
+
+    Ok(next.run(req).await)
+}
+
+/// Start a background task to clean up expired rate limiter entries.
+///
+/// This should be called once during application startup.
+/// The task runs every 60 seconds and will be aborted on shutdown.
+pub fn spawn_cleanup_task(ip_limiter: Arc<IpRateLimiter>) -> tokio::task::JoinHandle<()> {
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(60));
+        loop {
+            interval.tick().await;
+            ip_limiter.retain_recent();
+        }
+    })
+}
+
+/// Create a 429 Too Many Requests response.
+fn too_many_requests_response(retry_after: Option<Duration>) -> Response {
+    let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+    headers.insert("Content-Type", HeaderValue::from_static("application/json"));
+
+    if let Some(duration) = retry_after {
+        let secs = duration.as_secs().max(1);
+        if let Ok(value) = HeaderValue::from_str(&secs.to_string()) {
+            headers.insert("Retry-After", value);
+        }
+    }
+
+    let body = json!({
+        "error": "Too many requests, please try again later"
+    });
+
+    (StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, headers, body.to_string()).into_response()
+}
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/tools.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/tools.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::time::Instant;

 use anyhow::Result;
@@ -18,6 +17,8 @@ use serde_json::{Map, Value};
 use sqlx::PgPool;
 use uuid::Uuid;

+use crate::validation;
+
 // ── Serde helpers for numeric parameters that may arrive as strings ──────────

 mod deser {
@@ -70,6 +71,94 @@ mod deser {
            }
        }
    }
+
+    /// Deserialize a bool that may come as a JSON bool or a JSON string ("true"/"false").
+    pub fn option_bool_from_string<'de, D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Option<bool>, D::Error>
+    where
+        D: Deserializer<'de>,
+    {
+        #[derive(Deserialize)]
+        #[serde(untagged)]
+        enum BoolOrStr {
+            Bool(bool),
+            Str(String),
+        }
+
+        match Option::<BoolOrStr>::deserialize(deserializer)? {
+            None => Ok(None),
+            Some(BoolOrStr::Bool(b)) => Ok(Some(b)),
+            Some(BoolOrStr::Str(s)) => {
+                if s.is_empty() {
+                    return Ok(None);
+                }
+                s.parse::<bool>().map(Some).map_err(de::Error::custom)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Deserialize a Vec<String> that may come as a JSON array or a JSON string containing an array.
+    pub fn option_vec_string_from_string<'de, D>(
+        deserializer: D,
+    ) -> Result<Option<Vec<String>>, D::Error>
+    where
+        D: Deserializer<'de>,
+    {
+        #[derive(Deserialize)]
+        #[serde(untagged)]
+        enum VecOrStr {
+            Vec(Vec<String>),
+            Str(String),
+        }
+
+        match Option::<VecOrStr>::deserialize(deserializer)? {
+            None => Ok(None),
+            Some(VecOrStr::Vec(v)) => Ok(Some(v)),
+            Some(VecOrStr::Str(s)) => {
+                if s.is_empty() {
+                    return Ok(None);
+                }
+                serde_json::from_str(&s)
+                    .map(Some)
+                    .map_err(|e| {
+                        de::Error::custom(format!(
+                            "invalid string value for array field: expected a JSON array, e.g. '[\"a\",\"b\"]': {e}"
+                        ))
+                    })
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Deserialize a Map<String, Value> that may come as a JSON object or a JSON string containing an object.
+    pub fn option_map_from_string<'de, D>(
+        deserializer: D,
+    ) -> Result<Option<Map<String, Value>>, D::Error>
+    where
+        D: Deserializer<'de>,
+    {
+        #[derive(Deserialize)]
+        #[serde(untagged)]
+        enum MapOrStr {
+            Map(Map<String, Value>),
+            Str(String),
+        }
+
+        match Option::<MapOrStr>::deserialize(deserializer)? {
+            None => Ok(None),
+            Some(MapOrStr::Map(m)) => Ok(Some(m)),
+            Some(MapOrStr::Str(s)) => {
+                if s.is_empty() {
+                    return Ok(None);
+                }
+                serde_json::from_str(&s)
+                    .map(Some)
+                    .map_err(|e| {
+                        de::Error::custom(format!(
+                            "invalid string value for object field: expected a JSON object, e.g. '{{\"key\":\"value\"}}': {e}"
+                        ))
+                    })
+            }
+        }
+    }
 }

 use secrets_core::models::ExportFormat;
@@ -128,27 +217,18 @@ fn mcp_err_invalid_encryption_key_logged(err: impl std::fmt::Display) -> rmcp::E

 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub struct SecretsService {
-    pub pool: Arc<PgPool>,
+    pub pool: PgPool,
    pub tool_router: rmcp::handler::server::router::tool::ToolRouter<SecretsService>,
 }

 impl SecretsService {
-    pub fn new(pool: Arc<PgPool>) -> Self {
+    pub fn new(pool: PgPool) -> Self {
        Self {
            pool,
            tool_router: Self::tool_router(),
        }
    }

-    /// Extract user_id from the HTTP request parts injected by auth middleware.
-    fn user_id_from_ctx(ctx: &RequestContext<RoleServer>) -> Result<Option<Uuid>, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let parts = ctx
-            .extensions
-            .get::<http::request::Parts>()
-            .ok_or_else(mcp_err_missing_http_parts)?;
-        Ok(parts.extensions.get::<AuthUser>().map(|a| a.user_id))
-    }
-
    /// Get the authenticated user_id (returns error if not authenticated).
    fn require_user_id(ctx: &RequestContext<RoleServer>) -> Result<Uuid, rmcp::ErrorData> {
        let parts = ctx
@@ -184,6 +264,18 @@ impl SecretsService {
                rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_request("Invalid X-Encryption-Key header value", None)
            })?;
        let trimmed = hex_str.trim();
+        // Debug-level fingerprint: helps diagnose header forwarding issues
+        // (e.g. Cursor Chat MCP truncating or transforming the key value)
+        // without revealing the full secret.
+        tracing::debug!(
+            raw_len = hex_str.len(),
+            trimmed_len = trimmed.len(),
+            key_prefix = trimmed.get(..8).unwrap_or(trimmed),
+            key_suffix = trimmed
+                .get(trimmed.len().saturating_sub(8)..)
+                .unwrap_or(trimmed),
+            "X-Encryption-Key received",
+        );
        if trimmed.len() != 64 {
            tracing::warn!(
                got_len = trimmed.len(),
@@ -208,7 +300,51 @@ impl SecretsService {
            .map_err(mcp_err_invalid_encryption_key_logged)
    }

-    /// Require both user_id and encryption key.
+    /// Extract the encryption key, preferring an explicit argument value over
+    /// the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header.
+    ///
+    /// `arg_key` is the optional `encryption_key` field from the tool's input
+    /// struct. When present, it is used directly and the header is ignored.
+    /// This allows MCP clients that cannot reliably forward custom HTTP headers
+    /// (e.g. Cursor Chat) to pass the key as a normal tool argument.
+    fn extract_enc_key_or_arg(
+        ctx: &RequestContext<RoleServer>,
+        arg_key: Option<&str>,
+    ) -> Result<[u8; 32], rmcp::ErrorData> {
+        if let Some(hex_str) = arg_key {
+            let trimmed = hex_str.trim();
+            tracing::debug!(
+                source = "argument",
+                raw_len = hex_str.len(),
+                trimmed_len = trimmed.len(),
+                key_prefix = trimmed.get(..8).unwrap_or(trimmed),
+                key_suffix = trimmed
+                    .get(trimmed.len().saturating_sub(8)..)
+                    .unwrap_or(trimmed),
+                "X-Encryption-Key received",
+            );
+            if trimmed.len() != 64 {
+                return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_request(
+                    format!(
+                        "encryption_key must be exactly 64 hex characters (32-byte key), got {}.",
+                        trimmed.len()
+                    ),
+                    None,
+                ));
+            }
+            if !trimmed.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
+                return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_request(
+                    "encryption_key contains non-hexadecimal characters.",
+                    None,
+                ));
+            }
+            return secrets_core::crypto::extract_key_from_hex(trimmed)
+                .map_err(mcp_err_invalid_encryption_key_logged);
+        }
+        Self::extract_enc_key(ctx)
+    }
+
+    /// Require both user_id and encryption key (header only, no arg fallback).
    fn require_user_and_key(
        ctx: &RequestContext<RoleServer>,
    ) -> Result<(Uuid, [u8; 32]), rmcp::ErrorData> {
@@ -216,6 +352,17 @@ impl SecretsService {
        let key = Self::extract_enc_key(ctx)?;
        Ok((user_id, key))
    }
+
+    /// Require both user_id and encryption key, preferring an explicit argument
+    /// value over the X-Encryption-Key header.
+    fn require_user_and_key_or_arg(
+        ctx: &RequestContext<RoleServer>,
+        arg_key: Option<&str>,
+    ) -> Result<(Uuid, [u8; 32]), rmcp::ErrorData> {
+        let user_id = Self::require_user_id(ctx)?;
+        let key = Self::extract_enc_key_or_arg(ctx, arg_key)?;
+        Ok((user_id, key))
+    }
 }

 // ── Tool parameter types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -229,7 +376,7 @@ struct FindInput {
    #[schemars(description = "Exact folder filter (e.g. 'refining', 'ricnsmart')")]
    folder: Option<String>,
    #[schemars(
-        description = "Exact type filter (recommended: 'server', 'service', 'person', 'document')"
+        description = "Exact type filter (e.g. 'server', 'service', 'account', 'person', 'document'). User-defined, any value accepted."
    )]
    #[serde(rename = "type")]
    entry_type: Option<String>,
@@ -240,10 +387,14 @@ struct FindInput {
    )]
    name_query: Option<String>,
    #[schemars(description = "Tag filters (all must match)")]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    tags: Option<Vec<String>>,
    #[schemars(description = "Max results (default 20)")]
    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_u32_from_string")]
    limit: Option<u32>,
+    #[schemars(description = "Offset for pagination (default 0)")]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_u32_from_string")]
+    offset: Option<u32>,
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
@@ -253,7 +404,7 @@ struct SearchInput {
    #[schemars(description = "Folder filter (e.g. 'refining', 'personal', 'family')")]
    folder: Option<String>,
    #[schemars(
-        description = "Type filter (recommended: 'server', 'service', 'person', 'document')"
+        description = "Type filter (e.g. 'server', 'service', 'account', 'person', 'document'). User-defined, any value accepted."
    )]
    #[serde(rename = "type")]
    entry_type: Option<String>,
@@ -264,8 +415,10 @@ struct SearchInput {
    )]
    name_query: Option<String>,
    #[schemars(description = "Tag filters (all must match)")]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    tags: Option<Vec<String>>,
    #[schemars(description = "Return only summary fields (name/tags/notes/updated_at)")]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_bool_from_string")]
    summary: Option<bool>,
    #[schemars(description = "Sort order: 'name' (default), 'updated', 'created'")]
    sort: Option<String>,
@@ -283,6 +436,10 @@ struct GetSecretInput {
    id: String,
    #[schemars(description = "Specific field to retrieve. If omitted, returns all fields.")]
    field: Option<String>,
+    #[schemars(description = "Encryption key as a 64-char hex string. \
+        If provided, takes priority over the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header. \
+        Use this when the MCP client cannot reliably forward custom headers.")]
+    encryption_key: Option<String>,
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
@@ -292,36 +449,47 @@ struct AddInput {
    #[schemars(description = "Folder for organization (optional, e.g. 'personal', 'refining')")]
    folder: Option<String>,
    #[schemars(
-        description = "Type/category of this entry (optional, recommended: 'server', 'service', 'person', 'document')"
+        description = "Type/category of this entry (optional, e.g. 'server', 'service', 'account', 'person', 'document'). Free-form, choose what best describes the entry."
    )]
    #[serde(rename = "type")]
    entry_type: Option<String>,
    #[schemars(description = "Free-text notes for this entry (optional)")]
    notes: Option<String>,
    #[schemars(description = "Tags for this entry")]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    tags: Option<Vec<String>>,
    #[schemars(description = "Metadata fields as 'key=value' or 'key:=json' strings")]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    meta: Option<Vec<String>>,
    #[schemars(
        description = "Metadata fields as a JSON object {\"key\": value}. Merged with 'meta' if both provided."
    )]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_map_from_string")]
    meta_obj: Option<Map<String, Value>>,
    #[schemars(
        description = "Secret fields as 'key=value' strings. Reminder: non-sensitive endpoint/address fields should go to metadata.address instead of secrets."
    )]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    secrets: Option<Vec<String>>,
    #[schemars(
        description = "Secret fields as a JSON object {\"key\": \"value\"}. Merged with 'secrets' if both provided. Reminder: non-sensitive endpoint/address fields should go to metadata.address."
    )]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_map_from_string")]
    secrets_obj: Option<Map<String, Value>>,
    #[schemars(
        description = "Secret types as {\"secret_name\": \"type\"}. Keys must match secret field names. Missing keys default to \"text\"."
    )]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_map_from_string")]
    secret_types: Option<Map<String, Value>>,
    #[schemars(
        description = "Link existing secrets by secret name. Names must resolve uniquely under current user."
    )]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    link_secret_names: Option<Vec<String>>,
+    #[schemars(description = "Encryption key as a 64-char hex string. \
+        If provided, takes priority over the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header. \
+        Use this when the MCP client cannot reliably forward custom headers.")]
+    encryption_key: Option<String>,
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
@@ -339,39 +507,54 @@ struct UpdateInput {
    #[schemars(description = "Update the notes field")]
    notes: Option<String>,
    #[schemars(description = "Tags to add")]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    add_tags: Option<Vec<String>>,
    #[schemars(description = "Tags to remove")]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    remove_tags: Option<Vec<String>>,
    #[schemars(description = "Metadata fields to update/add as 'key=value' strings")]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    meta: Option<Vec<String>>,
    #[schemars(
        description = "Metadata fields to update/add as a JSON object {\"key\": value}. Merged with 'meta' if both provided."
    )]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_map_from_string")]
    meta_obj: Option<Map<String, Value>>,
    #[schemars(description = "Metadata field keys to remove")]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    remove_meta: Option<Vec<String>>,
    #[schemars(
        description = "Secret fields to update/add as 'key=value' strings. Reminder: non-sensitive endpoint/address fields should go to metadata.address instead of secrets."
    )]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    secrets: Option<Vec<String>>,
    #[schemars(
        description = "Secret fields to update/add as a JSON object {\"key\": \"value\"}. Merged with 'secrets' if both provided. Reminder: non-sensitive endpoint/address fields should go to metadata.address."
    )]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_map_from_string")]
    secrets_obj: Option<Map<String, Value>>,
    #[schemars(
        description = "Secret types as {\"secret_name\": \"type\"}. Keys must match secret field names. Missing keys default to \"text\"."
    )]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_map_from_string")]
    secret_types: Option<Map<String, Value>>,
    #[schemars(description = "Secret field keys to remove")]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    remove_secrets: Option<Vec<String>>,
    #[schemars(
        description = "Link existing secrets by name to this entry. Names must resolve uniquely under current user."
    )]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    link_secret_names: Option<Vec<String>>,
    #[schemars(
        description = "Unlink secrets by name from this entry. Orphaned secrets are auto-deleted."
    )]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    unlink_secret_names: Option<Vec<String>>,
+    #[schemars(description = "Encryption key as a 64-char hex string. \
+        If provided, takes priority over the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header. \
+        Use this when the MCP client cannot reliably forward custom headers.")]
+    encryption_key: Option<String>,
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
@@ -390,6 +573,7 @@ struct DeleteInput {
    #[serde(rename = "type")]
    entry_type: Option<String>,
    #[schemars(description = "Preview deletions without writing")]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_bool_from_string")]
    dry_run: Option<bool>,
 }

@@ -437,11 +621,16 @@ struct ExportInput {
    #[schemars(description = "Exact name filter")]
    name: Option<String>,
    #[schemars(description = "Tag filters")]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    tags: Option<Vec<String>>,
    #[schemars(description = "Fuzzy query")]
    query: Option<String>,
    #[schemars(description = "Export format: 'json' (default), 'toml', 'yaml'")]
    format: Option<String>,
+    #[schemars(description = "Encryption key as a 64-char hex string. \
+        If provided, takes priority over the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header. \
+        Use this when the MCP client cannot reliably forward custom headers.")]
+    encryption_key: Option<String>,
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
@@ -454,8 +643,10 @@ struct EnvMapInput {
    #[schemars(description = "Exact name filter")]
    name: Option<String>,
    #[schemars(description = "Tag filters")]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    tags: Option<Vec<String>>,
    #[schemars(description = "Only include these secret fields")]
+    #[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
    only_fields: Option<Vec<String>>,
    #[schemars(description = "Environment variable name prefix. \
        Variable names are built as UPPER(prefix)_UPPER(entry_name)_UPPER(field_name), \
@@ -463,6 +654,10 @@ struct EnvMapInput {
        Example: entry 'aliyun', field 'access_key_id' → ALIYUN_ACCESS_KEY_ID \
        (or PREFIX_ALIYUN_ACCESS_KEY_ID with prefix set).")]
    prefix: Option<String>,
+    #[schemars(description = "Encryption key as a 64-char hex string. \
+        If provided, takes priority over the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header. \
+        Use this when the MCP client cannot reliably forward custom headers.")]
+    encryption_key: Option<String>,
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
@@ -480,6 +675,50 @@ fn map_to_kv_strings(map: Map<String, Value>) -> Vec<String> {
        .collect()
 }

+/// Check if any KV string would trigger a server-side file read.
+///
+/// `parse_kv` in secrets-core supports two file-read syntaxes:
+///   - `key=@path`  (has `=`, value starts with `@`)
+///   - `key@path`   (no `=`, split on `@`)
+///
+/// Both are legitimate for CLI usage but must be rejected in the MCP context
+/// where the server process runs remotely and the caller controls the path.
+///
+/// Note: `key:=json` is intentionally skipped here. Although the value may
+/// contain `@` characters (e.g. `config:=@/etc/passwd`), the `:=` branch in
+/// `parse_kv` treats the right-hand side as raw JSON and never performs file
+/// reads. The `@` in such cases is just data, not a file reference.
+///
+/// For entries without `=` that contain `@`, we only reject them if the `@`
+/// appears to be file-path syntax (i.e., the part after `@` starts with `/`,
+/// `~`, or `.`). This avoids false positives on values like `user@example.com`.
+fn contains_file_reference(entries: &[String]) -> Option<String> {
+    for entry in entries {
+        // key:=json — safe, skip before checking for `=`
+        if entry.contains(":=") {
+            continue;
+        }
+        // key=@path
+        if let Some((_, value)) = entry.split_once('=') {
+            if value.starts_with('@') {
+                return Some(entry.clone());
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+        // key@path (no `=` present)
+        // Only reject if the `@` looks like file-path syntax: the segment after
+        // `@` starts with `/`, `~`, or `.`, which are common path prefixes.
+        // Values like "user@example.com" pass through safely.
+        if let Some((_, path_part)) = entry.split_once('@') {
+            let trimmed = path_part.trim_start();
+            if trimmed.starts_with('/') || trimmed.starts_with('~') || trimmed.starts_with('.') {
+                return Some(entry.clone());
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
 /// Parse a UUID string, returning an MCP error on failure.
 fn parse_uuid(s: &str) -> Result<Uuid, rmcp::ErrorData> {
    s.parse::<Uuid>()
@@ -527,13 +766,33 @@ impl SecretsService {
                query: input.query.as_deref(),
                sort: "name",
                limit: input.limit.unwrap_or(20),
-                offset: 0,
+                offset: input.offset.unwrap_or(0),
                user_id: Some(user_id),
            },
        )
        .await
        .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_find", Some(user_id), e))?;

+        let count_params = SearchParams {
+            folder: input.folder.as_deref(),
+            entry_type: input.entry_type.as_deref(),
+            name: input.name.as_deref(),
+            name_query: input.name_query.as_deref(),
+            tags: &tags,
+            query: input.query.as_deref(),
+            sort: "name",
+            limit: 0,
+            offset: 0,
+            user_id: Some(user_id),
+        };
+
+        let total_count = secrets_core::service::search::count_entries(&self.pool, &count_params)
+            .await
+            .inspect_err(
+                |e| tracing::warn!(tool = "secrets_find", error = %e, "count_entries failed"),
+            )
+            .unwrap_or(0);
+
        let entries: Vec<serde_json::Value> = result
            .entries
            .iter()
@@ -566,14 +825,20 @@ impl SecretsService {
            })
            .collect();

+        let output = serde_json::json!({
+            "total_count": total_count,
+            "entries": entries,
+        });
+
        tracing::info!(
            tool = "secrets_find",
            ?user_id,
            result_count = entries.len(),
+            total_count,
            elapsed_ms = t.elapsed().as_millis(),
            "tool call ok",
        );
-        let json = serde_json::to_string_pretty(&entries).unwrap_or_else(|_| "[]".to_string());
+        let json = serde_json::to_string_pretty(&output).unwrap_or_else(|_| "{}".to_string());
        Ok(CallToolResult::success(vec![Content::text(json)]))
    }

@@ -697,7 +962,8 @@ impl SecretsService {
        ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
    ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
        let t = Instant::now();
-        let (user_id, user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
+        let (user_id, user_key) =
+            Self::require_user_and_key_or_arg(&ctx, input.encryption_key.as_deref())?;
        let entry_id = parse_uuid(&input.id)?;
        tracing::info!(
            tool = "secrets_get",
@@ -751,7 +1017,8 @@ impl SecretsService {
        ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
    ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
        let t = Instant::now();
-        let (user_id, user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
+        let (user_id, user_key) =
+            Self::require_user_and_key_or_arg(&ctx, input.encryption_key.as_deref())?;
        tracing::info!(
            tool = "secrets_add",
            ?user_id,
@@ -766,10 +1033,33 @@ impl SecretsService {
        if let Some(obj) = input.meta_obj {
            meta.extend(map_to_kv_strings(obj));
        }
+        if let Some(offending) = contains_file_reference(&meta) {
+            return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_params(
+                format!("@file syntax is not allowed in MCP tools: '{}'", offending),
+                None,
+            ));
+        }
        let mut secrets = input.secrets.unwrap_or_default();
        if let Some(obj) = input.secrets_obj {
            secrets.extend(map_to_kv_strings(obj));
        }
+        if let Some(offending) = contains_file_reference(&secrets) {
+            return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_params(
+                format!("@file syntax is not allowed in MCP tools: '{}'", offending),
+                None,
+            ));
+        }
+
+        // Input length validation
+        validation::validate_input_lengths(
+            &input.name,
+            input.folder.as_deref(),
+            input.entry_type.as_deref(),
+            input.notes.as_deref(),
+        )?;
+        validation::validate_tags(&tags)?;
+        validation::validate_meta_entries(&meta)?;
+
        let secret_types = input.secret_types.unwrap_or_default();
        let secret_types_map: std::collections::HashMap<String, String> = secret_types
            .into_iter()
@@ -822,7 +1112,8 @@ impl SecretsService {
        ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
    ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
        let t = Instant::now();
-        let (user_id, user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
+        let (user_id, user_key) =
+            Self::require_user_and_key_or_arg(&ctx, input.encryption_key.as_deref())?;
        tracing::info!(
            tool = "secrets_update",
            ?user_id,
@@ -849,11 +1140,34 @@ impl SecretsService {
        if let Some(obj) = input.meta_obj {
            meta.extend(map_to_kv_strings(obj));
        }
+        if let Some(offending) = contains_file_reference(&meta) {
+            return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_params(
+                format!("@file syntax is not allowed in MCP tools: '{}'", offending),
+                None,
+            ));
+        }
        let remove_meta = input.remove_meta.unwrap_or_default();
        let mut secrets = input.secrets.unwrap_or_default();
        if let Some(obj) = input.secrets_obj {
            secrets.extend(map_to_kv_strings(obj));
        }
+        if let Some(offending) = contains_file_reference(&secrets) {
+            return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_params(
+                format!("@file syntax is not allowed in MCP tools: '{}'", offending),
+                None,
+            ));
+        }
+
+        // Input length validation
+        validation::validate_input_lengths(
+            &input.name,
+            input.folder.as_deref(),
+            None,
+            input.notes.as_deref(),
+        )?;
+        validation::validate_tags(&add_tags)?;
+        validation::validate_meta_entries(&meta)?;
+
        let secret_types = input.secret_types.unwrap_or_default();
        let secret_types_map: std::collections::HashMap<String, String> = secret_types
            .into_iter()
@@ -908,7 +1222,7 @@ impl SecretsService {
        ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
    ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
        let t = Instant::now();
-        let user_id = Self::user_id_from_ctx(&ctx)?;
+        let user_id = Self::require_user_id(&ctx)?;

        // Safety: require at least one filter.
        if input.id.is_none()
@@ -938,9 +1252,9 @@ impl SecretsService {
            if let Some(ref id_str) = input.id {
                let eid = parse_uuid(id_str)?;
                let uid = user_id;
-                let entry = resolve_entry_by_id(&self.pool, eid, uid)
+                let entry = resolve_entry_by_id(&self.pool, eid, Some(uid))
                    .await
-                    .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_delete", uid, e))?;
+                    .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_delete", Some(uid), e))?;
                (Some(entry.name), Some(entry.folder))
            } else {
                (input.name.clone(), input.folder.clone())
@@ -953,11 +1267,11 @@ impl SecretsService {
                folder: effective_folder.as_deref(),
                entry_type: input.entry_type.as_deref(),
                dry_run: input.dry_run.unwrap_or(false),
-                user_id,
+                user_id: Some(user_id),
            },
        )
        .await
-        .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_delete", user_id, e))?;
+        .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_delete", Some(user_id), e))?;

        tracing::info!(
            tool = "secrets_delete",
@@ -984,7 +1298,7 @@ impl SecretsService {
        ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
    ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
        let t = Instant::now();
-        let user_id = Self::user_id_from_ctx(&ctx)?;
+        let user_id = Self::require_user_id(&ctx)?;
        tracing::info!(
            tool = "secrets_history",
            ?user_id,
@@ -996,9 +1310,9 @@ impl SecretsService {
        let (resolved_name, resolved_folder): (String, Option<String>) =
            if let Some(ref id_str) = input.id {
                let eid = parse_uuid(id_str)?;
-                let entry = resolve_entry_by_id(&self.pool, eid, user_id)
+                let entry = resolve_entry_by_id(&self.pool, eid, Some(user_id))
                    .await
-                    .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_history", user_id, e))?;
+                    .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_history", Some(user_id), e))?;
                (entry.name, Some(entry.folder))
            } else {
                (input.name.clone(), input.folder.clone())
@@ -1009,10 +1323,10 @@ impl SecretsService {
            &resolved_name,
            resolved_folder.as_deref(),
            input.limit.unwrap_or(20),
-            user_id,
+            Some(user_id),
        )
        .await
-        .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_history", user_id, e))?;
+        .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_history", Some(user_id), e))?;

        tracing::info!(
            tool = "secrets_history",
@@ -1036,7 +1350,7 @@ impl SecretsService {
        ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
    ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
        let t = Instant::now();
-        let (user_id, user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
+        let (user_id, _user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
        tracing::info!(
            tool = "secrets_rollback",
            ?user_id,
@@ -1062,7 +1376,6 @@ impl SecretsService {
            &resolved_name,
            resolved_folder.as_deref(),
            input.to_version,
-            &user_key,
            Some(user_id),
        )
        .await
@@ -1093,7 +1406,8 @@ impl SecretsService {
        ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
    ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
        let t = Instant::now();
-        let (user_id, user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
+        let (user_id, user_key) =
+            Self::require_user_and_key_or_arg(&ctx, input.encryption_key.as_deref())?;
        let tags = input.tags.unwrap_or_default();
        let format = input.format.as_deref().unwrap_or("json");
        tracing::info!(
@@ -1162,7 +1476,8 @@ impl SecretsService {
        ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
    ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
        let t = Instant::now();
-        let (user_id, user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
+        let (user_id, user_key) =
+            Self::require_user_and_key_or_arg(&ctx, input.encryption_key.as_deref())?;
        let tags = input.tags.unwrap_or_default();
        let only_fields = input.only_fields.unwrap_or_default();
        tracing::info!(
@@ -1224,21 +1539,21 @@ impl SecretsService {
            count: i64,
        }

-        let folder_rows: Vec<CountRow> = sqlx::query_as(
+        let folder_rows: Vec<CountRow> = sqlx::query_as::<_, CountRow>(
            "SELECT folder AS name, COUNT(*) AS count FROM entries \
             WHERE user_id = $1 GROUP BY folder ORDER BY folder",
        )
        .bind(user_id)
-        .fetch_all(&*self.pool)
+        .fetch_all(&self.pool)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_overview", Some(user_id), e))?;

-        let type_rows: Vec<CountRow> = sqlx::query_as(
+        let type_rows: Vec<CountRow> = sqlx::query_as::<_, CountRow>(
            "SELECT type AS name, COUNT(*) AS count FROM entries \
             WHERE user_id = $1 GROUP BY type ORDER BY type",
        )
        .bind(user_id)
-        .fetch_all(&*self.pool)
+        .fetch_all(&self.pool)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_overview", Some(user_id), e))?;

@@ -1286,3 +1601,202 @@ impl ServerHandler for SecretsService {
        info
    }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod deser_tests {
+    use super::deser;
+    use serde::Deserialize;
+    use serde_json::json;
+
+    #[derive(Deserialize)]
+    struct TestU32 {
+        #[serde(deserialize_with = "deser::option_u32_from_string")]
+        val: Option<u32>,
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Deserialize)]
+    struct TestI64 {
+        #[serde(deserialize_with = "deser::option_i64_from_string")]
+        val: Option<i64>,
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Deserialize)]
+    struct TestBool {
+        #[serde(deserialize_with = "deser::option_bool_from_string")]
+        val: Option<bool>,
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+    struct TestVec {
+        #[serde(deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
+        val: Option<Vec<String>>,
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+    struct TestMap {
+        #[serde(deserialize_with = "deser::option_map_from_string")]
+        val: Option<serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value>>,
+    }
+
+    // option_u32_from_string
+    #[test]
+    fn u32_native_number() {
+        let v: TestU32 = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": 42})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, Some(42));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn u32_string_number() {
+        let v: TestU32 = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": "42"})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, Some(42));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn u32_empty_string() {
+        let v: TestU32 = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": ""})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn u32_none() {
+        let v: TestU32 = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": null})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, None);
+    }
+
+    // option_i64_from_string
+    #[test]
+    fn i64_native_number() {
+        let v: TestI64 = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": -100})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, Some(-100));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn i64_string_number() {
+        let v: TestI64 = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": "999"})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, Some(999));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn i64_empty_string() {
+        let v: TestI64 = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": ""})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn i64_none() {
+        let v: TestI64 = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": null})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, None);
+    }
+
+    // option_bool_from_string
+    #[test]
+    fn bool_native_true() {
+        let v: TestBool = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": true})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, Some(true));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn bool_native_false() {
+        let v: TestBool = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": false})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, Some(false));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn bool_string_true() {
+        let v: TestBool = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": "true"})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, Some(true));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn bool_string_false() {
+        let v: TestBool = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": "false"})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, Some(false));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn bool_empty_string() {
+        let v: TestBool = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": ""})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn bool_none() {
+        let v: TestBool = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": null})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, None);
+    }
+
+    // option_vec_string_from_string
+    #[test]
+    fn vec_native_array() {
+        let v: TestVec = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": ["a", "b"]})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, Some(vec!["a".to_string(), "b".to_string()]));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn vec_json_string_array() {
+        let v: TestVec = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": "[\"x\",\"y\"]"})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, Some(vec!["x".to_string(), "y".to_string()]));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn vec_empty_string() {
+        let v: TestVec = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": ""})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn vec_none() {
+        let v: TestVec = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": null})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn vec_invalid_string_errors() {
+        let err = serde_json::from_value::<TestVec>(json!({"val": "not-json"}))
+            .expect_err("should fail on invalid JSON");
+        let msg = err.to_string();
+        assert!(msg.contains("invalid string value for array field"));
+        assert!(msg.contains("expected a JSON array"));
+    }
+
+    // option_map_from_string
+    #[test]
+    fn map_native_object() {
+        let v: TestMap = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": {"key": "value"}})).unwrap();
+        assert!(v.val.is_some());
+        let m = v.val.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            m.get("key"),
+            Some(&serde_json::Value::String("value".to_string()))
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn map_json_string_object() {
+        let v: TestMap = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": "{\"a\":1}"})).unwrap();
+        assert!(v.val.is_some());
+        let m = v.val.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(m.get("a"), Some(&serde_json::Value::Number(1.into())));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn map_empty_string() {
+        let v: TestMap = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": ""})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn map_none() {
+        let v: TestMap = serde_json::from_value(json!({"val": null})).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.val, None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn map_invalid_string_errors() {
+        let err = serde_json::from_value::<TestMap>(json!({"val": "not-json"}))
+            .expect_err("should fail on invalid JSON");
+        let msg = err.to_string();
+        assert!(msg.contains("invalid string value for object field"));
+        assert!(msg.contains("expected a JSON object"));
+    }
+}
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/validation.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/validation.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+/// Validation constants for input field lengths.
+pub const MAX_NAME_LENGTH: usize = 256;
+pub const MAX_FOLDER_LENGTH: usize = 128;
+pub const MAX_ENTRY_TYPE_LENGTH: usize = 64;
+pub const MAX_NOTES_LENGTH: usize = 10000;
+pub const MAX_TAG_LENGTH: usize = 64;
+pub const MAX_TAG_COUNT: usize = 50;
+pub const MAX_META_KEY_LENGTH: usize = 128;
+pub const MAX_META_VALUE_LENGTH: usize = 4096;
+pub const MAX_META_COUNT: usize = 100;
+
+/// Validate input field lengths for MCP tools.
+///
+/// Returns an error if any field exceeds its maximum length.
+pub fn validate_input_lengths(
+    name: &str,
+    folder: Option<&str>,
+    entry_type: Option<&str>,
+    notes: Option<&str>,
+) -> Result<(), rmcp::ErrorData> {
+    if name.chars().count() > MAX_NAME_LENGTH {
+        return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_params(
+            format!("name must be at most {} characters", MAX_NAME_LENGTH),
+            None,
+        ));
+    }
+    if let Some(folder) = folder
+        && folder.chars().count() > MAX_FOLDER_LENGTH
+    {
+        return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_params(
+            format!("folder must be at most {} characters", MAX_FOLDER_LENGTH),
+            None,
+        ));
+    }
+    if let Some(entry_type) = entry_type
+        && entry_type.chars().count() > MAX_ENTRY_TYPE_LENGTH
+    {
+        return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_params(
+            format!("type must be at most {} characters", MAX_ENTRY_TYPE_LENGTH),
+            None,
+        ));
+    }
+    if let Some(notes) = notes
+        && notes.chars().count() > MAX_NOTES_LENGTH
+    {
+        return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_params(
+            format!("notes must be at most {} characters", MAX_NOTES_LENGTH),
+            None,
+        ));
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Validate the tags list.
+///
+/// Checks total count and per-tag character length.
+pub fn validate_tags(tags: &[String]) -> Result<(), rmcp::ErrorData> {
+    if tags.len() > MAX_TAG_COUNT {
+        return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_params(
+            format!("at most {} tags are allowed", MAX_TAG_COUNT),
+            None,
+        ));
+    }
+    for tag in tags {
+        if tag.chars().count() > MAX_TAG_LENGTH {
+            return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_params(
+                format!(
+                    "tag '{}' exceeds the maximum length of {} characters",
+                    tag, MAX_TAG_LENGTH
+                ),
+                None,
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Validate metadata KV strings (key=value / key:=json format).
+///
+/// Checks total count and per-key/per-value character lengths.
+/// This is a best-effort check on the raw KV strings before parsing;
+/// keys containing `:` path separators are checked as a whole.
+pub fn validate_meta_entries(entries: &[String]) -> Result<(), rmcp::ErrorData> {
+    if entries.len() > MAX_META_COUNT {
+        return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_params(
+            format!("at most {} metadata entries are allowed", MAX_META_COUNT),
+            None,
+        ));
+    }
+    for entry in entries {
+        // key:=json — check both key and JSON value length
+        if let Some((key, value)) = entry.split_once(":=") {
+            if key.chars().count() > MAX_META_KEY_LENGTH {
+                return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_params(
+                    format!(
+                        "metadata key '{}' exceeds the maximum length of {} characters",
+                        key, MAX_META_KEY_LENGTH
+                    ),
+                    None,
+                ));
+            }
+            if value.chars().count() > MAX_META_VALUE_LENGTH {
+                return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_params(
+                    format!(
+                        "metadata JSON value for key '{}' exceeds the maximum length of {} characters",
+                        key, MAX_META_VALUE_LENGTH
+                    ),
+                    None,
+                ));
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+        // key=value or key@path
+        if let Some((key, value)) = entry.split_once('=') {
+            if key.chars().count() > MAX_META_KEY_LENGTH {
+                return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_params(
+                    format!(
+                        "metadata key '{}' exceeds the maximum length of {} characters",
+                        key, MAX_META_KEY_LENGTH
+                    ),
+                    None,
+                ));
+            }
+            if value.chars().count() > MAX_META_VALUE_LENGTH {
+                return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_params(
+                    format!(
+                        "metadata value for key '{}' exceeds the maximum length of {} characters",
+                        key, MAX_META_VALUE_LENGTH
+                    ),
+                    None,
+                ));
+            }
+        } else {
+            // Fallback: entry without = or := — check total length
+            let max_total = MAX_META_KEY_LENGTH + MAX_META_VALUE_LENGTH;
+            if entry.chars().count() > max_total {
+                let preview = entry.chars().take(50).collect::<String>();
+                return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_params(
+                    format!(
+                        "metadata entry '{}' exceeds the maximum length of {} characters",
+                        preview, max_total
+                    ),
+                    None,
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/web.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/web.rs
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/web/account.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/web/account.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+use askama::Template;
+use axum::{Json, extract::State, http::StatusCode, response::Response};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use tower_sessions::Session;
+
+use secrets_core::crypto::hex;
+use secrets_core::service::{
+    api_key::{ensure_api_key, regenerate_api_key},
+    user::{change_user_key, get_user_by_id, update_user_key_setup},
+};
+
+use crate::AppState;
+
+use super::{SESSION_KEY_VERSION, current_user_id, render_template, require_valid_user};
+
+#[derive(Template)]
+#[template(path = "dashboard.html")]
+struct DashboardTemplate {
+    user_name: String,
+    user_email: String,
+    has_passphrase: bool,
+    base_url: String,
+    version: &'static str,
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize)]
+pub(super) struct KeySaltResponse {
+    has_passphrase: bool,
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    salt: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    key_check: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    params: Option<serde_json::Value>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+pub(super) struct KeySetupRequest {
+    /// Hex-encoded 32-byte random salt
+    salt: String,
+    /// Hex-encoded AES-256-GCM encryption of "secrets-mcp-key-check" with the derived key
+    key_check: String,
+    /// Key derivation parameters, e.g. {"alg":"pbkdf2-sha256","iterations":600000}
+    params: serde_json::Value,
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize)]
+pub(super) struct KeySetupResponse {
+    ok: bool,
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+pub(super) struct KeyChangeRequest {
+    /// Old derived key as 64-char hex — used to decrypt existing secrets
+    old_key: String,
+    /// New derived key as 64-char hex — used to re-encrypt secrets
+    new_key: String,
+    /// New 32-byte hex salt
+    salt: String,
+    /// New key_check: AES-256-GCM of KEY_CHECK_PLAINTEXT with the new key (hex)
+    key_check: String,
+    /// New key derivation parameters
+    params: serde_json::Value,
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize)]
+pub(super) struct ApiKeyResponse {
+    api_key: String,
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn dashboard(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
+    let user = match require_valid_user(&state.pool, &session, "dashboard").await {
+        Ok(u) => u,
+        Err(r) => return Ok(r),
+    };
+
+    let tmpl = DashboardTemplate {
+        user_name: user.name.clone(),
+        user_email: user.email.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
+        has_passphrase: user.key_salt.is_some(),
+        base_url: state.base_url.clone(),
+        version: env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
+    };
+
+    render_template(tmpl)
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn api_key_salt(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+) -> Result<Json<KeySaltResponse>, StatusCode> {
+    let user_id = current_user_id(&session)
+        .await
+        .ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
+
+    let user = get_user_by_id(&state.pool, user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to load user for key-salt API");
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?
+        .ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
+
+    if user.key_salt.is_none() {
+        return Ok(Json(KeySaltResponse {
+            has_passphrase: false,
+            salt: None,
+            key_check: None,
+            params: None,
+        }));
+    }
+
+    Ok(Json(KeySaltResponse {
+        has_passphrase: true,
+        salt: user.key_salt.as_deref().map(hex::encode_hex),
+        key_check: user.key_check.as_deref().map(hex::encode_hex),
+        params: user.key_params,
+    }))
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn api_key_setup(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+    Json(body): Json<KeySetupRequest>,
+) -> Result<Json<KeySetupResponse>, StatusCode> {
+    let user_id = current_user_id(&session)
+        .await
+        .ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
+
+    // Guard: if a passphrase is already configured, reject and direct to /api/key-change
+    let user = get_user_by_id(&state.pool, user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to load user for key-setup guard");
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?
+        .ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
+
+    if user.key_salt.is_some() {
+        tracing::warn!(%user_id, "key-setup called but passphrase already configured; use /api/key-change");
+        return Err(StatusCode::CONFLICT);
+    }
+
+    let salt = hex::decode_hex(&body.salt).map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid hex in key-setup salt");
+        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
+    })?;
+    let key_check = hex::decode_hex(&body.key_check).map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid hex in key-setup key_check");
+        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
+    })?;
+
+    if salt.len() != 32 {
+        tracing::warn!(salt_len = salt.len(), "key-setup salt must be 32 bytes");
+        return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+    }
+
+    update_user_key_setup(&state.pool, user_id, &salt, &key_check, &body.params)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to update key setup");
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?;
+
+    Ok(Json(KeySetupResponse { ok: true }))
+}
+
+// ── Change passphrase (re-encrypts all secrets) ───────────────────────────────
+
+pub(super) async fn api_key_change(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+    Json(body): Json<KeyChangeRequest>,
+) -> Result<Json<KeySetupResponse>, StatusCode> {
+    let user_id = current_user_id(&session)
+        .await
+        .ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
+
+    let user = get_user_by_id(&state.pool, user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to load user for key-change");
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?
+        .ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
+
+    // Must have an existing passphrase to change
+    let existing_key_check = user.key_check.ok_or_else(|| {
+        tracing::warn!(%user_id, "key-change called but no passphrase configured; use /api/key-setup");
+        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
+    })?;
+
+    // Validate and decode old key
+    let old_key_bytes = secrets_core::crypto::extract_key_from_hex(&body.old_key).map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid old_key hex in key-change");
+        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
+    })?;
+
+    // Verify old_key against the stored key_check
+    let plaintext = secrets_core::crypto::decrypt(&old_key_bytes, &existing_key_check).map_err(|_| {
+        tracing::warn!(%user_id, "key-change rejected: old_key does not match stored key_check");
+        StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
+    })?;
+    if plaintext != b"secrets-mcp-key-check" {
+        tracing::warn!(%user_id, "key-change rejected: decrypted key_check content mismatch");
+        return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+    }
+
+    // Validate and decode new key
+    let new_key_bytes = secrets_core::crypto::extract_key_from_hex(&body.new_key).map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid new_key hex in key-change");
+        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
+    })?;
+
+    // Decode new salt and key_check
+    let new_salt = hex::decode_hex(&body.salt).map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid hex in key-change salt");
+        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
+    })?;
+    if new_salt.len() != 32 {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            salt_len = new_salt.len(),
+            "key-change salt must be 32 bytes"
+        );
+        return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+    }
+    let new_key_check = hex::decode_hex(&body.key_check).map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid hex in key-change key_check");
+        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
+    })?;
+
+    change_user_key(
+        &state.pool,
+        user_id,
+        &old_key_bytes,
+        &new_key_bytes,
+        &new_salt,
+        &new_key_check,
+        &body.params,
+    )
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to change user key");
+        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+    })?;
+
+    // Refresh the session's key_version so the current session is not immediately
+    // invalidated by require_valid_user on the next page load.
+    match get_user_by_id(&state.pool, user_id).await {
+        Ok(Some(updated_user)) => {
+            if let Err(e) = session
+                .insert(SESSION_KEY_VERSION, updated_user.key_version)
+                .await
+            {
+                tracing::warn!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to update key_version in session after key change");
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(None) => {
+            tracing::warn!(%user_id, "user not found after key change; session not updated");
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to reload user after key change; session not updated");
+        }
+    }
+
+    tracing::info!(%user_id, secrets_count = "(see service log)", "passphrase changed and secrets re-encrypted");
+    Ok(Json(KeySetupResponse { ok: true }))
+}
+
+// ── API Key management ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+pub(super) async fn api_apikey_get(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+) -> Result<Json<ApiKeyResponse>, StatusCode> {
+    let user_id = current_user_id(&session)
+        .await
+        .ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
+
+    let api_key = ensure_api_key(&state.pool, user_id).await.map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "ensure_api_key failed");
+        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+    })?;
+
+    Ok(Json(ApiKeyResponse { api_key }))
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn api_apikey_regenerate(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+) -> Result<Json<ApiKeyResponse>, StatusCode> {
+    let user_id = current_user_id(&session)
+        .await
+        .ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
+
+    let api_key = regenerate_api_key(&state.pool, user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "regenerate_api_key failed");
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?;
+
+    Ok(Json(ApiKeyResponse { api_key }))
+}
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/web/assets.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/web/assets.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+use axum::{
+    body::Body,
+    extract::State,
+    http::{StatusCode, header},
+    response::{IntoResponse, Response},
+};
+
+use crate::AppState;
+
+pub(super) fn text_asset_response(content: &'static str, content_type: &'static str) -> Response {
+    Response::builder()
+        .status(StatusCode::OK)
+        .header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, content_type)
+        .header(header::CACHE_CONTROL, "public, max-age=86400")
+        .body(Body::from(content))
+        .expect("text asset response")
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn robots_txt() -> Response {
+    text_asset_response(
+        include_str!("../../static/robots.txt"),
+        "text/plain; charset=utf-8",
+    )
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn llms_txt() -> Response {
+    text_asset_response(
+        include_str!("../../static/llms.txt"),
+        "text/markdown; charset=utf-8",
+    )
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn ai_txt() -> Response {
+    llms_txt().await
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn i18n_js() -> Response {
+    text_asset_response(
+        include_str!("../../templates/i18n.js"),
+        "application/javascript; charset=utf-8",
+    )
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn favicon_svg() -> Response {
+    Response::builder()
+        .status(StatusCode::OK)
+        .header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "image/svg+xml")
+        .header(header::CACHE_CONTROL, "public, max-age=86400")
+        .body(Body::from(include_str!("../../static/favicon.svg")))
+        .expect("favicon response")
+}
+
+/// RFC 9728 — OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata.
+///
+/// Advertises that this server accepts Bearer tokens in the `Authorization`
+/// header.  We deliberately omit `authorization_servers` because this service
+/// issues its own API keys (no external OAuth AS is involved).  MCP clients
+/// that probe this endpoint will see the resource identifier and stop looking
+/// for a delegated OAuth flow.
+pub(super) async fn oauth_protected_resource_metadata(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+) -> impl IntoResponse {
+    let body = serde_json::json!({
+        "resource": state.base_url,
+        "bearer_methods_supported": ["header"],
+        "resource_documentation": format!("{}/dashboard", state.base_url),
+    });
+    (
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        [(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")],
+        axum::Json(body),
+    )
+}
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/web/audit.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/web/audit.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+use askama::Template;
+use axum::{
+    extract::{Query, State},
+    http::StatusCode,
+    response::Response,
+};
+use chrono::SecondsFormat;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use tower_sessions::Session;
+
+use crate::AppState;
+
+use super::{AUDIT_PAGE_LIMIT, paginate, render_template, require_valid_user};
+
+#[derive(Template)]
+#[template(path = "audit.html")]
+struct AuditPageTemplate {
+    user_name: String,
+    user_email: String,
+    entries: Vec<AuditEntryView>,
+    current_page: u32,
+    total_pages: u32,
+    total_count: i64,
+    version: &'static str,
+}
+
+struct AuditEntryView {
+    /// RFC3339 UTC for `<time datetime>`; rendered as browser-local in audit.html.
+    created_at_iso: String,
+    action: String,
+    target: String,
+    detail: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+pub(super) struct AuditQuery {
+    page: Option<u32>,
+}
+
+fn format_audit_target(folder: &str, entry_type: &str, name: &str) -> String {
+    // Auth events (folder="auth") use entry_type/name as provider-scoped target.
+    if folder == "auth" {
+        format!("{}/{}", entry_type, name)
+    } else if !folder.is_empty() && !entry_type.is_empty() {
+        format!("[{}/{}] {}", folder, entry_type, name)
+    } else if !folder.is_empty() {
+        format!("[{}] {}", folder, name)
+    } else {
+        name.to_string()
+    }
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn audit_page(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+    Query(aq): Query<AuditQuery>,
+) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
+    use secrets_core::service::audit_log::{count_for_user, list_for_user};
+
+    let user = match require_valid_user(&state.pool, &session, "audit_page").await {
+        Ok(u) => u,
+        Err(r) => return Ok(r),
+    };
+    let user_id = user.id;
+
+    let page = aq.page.unwrap_or(1).max(1);
+
+    let total_count = count_for_user(&state.pool, user_id).await.map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to count audit log for user");
+        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+    })?;
+
+    let (current_page, total_pages, offset) = paginate(page, total_count, AUDIT_PAGE_LIMIT as u32);
+    let actual_offset = i64::from(offset);
+
+    let rows = list_for_user(&state.pool, user_id, AUDIT_PAGE_LIMIT, actual_offset)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to load audit log for user");
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?;
+
+    let entries = rows
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|row| AuditEntryView {
+            created_at_iso: row.created_at.to_rfc3339_opts(SecondsFormat::Secs, true),
+            action: row.action,
+            target: format_audit_target(&row.folder, &row.entry_type, &row.name),
+            detail: serde_json::to_string_pretty(&row.detail).unwrap_or_else(|_| "{}".to_string()),
+        })
+        .collect();
+
+    let tmpl = AuditPageTemplate {
+        user_name: user.name.clone(),
+        user_email: user.email.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
+        entries,
+        current_page,
+        total_pages,
+        total_count,
+        version: env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
+    };
+
+    render_template(tmpl)
+}
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/web/auth.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/web/auth.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
+
+use askama::Template;
+use axum::{
+    extract::{ConnectInfo, Path, Query, State},
+    http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode},
+    response::{IntoResponse, Redirect, Response},
+};
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use tower_sessions::Session;
+
+use secrets_core::audit::log_login;
+use secrets_core::service::user::{
+    OAuthProfile, bind_oauth_account, find_or_create_user, unbind_oauth_account,
+};
+
+use crate::AppState;
+use crate::oauth::{OAuthConfig, OAuthUserInfo, google_auth_url, random_state};
+
+use super::{
+    SESSION_KEY_VERSION, SESSION_LOGIN_PROVIDER, SESSION_OAUTH_BIND_MODE, SESSION_OAUTH_STATE,
+    SESSION_USER_ID, current_user_id, google_cfg, render_template, request_user_agent,
+};
+
+#[derive(Template)]
+#[template(path = "login.html")]
+struct LoginTemplate {
+    has_google: bool,
+    base_url: String,
+    version: &'static str,
+}
+
+#[derive(Template)]
+#[template(path = "home.html")]
+struct HomeTemplate {
+    is_logged_in: bool,
+    base_url: String,
+    version: &'static str,
+}
+
+// ── Home page (public) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+pub(super) async fn home_page(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
+    let is_logged_in = current_user_id(&session).await.is_some();
+    let tmpl = HomeTemplate {
+        is_logged_in,
+        base_url: state.base_url.clone(),
+        version: env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
+    };
+    render_template(tmpl)
+}
+
+// ── Login page ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+pub(super) async fn login_page(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
+    if let Some(_uid) = current_user_id(&session).await {
+        return Ok(Redirect::to("/dashboard").into_response());
+    }
+
+    let tmpl = LoginTemplate {
+        has_google: state.google_config.is_some(),
+        base_url: state.base_url.clone(),
+        version: env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
+    };
+    render_template(tmpl)
+}
+
+// ── Google OAuth ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+pub(super) async fn auth_google(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
+    let config = google_cfg(&state).ok_or(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE)?;
+
+    let oauth_state = random_state();
+    session
+        .insert(SESSION_OAUTH_STATE, &oauth_state)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to insert oauth_state into session");
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?;
+
+    let url = google_auth_url(config, &oauth_state);
+    Ok(Redirect::to(&url).into_response())
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+pub(super) struct OAuthCallbackQuery {
+    code: Option<String>,
+    state: Option<String>,
+    error: Option<String>,
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn auth_google_callback(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    connect_info: ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    session: Session,
+    Query(params): Query<OAuthCallbackQuery>,
+) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
+    let client_ip = Some(crate::client_ip::extract_client_ip_parts(
+        &headers,
+        connect_info.0,
+    ));
+    let user_agent = request_user_agent(&headers);
+    handle_oauth_callback(
+        &state,
+        &session,
+        params,
+        "google",
+        client_ip.as_deref(),
+        user_agent.as_deref(),
+        |s, cfg, code| {
+            Box::pin(crate::oauth::google::exchange_code(
+                &s.http_client,
+                cfg,
+                code,
+            ))
+        },
+    )
+    .await
+}
+
+// ── Shared OAuth callback handler ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+async fn handle_oauth_callback<F>(
+    state: &AppState,
+    session: &Session,
+    params: OAuthCallbackQuery,
+    provider: &str,
+    client_ip: Option<&str>,
+    user_agent: Option<&str>,
+    exchange_fn: F,
+) -> Result<Response, StatusCode>
+where
+    F: for<'a> Fn(
+        &'a AppState,
+        &'a OAuthConfig,
+        &'a str,
+    ) -> std::pin::Pin<
+        Box<dyn std::future::Future<Output = anyhow::Result<OAuthUserInfo>> + Send + 'a>,
+    >,
+{
+    if let Some(err) = params.error {
+        tracing::warn!(provider, error = %err, "OAuth error");
+        return Ok(Redirect::to("/login?error=oauth_error").into_response());
+    }
+
+    let Some(code) = params.code else {
+        tracing::warn!(provider, "OAuth callback missing code");
+        return Ok(Redirect::to("/login?error=oauth_missing_code").into_response());
+    };
+    let Some(returned_state) = params.state.as_deref() else {
+        tracing::warn!(provider, "OAuth callback missing state");
+        return Ok(Redirect::to("/login?error=oauth_missing_state").into_response());
+    };
+
+    let expected_state: Option<String> = session.get(SESSION_OAUTH_STATE).await.map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!(provider, error = %e, "failed to read oauth_state from session");
+        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+    })?;
+    if expected_state.as_deref() != Some(returned_state) {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            provider,
+            expected_present = expected_state.is_some(),
+            "OAuth state mismatch (empty session often means SameSite=Strict or server restart)"
+        );
+        return Ok(Redirect::to("/login?error=oauth_state").into_response());
+    }
+    if let Err(e) = session.remove::<String>(SESSION_OAUTH_STATE).await {
+        tracing::warn!(provider, error = %e, "failed to remove oauth_state from session");
+    }
+
+    let config = match provider {
+        "google" => state
+            .google_config
+            .as_ref()
+            .ok_or(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE)?,
+        _ => return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST),
+    };
+
+    let user_info = exchange_fn(state, config, code.as_str())
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(provider, error = %e, "failed to exchange OAuth code");
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?;
+
+    let bind_mode: bool = match session.get::<bool>(SESSION_OAUTH_BIND_MODE).await {
+        Ok(v) => v.unwrap_or(false),
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::error!(
+                provider,
+                error = %e,
+                "failed to read oauth_bind_mode from session"
+            );
+            return Err(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR);
+        }
+    };
+
+    if bind_mode {
+        let user_id = current_user_id(session)
+            .await
+            .ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
+        if let Err(e) = session.remove::<bool>(SESSION_OAUTH_BIND_MODE).await {
+            tracing::warn!(provider, error = %e, "failed to remove oauth_bind_mode from session after bind");
+        }
+
+        let profile = OAuthProfile {
+            provider: user_info.provider,
+            provider_id: user_info.provider_id,
+            email: user_info.email,
+            name: user_info.name,
+            avatar_url: user_info.avatar_url,
+        };
+
+        bind_oauth_account(&state.pool, user_id, profile)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| {
+                tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to bind OAuth account");
+                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+            })?;
+
+        return Ok(Redirect::to("/dashboard?bound=1").into_response());
+    }
+
+    let profile = OAuthProfile {
+        provider: user_info.provider,
+        provider_id: user_info.provider_id,
+        email: user_info.email,
+        name: user_info.name,
+        avatar_url: user_info.avatar_url,
+    };
+
+    let (user, _is_new) = find_or_create_user(&state.pool, profile)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to find or create user");
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?;
+
+    session
+        .insert(SESSION_USER_ID, user.id.to_string())
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(
+                error = %e,
+                user_id = %user.id,
+                "failed to insert user_id into session after OAuth"
+            );
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?;
+    session
+        .insert(SESSION_LOGIN_PROVIDER, &provider)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(
+                provider,
+                error = %e,
+                "failed to insert login_provider into session after OAuth"
+            );
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?;
+    if let Err(e) = session.insert(SESSION_KEY_VERSION, user.key_version).await {
+        tracing::warn!(error = %e, user_id = %user.id, "failed to insert key_version into session after OAuth");
+    }
+
+    log_login(
+        &state.pool,
+        "oauth",
+        provider,
+        user.id,
+        client_ip,
+        user_agent,
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    Ok(Redirect::to("/dashboard").into_response())
+}
+
+// ── Logout ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+pub(super) async fn auth_logout(session: Session) -> impl IntoResponse {
+    if let Err(e) = session.flush().await {
+        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to flush session on logout");
+    }
+    Redirect::to("/")
+}
+
+// ── Account bind/unbind ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+pub(super) async fn account_bind_google(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
+    let _ = current_user_id(&session)
+        .await
+        .ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
+
+    session
+        .insert(SESSION_OAUTH_BIND_MODE, true)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to insert oauth_bind_mode into session");
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?;
+
+    let config = google_cfg(&state).ok_or(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE)?;
+    let oauth_state = random_state();
+    if let Err(e) = session.insert(SESSION_OAUTH_STATE, &oauth_state).await {
+        tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to insert oauth_state for account bind flow");
+        if let Err(rm) = session.remove::<bool>(SESSION_OAUTH_BIND_MODE).await {
+            tracing::warn!(error = %rm, "failed to roll back oauth_bind_mode after oauth_state insert failure");
+        }
+        return Err(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR);
+    }
+
+    let url = google_auth_url(config, &oauth_state);
+    Ok(Redirect::to(&url).into_response())
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn account_unbind(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Path(provider): Path<String>,
+    session: Session,
+) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
+    let user_id = current_user_id(&session)
+        .await
+        .ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
+
+    let current_login_provider = session
+        .get::<String>(SESSION_LOGIN_PROVIDER)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to read login_provider from session");
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?;
+
+    unbind_oauth_account(
+        &state.pool,
+        user_id,
+        &provider,
+        current_login_provider.as_deref(),
+    )
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to unbind oauth account");
+        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
+    })?;
+
+    Ok(Redirect::to("/dashboard?unbound=1").into_response())
+}
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/web/entries.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/web/entries.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,948 @@
+use axum::{
+    Json,
+    extract::{Path, Query, State},
+    http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode},
+    response::Response,
+};
+use chrono::SecondsFormat;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde_json::json;
+use tower_sessions::Session;
+use uuid::Uuid;
+
+use secrets_core::error::AppError;
+use secrets_core::service::{
+    delete::delete_by_id,
+    get_secret::get_all_secrets_by_id,
+    search::{SearchParams, count_entries, fetch_secrets_for_entries, ilike_pattern, list_entries},
+    update::{UpdateEntryFieldsByIdParams, update_fields_by_id},
+};
+
+use crate::AppState;
+
+use super::{
+    ENTRIES_PAGE_LIMIT, UiLang, current_user_id, paginate, render_template, request_ui_lang,
+    require_valid_user, tr,
+};
+
+// ── Template types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+use askama::Template;
+
+#[derive(Template)]
+#[template(path = "entries.html")]
+struct EntriesPageTemplate {
+    user_name: String,
+    user_email: String,
+    entries: Vec<EntryListItemView>,
+    folder_tabs: Vec<FolderTabView>,
+    type_options: Vec<String>,
+    secret_type_options_json: String,
+    filter_folder: String,
+    filter_name: String,
+    filter_type: String,
+    current_page: u32,
+    total_pages: u32,
+    total_count: i64,
+    version: &'static str,
+}
+
+/// Non-sensitive entry fields; `secrets` lists field names/types only (no ciphertext).
+struct EntryListItemView {
+    id: String,
+    folder: String,
+    entry_type: String,
+    name: String,
+    notes: String,
+    tags: String,
+    /// Compact JSON for `data-entry-metadata` (dialog editor).
+    metadata_json: String,
+    /// Secret field summaries for table + dialog chips.
+    secrets: Vec<SecretSummaryView>,
+    /// JSON array of `{ id, name, secret_type }` for dialog secret chips.
+    secrets_json: String,
+    /// RFC3339 UTC; shown in edit dialog.
+    updated_at_iso: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize)]
+struct SecretSummaryView {
+    id: String,
+    name: String,
+    secret_type: String,
+}
+
+struct FolderTabView {
+    name: String,
+    count: i64,
+    href: String,
+    active: bool,
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+pub(super) struct EntriesQuery {
+    folder: Option<String>,
+    name: Option<String>,
+    /// URL query key is `type` (maps to DB column `entries.type`).
+    #[serde(rename = "type")]
+    entry_type: Option<String>,
+    page: Option<u32>,
+}
+
+// ── Entry mutation error helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+type EntryApiError = (StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>);
+
+fn map_entry_mutation_err(e: anyhow::Error, lang: UiLang) -> EntryApiError {
+    if let Some(app_err) = e.downcast_ref::<AppError>() {
+        return map_app_error(app_err, lang);
+    }
+
+    // Fallback for legacy string-based errors and raw sqlx errors
+    let msg = e.to_string();
+    if msg.contains("already exists") {
+        return (
+            StatusCode::CONFLICT,
+            Json(
+                json!({ "error": tr(lang, "该账号下已存在相同 folder + name 的条目", "此帳號下已存在相同 folder + name 的條目", "An entry with the same folder + name already exists for this account") }),
+            ),
+        );
+    }
+    if msg.contains("must be at most") {
+        return (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, Json(json!({ "error": msg })));
+    }
+    tracing::error!(error = %e, "entry mutation failed");
+    (
+        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+        Json(
+            json!({ "error": tr(lang, "操作失败，请稍后重试", "操作失敗，請稍後重試", "Operation failed, please try again later") }),
+        ),
+    )
+}
+
+fn map_app_error(err: &AppError, lang: UiLang) -> EntryApiError {
+    match err {
+        AppError::ConflictEntryName { .. } | AppError::ConflictSecretName { .. } => (
+            StatusCode::CONFLICT,
+            Json(json!({ "error": err.to_string() })),
+        ),
+        AppError::NotFoundEntry | AppError::NotFoundUser | AppError::NotFoundSecret => (
+            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+            Json(
+                json!({ "error": tr(lang, "资源不存在或无权访问", "資源不存在或無權存取", "Resource not found or no access") }),
+            ),
+        ),
+        AppError::AuthenticationFailed | AppError::Unauthorized => (
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            Json(
+                json!({ "error": tr(lang, "认证失败或无权访问", "認證失敗或無權存取", "Authentication failed or unauthorized") }),
+            ),
+        ),
+        AppError::Validation { message } => {
+            (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, Json(json!({ "error": message })))
+        }
+        AppError::ConcurrentModification => (
+            StatusCode::CONFLICT,
+            Json(
+                json!({ "error": tr(lang, "条目已被修改，请刷新后重试", "條目已被修改，請重新整理後重試", "Entry was modified, please refresh and try again") }),
+            ),
+        ),
+        AppError::DecryptionFailed => (
+            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            Json(
+                json!({ "error": tr(lang, "解密失败，请检查密码短语", "解密失敗，請檢查密碼短語", "Decryption failed — please check your passphrase") }),
+            ),
+        ),
+        AppError::EncryptionKeyNotSet => (
+            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            Json(
+                json!({ "error": tr(lang, "请先设置密码短语后再使用此功能", "請先設定密碼短語再使用此功能", "Please set a passphrase before using this feature") }),
+            ),
+        ),
+        AppError::Internal(_) => {
+            tracing::error!(error = %err, "internal error in entry mutation");
+            (
+                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                Json(
+                    json!({ "error": tr(lang, "操作失败，请稍后重试", "操作失敗，請稍後重試", "Operation failed, please try again later") }),
+                ),
+            )
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+// ── Handlers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+pub(super) async fn entries_page(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+    Query(q): Query<EntriesQuery>,
+) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
+    let user = match require_valid_user(&state.pool, &session, "entries_page").await {
+        Ok(u) => u,
+        Err(r) => return Ok(r),
+    };
+    let user_id = user.id;
+
+    let folder_filter = q
+        .folder
+        .as_ref()
+        .map(|s| s.trim())
+        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+        .map(|s| s.to_string());
+    let type_filter = q
+        .entry_type
+        .as_ref()
+        .map(|s| s.trim())
+        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+        .map(|s| s.to_string());
+    let name_filter = q
+        .name
+        .as_ref()
+        .map(|s| s.trim())
+        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+        .map(|s| s.to_string());
+    let page = q.page.unwrap_or(1).max(1);
+    let count_params = SearchParams {
+        folder: folder_filter.as_deref(),
+        entry_type: type_filter.as_deref(),
+        name: None,
+        name_query: name_filter.as_deref(),
+        tags: &[],
+        query: None,
+        sort: "updated",
+        limit: ENTRIES_PAGE_LIMIT,
+        offset: 0,
+        user_id: Some(user_id),
+    };
+
+    // Build folder query before joining so the SQL string lives long enough.
+    #[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
+    struct FolderCountRow {
+        folder: String,
+        count: i64,
+    }
+    let mut folder_sql =
+        "SELECT folder, COUNT(*)::bigint AS count FROM entries WHERE user_id = $1".to_string();
+    let mut bind_idx = 2;
+    if type_filter.is_some() {
+        folder_sql.push_str(&format!(" AND type = ${bind_idx}"));
+        bind_idx += 1;
+    }
+    if name_filter.is_some() {
+        folder_sql.push_str(&format!(" AND name ILIKE ${bind_idx} ESCAPE '\\'"));
+        bind_idx += 1;
+    }
+    let _ = bind_idx;
+    folder_sql.push_str(" GROUP BY folder ORDER BY folder");
+    let mut folder_query = sqlx::query_as::<_, FolderCountRow>(&folder_sql).bind(user_id);
+    if let Some(t) = type_filter.as_deref() {
+        folder_query = folder_query.bind(t);
+    }
+    if let Some(n) = name_filter.as_deref() {
+        folder_query = folder_query.bind(ilike_pattern(n));
+    }
+
+    #[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
+    struct TypeOptionRow {
+        #[sqlx(rename = "type")]
+        entry_type: String,
+    }
+
+    // Phase 1: count, folder tabs, and type options are mutually independent — run in parallel.
+    let (total_count, folder_rows_res, type_options_res) = tokio::join!(
+        async {
+            count_entries(&state.pool, &count_params)
+                .await
+                .inspect_err(
+                    |e| tracing::warn!(error = %e, "count_entries failed for web entries page"),
+                )
+                .unwrap_or(0)
+        },
+        folder_query.fetch_all(&state.pool),
+        sqlx::query_as::<_, TypeOptionRow>(
+            "SELECT DISTINCT type FROM entries WHERE user_id = $1 ORDER BY type",
+        )
+        .bind(user_id)
+        .fetch_all(&state.pool),
+    );
+    let folder_rows = folder_rows_res.map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to load folder tabs for web");
+        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+    })?;
+    let mut type_options: Vec<String> = type_options_res
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to load type options for web");
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|r| r.entry_type)
+        .filter(|t| !t.is_empty())
+        .collect();
+
+    // Phase 2: paginate using count, then fetch entries for the page.
+    let (current_page, total_pages, offset) = paginate(page, total_count, ENTRIES_PAGE_LIMIT);
+    let list_params = SearchParams {
+        offset,
+        ..count_params
+    };
+    let rows = list_entries(&state.pool, list_params).await.map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to load entries list for web");
+        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+    })?;
+    let entry_ids: Vec<Uuid> = rows.iter().map(|e| e.id).collect();
+    let secret_schemas = fetch_secrets_for_entries(&state.pool, &entry_ids)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to load secret schema list for web");
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        })?;
+    if let Some(current) = type_filter.as_ref()
+        && !current.is_empty()
+        && !type_options.iter().any(|t| t == current)
+    {
+        type_options.push(current.clone());
+        type_options.sort_unstable();
+    }
+
+    fn entries_href(
+        folder: Option<&str>,
+        entry_type: Option<&str>,
+        name: Option<&str>,
+        page: Option<u32>,
+    ) -> String {
+        let mut pairs: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+        if let Some(f) = folder
+            && !f.is_empty()
+        {
+            pairs.push(format!("folder={}", urlencoding::encode(f)));
+        }
+        if let Some(t) = entry_type
+            && !t.is_empty()
+        {
+            pairs.push(format!("type={}", urlencoding::encode(t)));
+        }
+        if let Some(n) = name
+            && !n.is_empty()
+        {
+            pairs.push(format!("name={}", urlencoding::encode(n)));
+        }
+        if let Some(p) = page {
+            pairs.push(format!("page={}", p));
+        }
+        if pairs.is_empty() {
+            "/entries".to_string()
+        } else {
+            format!("/entries?{}", pairs.join("&"))
+        }
+    }
+
+    let all_count: i64 = folder_rows.iter().map(|r| r.count).sum();
+    let mut folder_tabs: Vec<FolderTabView> = Vec::with_capacity(folder_rows.len() + 1);
+    folder_tabs.push(FolderTabView {
+        name: "全部".to_string(),
+        count: all_count,
+        href: entries_href(
+            None,
+            type_filter.as_deref(),
+            name_filter.as_deref(),
+            Some(1),
+        ),
+        active: folder_filter.is_none(),
+    });
+    for r in folder_rows {
+        let name = r.folder;
+        folder_tabs.push(FolderTabView {
+            href: entries_href(
+                Some(&name),
+                type_filter.as_deref(),
+                name_filter.as_deref(),
+                Some(1),
+            ),
+            active: folder_filter.as_deref() == Some(name.as_str()),
+            name,
+            count: r.count,
+        });
+    }
+
+    let entries = rows
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|e| {
+            let secrets: Vec<SecretSummaryView> = secret_schemas
+                .get(&e.id)
+                .map(|fields| {
+                    fields
+                        .iter()
+                        .map(|f| SecretSummaryView {
+                            id: f.id.to_string(),
+                            name: f.name.clone(),
+                            secret_type: f.secret_type.clone(),
+                        })
+                        .collect()
+                })
+                .unwrap_or_default();
+            let secrets_json = serde_json::to_string(&secrets).unwrap_or_else(|_| "[]".to_string());
+            let metadata_json =
+                serde_json::to_string(&e.metadata).unwrap_or_else(|_| "{}".to_string());
+            EntryListItemView {
+                id: e.id.to_string(),
+                folder: e.folder,
+                entry_type: e.entry_type,
+                name: e.name,
+                notes: e.notes,
+                tags: e.tags.join(", "),
+                metadata_json,
+                secrets,
+                secrets_json,
+                updated_at_iso: e.updated_at.to_rfc3339_opts(SecondsFormat::Secs, true),
+            }
+        })
+        .collect();
+
+    let tmpl = EntriesPageTemplate {
+        user_name: user.name.clone(),
+        user_email: user.email.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
+        entries,
+        folder_tabs,
+        type_options,
+        secret_type_options_json: serde_json::to_string(
+            &secrets_core::taxonomy::SECRET_TYPE_OPTIONS
+                .iter()
+                .map(|s| s.to_string())
+                .collect::<Vec<_>>(),
+        )
+        .unwrap_or_default(),
+        filter_folder: folder_filter.unwrap_or_default(),
+        filter_name: name_filter.unwrap_or_default(),
+        filter_type: type_filter.unwrap_or_default(),
+        current_page,
+        total_pages,
+        total_count,
+        version: env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
+    };
+
+    render_template(tmpl)
+}
+
+// ── Entry management (Web UI, non-sensitive fields only) ───────────────────────
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+pub(super) struct EntryPatchBody {
+    folder: String,
+    #[serde(rename = "type")]
+    entry_type: String,
+    name: String,
+    notes: String,
+    tags: Vec<String>,
+    metadata: serde_json::Value,
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn api_entry_patch(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    Path(entry_id): Path<Uuid>,
+    Json(body): Json<EntryPatchBody>,
+) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, EntryApiError> {
+    let lang = request_ui_lang(&headers);
+    let user_id = current_user_id(&session).await.ok_or((
+        StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+        Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "未登录", "尚未登入", "Not logged in") })),
+    ))?;
+
+    let folder = body.folder.trim();
+    let entry_type = body.entry_type.trim();
+    let name = body.name.trim();
+    let notes = body.notes.trim();
+
+    if name.is_empty() {
+        return Err((
+            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            Json(
+                json!({ "error": tr(lang, "name 不能为空", "name 不能為空", "name cannot be empty") }),
+            ),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let tags: Vec<String> = body
+        .tags
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|t| t.trim().to_string())
+        .filter(|t| !t.is_empty())
+        .collect();
+
+    if !body.metadata.is_object() {
+        return Err((
+            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            Json(
+                json!({ "error": tr(lang, "metadata 必须是 JSON 对象", "metadata 必須是 JSON 物件", "metadata must be a JSON object") }),
+            ),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    update_fields_by_id(
+        &state.pool,
+        entry_id,
+        user_id,
+        UpdateEntryFieldsByIdParams {
+            folder,
+            entry_type,
+            name,
+            notes,
+            tags: &tags,
+            metadata: &body.metadata,
+        },
+    )
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| map_entry_mutation_err(e, lang))?;
+
+    Ok(Json(json!({ "ok": true })))
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn api_entry_delete(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    Path(entry_id): Path<Uuid>,
+) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, EntryApiError> {
+    let lang = request_ui_lang(&headers);
+    let user_id = current_user_id(&session).await.ok_or((
+        StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+        Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "未登录", "尚未登入", "Not logged in") })),
+    ))?;
+
+    delete_by_id(&state.pool, entry_id, user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| map_entry_mutation_err(e, lang))?;
+
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "ok": true,
+    })))
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+pub(super) struct SecretCheckNameQuery {
+    name: String,
+    exclude_secret_id: Option<Uuid>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize)]
+pub(super) struct SecretCheckNameResponse {
+    ok: bool,
+    available: bool,
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    error: Option<String>,
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn api_secret_check_name(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    Query(params): Query<SecretCheckNameQuery>,
+) -> Result<Json<SecretCheckNameResponse>, EntryApiError> {
+    let lang = request_ui_lang(&headers);
+    let user_id = current_user_id(&session).await.ok_or((
+        StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+        Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "未登录", "尚未登入", "Not logged in") })),
+    ))?;
+
+    let name = params.name.trim();
+    if name.is_empty() {
+        return Err((
+            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            Json(
+                json!({ "error": tr(lang, "secret name 不能为空", "secret name 不能為空", "secret name cannot be empty") }),
+            ),
+        ));
+    }
+    if name.chars().count() > 256 {
+        return Err((
+            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            Json(
+                json!({ "error": tr(lang, "secret name 长度不能超过 256 个字符", "secret name 長度不能超過 256 個字元", "secret name must be at most 256 characters") }),
+            ),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let count: i64 = if let Some(exclude_id) = params.exclude_secret_id {
+        sqlx::query_scalar::<_, i64>(
+            "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM secrets WHERE user_id = $1 AND name = $2 AND id != $3",
+        )
+        .bind(user_id)
+        .bind(name)
+        .bind(exclude_id)
+        .fetch_one(&state.pool)
+        .await
+    } else {
+        sqlx::query_scalar::<_, i64>(
+            "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM secrets WHERE user_id = $1 AND name = $2",
+        )
+        .bind(user_id)
+        .bind(name)
+        .fetch_one(&state.pool)
+        .await
+    }.map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to check secret name availability");
+        (
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            Json(
+                json!({ "error": tr(lang, "操作失败，请稍后重试", "操作失敗，請稍後重試", "Operation failed, please try again later") }),
+            ),
+        )
+    })?;
+
+    let available = count == 0;
+    let error = if available {
+        None
+    } else {
+        Some(
+            tr(
+                lang,
+                "该用户下已存在相同 name 的密文",
+                "該用戶下已存在相同 name 的密文",
+                "A secret with the same name already exists for this user",
+            )
+            .to_string(),
+        )
+    };
+
+    Ok(Json(SecretCheckNameResponse {
+        ok: true,
+        available,
+        error,
+    }))
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+pub(super) struct SecretPatchBody {
+    name: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(rename = "type")]
+    secret_type: Option<String>,
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn api_secret_patch(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    Path(secret_id): Path<Uuid>,
+    Json(body): Json<SecretPatchBody>,
+) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, EntryApiError> {
+    #[derive(Serialize, sqlx::FromRow)]
+    struct LinkedEntryAuditRow {
+        folder: String,
+        #[sqlx(rename = "type")]
+        entry_type: String,
+        name: String,
+    }
+
+    let lang = request_ui_lang(&headers);
+    let user_id = current_user_id(&session).await.ok_or((
+        StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+        Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "未登录", "尚未登入", "Not logged in") })),
+    ))?;
+
+    let name = body.name.as_ref().map(|s| s.trim());
+    let secret_type = body.secret_type.as_ref().map(|s| s.trim());
+
+    if let Some(n) = name {
+        if n.is_empty() {
+            return Err((
+                StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+                Json(
+                    json!({ "error": tr(lang, "secret name 不能为空", "secret name 不能為空", "secret name cannot be empty") }),
+                ),
+            ));
+        }
+        if n.chars().count() > 256 {
+            return Err((
+                StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+                Json(
+                    json!({ "error": tr(lang, "secret name 长度不能超过 256 个字符", "secret name 長度不能超過 256 個字元", "secret name must be at most 256 characters") }),
+                ),
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+
+    if let Some(t) = secret_type {
+        if t.is_empty() {
+            return Err((
+                StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+                Json(
+                    json!({ "error": tr(lang, "secret type 不能为空", "secret type 不能為空", "secret type cannot be empty") }),
+                ),
+            ));
+        }
+        if t.chars().count() > 64 {
+            return Err((
+                StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+                Json(
+                    json!({ "error": tr(lang, "secret type 长度不能超过 64 个字符", "secret type 長度不能超過 64 個字元", "secret type must be at most 64 characters") }),
+                ),
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+
+    if name.is_none() && secret_type.is_none() {
+        return Err((
+            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            Json(
+                json!({ "error": tr(lang, "至少需要提供 name 或 type 之一", "至少需要提供 name 或 type 之一", "At least one of name or type is required") }),
+            ),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let mut tx = state
+        .pool
+        .begin()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| map_entry_mutation_err(e.into(), lang))?;
+
+    let secret_row: Option<(String, String)> =
+        sqlx::query_as("SELECT name, type FROM secrets WHERE id = $1 AND user_id = $2 FOR UPDATE")
+            .bind(secret_id)
+            .bind(user_id)
+            .fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| map_entry_mutation_err(e.into(), lang))?;
+
+    let Some((old_name, old_type)) = secret_row else {
+        let _ = tx.rollback().await;
+        return Err((
+            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+            Json(
+                json!({ "error": tr(lang, "密文不存在或无权访问", "密文不存在或無權存取", "Secret not found or no access") }),
+            ),
+        ));
+    };
+
+    let linked_entries: Vec<LinkedEntryAuditRow> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT e.folder, e.type, e.name \
+         FROM entry_secrets es \
+         JOIN entries e ON e.id = es.entry_id \
+         WHERE es.secret_id = $1 AND e.user_id = $2 \
+         ORDER BY e.folder, e.type, e.name",
+    )
+    .bind(secret_id)
+    .bind(user_id)
+    .fetch_all(&mut *tx)
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| map_entry_mutation_err(e.into(), lang))?;
+
+    let new_name = name.unwrap_or(&old_name).to_string();
+    let new_type = secret_type.unwrap_or(&old_type).to_string();
+
+    let result = sqlx::query(
+        "UPDATE secrets SET name = $1, type = $2, version = version + 1, updated_at = NOW() \
+         WHERE id = $3",
+    )
+    .bind(&new_name)
+    .bind(&new_type)
+    .bind(secret_id)
+    .execute(&mut *tx)
+    .await;
+
+    if let Err(e) = result {
+        if let Some(db_err) = e.as_database_error()
+            && db_err.code() == Some("23505".into())
+        {
+            let _ = tx.rollback().await;
+            return Err(map_app_error(
+                &AppError::ConflictSecretName {
+                    secret_name: new_name.clone(),
+                },
+                lang,
+            ));
+        }
+        let _ = tx.rollback().await;
+        return Err(map_entry_mutation_err(e.into(), lang));
+    }
+
+    secrets_core::audit::log_tx(
+        &mut tx,
+        Some(user_id),
+        "rename_secret",
+        "",
+        "",
+        &old_name,
+        json!({
+            "source": "web",
+            "secret_id": secret_id,
+            "old_name": old_name,
+            "new_name": new_name,
+            "old_type": old_type,
+            "new_type": new_type,
+            "linked_entries": linked_entries,
+        }),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    tx.commit()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| map_entry_mutation_err(e.into(), lang))?;
+
+    Ok(Json(json!({ "ok": true })))
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn api_entry_secret_unlink(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    Path((entry_id, secret_id)): Path<(Uuid, Uuid)>,
+) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, EntryApiError> {
+    #[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
+    struct EntryAuditRow {
+        folder: String,
+        #[sqlx(rename = "type")]
+        entry_type: String,
+        name: String,
+    }
+
+    let lang = request_ui_lang(&headers);
+    let user_id = current_user_id(&session).await.ok_or((
+        StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+        Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "未登录", "尚未登入", "Not logged in") })),
+    ))?;
+
+    let mut tx = state
+        .pool
+        .begin()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| map_entry_mutation_err(e.into(), lang))?;
+
+    let entry_row: Option<EntryAuditRow> =
+        sqlx::query_as("SELECT folder, type, name FROM entries WHERE id = $1 AND user_id = $2")
+            .bind(entry_id)
+            .bind(user_id)
+            .fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| map_entry_mutation_err(e.into(), lang))?;
+
+    let Some(entry_row) = entry_row else {
+        let _ = tx.rollback().await;
+        return Err((
+            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+            Json(
+                json!({ "error": tr(lang, "条目不存在或无权访问", "條目不存在或無權存取", "Entry not found or no access") }),
+            ),
+        ));
+    };
+
+    let deleted = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM entry_secrets WHERE entry_id = $1 AND secret_id = $2")
+        .bind(entry_id)
+        .bind(secret_id)
+        .execute(&mut *tx)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| map_entry_mutation_err(e.into(), lang))?
+        .rows_affected();
+
+    if deleted == 0 {
+        let _ = tx.rollback().await;
+        return Err((
+            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+            Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "关联不存在", "關聯不存在", "Relation not found") })),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let secret_deleted = sqlx::query(
+        "DELETE FROM secrets s \
+         WHERE s.id = $1 \
+           AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM entry_secrets es WHERE es.secret_id = s.id)",
+    )
+    .bind(secret_id)
+    .execute(&mut *tx)
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| map_entry_mutation_err(e.into(), lang))?
+    .rows_affected()
+        > 0;
+
+    secrets_core::audit::log_tx(
+        &mut tx,
+        Some(user_id),
+        "unlink_secret",
+        &entry_row.folder,
+        &entry_row.entry_type,
+        &entry_row.name,
+        json!({
+            "source": "web",
+            "entry_id": entry_id,
+            "secret_id": secret_id,
+            "deleted_secret": secret_deleted,
+        }),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    tx.commit()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| map_entry_mutation_err(e.into(), lang))?;
+
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "ok": true,
+        "deleted_relation": true,
+        "deleted_secret": secret_deleted,
+    })))
+}
+
+// ── Decrypt entry secrets (Web UI) ───────────────────────────────────────────
+
+pub(super) async fn api_entry_secrets_decrypt(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    session: Session,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    Path(entry_id): Path<Uuid>,
+) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, EntryApiError> {
+    let lang = request_ui_lang(&headers);
+    let user_id = current_user_id(&session).await.ok_or((
+        StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+        Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "未登录", "尚未登入", "Not logged in") })),
+    ))?;
+
+    let enc_key_hex = headers
+        .get("x-encryption-key")
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .ok_or_else(|| {
+            (
+                StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+                Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "缺少 X-Encryption-Key 请求头", "缺少 X-Encryption-Key 請求標頭", "Missing X-Encryption-Key header") })),
+            )
+        })?;
+
+    let master_key =
+        secrets_core::crypto::extract_key_from_hex(enc_key_hex).map_err(|_| {
+            (
+                StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+                Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "X-Encryption-Key 格式无效", "X-Encryption-Key 格式無效", "Invalid X-Encryption-Key format") })),
+            )
+        })?;
+
+    let secrets =
+        get_all_secrets_by_id(&state.pool, entry_id, &master_key, Some(user_id))
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| {
+                if let Some(app_err) = e.downcast_ref::<AppError>() {
+                    return match app_err {
+                        AppError::DecryptionFailed => (
+                            StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
+                            Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "解密失败，请确认密码短语正确", "解密失敗，請確認密碼短語正確", "Decryption failed, please verify your passphrase") })),
+                        ),
+                        AppError::NotFoundEntry | AppError::NotFoundUser | AppError::NotFoundSecret => (
+                            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+                            Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "条目不存在或无权访问", "條目不存在或無權存取", "Entry not found or no access") })),
+                        ),
+                        _ => {
+                            tracing::error!(error = %e, %entry_id, "decrypt entry secrets failed");
+                            (
+                                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                                Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "操作失败，请稍后重试", "操作失敗，請稍後重試", "Operation failed, please try again later") })),
+                            )
+                        }
+                    };
+                }
+                tracing::error!(error = %e, %entry_id, "decrypt entry secrets failed");
+                (
+                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                    Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "操作失败，请稍后重试", "操作失敗，請稍後重試", "Operation failed, please try again later") })),
+                )
+            })?;
+
+    Ok(Json(json!({ "ok": true, "secrets": secrets })))
+}
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/src/web/mod.rs
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/src/web/mod.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+use askama::Template;
+use axum::{
+    Router,
+    http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode, header},
+    response::{Html, IntoResponse, Redirect, Response},
+    routing::{get, patch, post},
+};
+use tower_sessions::Session;
+use uuid::Uuid;
+
+use crate::AppState;
+use crate::oauth::OAuthConfig;
+
+mod account;
+mod assets;
+mod audit;
+mod auth;
+mod entries;
+
+// ── Session keys ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+const SESSION_USER_ID: &str = "user_id";
+const SESSION_OAUTH_STATE: &str = "oauth_state";
+const SESSION_OAUTH_BIND_MODE: &str = "oauth_bind_mode";
+const SESSION_LOGIN_PROVIDER: &str = "login_provider";
+const SESSION_KEY_VERSION: &str = "key_version";
+
+// ── Page limits ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/// Cap for HTML list (avoids loading unbounded rows into memory).
+const ENTRIES_PAGE_LIMIT: u32 = 50;
+const AUDIT_PAGE_LIMIT: i64 = 10;
+
+// ── UI language ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+enum UiLang {
+    ZhCn,
+    ZhTw,
+    En,
+}
+
+fn request_ui_lang(headers: &HeaderMap) -> UiLang {
+    let Some(raw) = headers
+        .get(header::ACCEPT_LANGUAGE)
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+    else {
+        return UiLang::ZhCn;
+    };
+    let lower = raw.to_ascii_lowercase();
+    if lower.contains("zh-tw") || lower.contains("zh-hk") || lower.contains("zh-hant") {
+        UiLang::ZhTw
+    } else if lower.contains("zh") {
+        UiLang::ZhCn
+    } else if lower.contains("en") {
+        UiLang::En
+    } else {
+        UiLang::ZhCn
+    }
+}
+
+fn tr(lang: UiLang, zh_cn: &'static str, zh_tw: &'static str, en: &'static str) -> &'static str {
+    match lang {
+        UiLang::ZhCn => zh_cn,
+        UiLang::ZhTw => zh_tw,
+        UiLang::En => en,
+    }
+}
+
+// ── App state helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+fn google_cfg(state: &AppState) -> Option<&OAuthConfig> {
+    state.google_config.as_ref()
+}
+
+async fn current_user_id(session: &Session) -> Option<Uuid> {
+    match session.get::<String>(SESSION_USER_ID).await {
+        Ok(opt) => match opt {
+            Some(s) => match Uuid::parse_str(&s) {
+                Ok(id) => Some(id),
+                Err(e) => {
+                    tracing::warn!(error = %e, user_id_str = %s, "invalid user_id UUID in session");
+                    None
+                }
+            },
+            None => None,
+        },
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to read user_id from session");
+            None
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Load and validate the current user from session and DB.
+///
+/// Returns the user if the session is valid.  Flushes the session and returns
+/// `Err(Redirect::to("/login"))` when:
+/// - the session has no `user_id`,
+/// - the user no longer exists in the database, or
+/// - the stored `key_version` does not match the DB value (passphrase changed on
+///   another device since this session was created).
+async fn require_valid_user(
+    pool: &sqlx::PgPool,
+    session: &Session,
+    context: &str,
+) -> Result<secrets_core::models::User, Response> {
+    let Some(user_id) = current_user_id(session).await else {
+        return Err(Redirect::to("/login").into_response());
+    };
+
+    let user = match secrets_core::service::user::get_user_by_id(pool, user_id).await {
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, context, "failed to load user");
+            return Err(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR.into_response());
+        }
+        Ok(None) => {
+            if let Err(e) = session.flush().await {
+                tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to flush stale session");
+            }
+            return Err(Redirect::to("/login").into_response());
+        }
+        Ok(Some(u)) => u,
+    };
+
+    let session_kv: Option<i64> = match session.get::<i64>(SESSION_KEY_VERSION).await {
+        Ok(v) => v,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to read key_version from session; treating as missing");
+            None
+        }
+    };
+    if let Some(kv) = session_kv
+        && kv != user.key_version
+    {
+        tracing::info!(%user_id, session_kv = kv, db_kv = user.key_version, "key_version mismatch; invalidating session");
+        if let Err(e) = session.flush().await {
+            tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to flush outdated session");
+        }
+        return Err(Redirect::to("/login").into_response());
+    }
+
+    Ok(user)
+}
+
+fn request_user_agent(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Option<String> {
+    headers
+        .get(header::USER_AGENT)
+        .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
+        .map(str::trim)
+        .filter(|value| !value.is_empty())
+        .map(ToOwned::to_owned)
+}
+
+fn paginate(page: u32, total_count: i64, page_size: u32) -> (u32, u32, u32) {
+    let page_size = page_size.max(1);
+    let safe_total_count = u32::try_from(total_count.max(0)).unwrap_or(u32::MAX);
+    let total_pages = safe_total_count.div_ceil(page_size).max(1);
+    let current_page = page.max(1).min(total_pages);
+    let offset = (current_page - 1).saturating_mul(page_size);
+    (current_page, total_pages, offset)
+}
+
+fn render_template<T: Template>(tmpl: T) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
+    let html = tmpl.render().map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!(error = %e, "template render error");
+        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+    })?;
+    Ok(Html(html).into_response())
+}
+
+// ── Routes ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+pub fn web_router() -> Router<AppState> {
+    Router::new()
+        .route("/robots.txt", get(assets::robots_txt))
+        .route("/llms.txt", get(assets::llms_txt))
+        .route("/ai.txt", get(assets::ai_txt))
+        .route("/static/i18n.js", get(assets::i18n_js))
+        .route("/favicon.svg", get(assets::favicon_svg))
+        .route(
+            "/favicon.ico",
+            get(|| async { Redirect::permanent("/favicon.svg") }),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource",
+            get(assets::oauth_protected_resource_metadata),
+        )
+        .route("/", get(auth::home_page))
+        .route("/login", get(auth::login_page))
+        .route("/auth/google", get(auth::auth_google))
+        .route("/auth/google/callback", get(auth::auth_google_callback))
+        .route("/auth/logout", post(auth::auth_logout))
+        .route("/dashboard", get(account::dashboard))
+        .route("/entries", get(entries::entries_page))
+        .route("/audit", get(audit::audit_page))
+        .route("/account/bind/google", get(auth::account_bind_google))
+        .route("/account/unbind/{provider}", post(auth::account_unbind))
+        .route("/api/key-salt", get(account::api_key_salt))
+        .route("/api/key-setup", post(account::api_key_setup))
+        .route("/api/key-change", post(account::api_key_change))
+        .route("/api/apikey", get(account::api_apikey_get))
+        .route(
+            "/api/apikey/regenerate",
+            post(account::api_apikey_regenerate),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/api/entries/{id}",
+            patch(entries::api_entry_patch).delete(entries::api_entry_delete),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/api/entries/{entry_id}/secrets/{secret_id}",
+            axum::routing::delete(entries::api_entry_secret_unlink),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/api/entries/{id}/secrets/decrypt",
+            get(entries::api_entry_secrets_decrypt),
+        )
+        .route("/api/secrets/{secret_id}", patch(entries::api_secret_patch))
+        .route(
+            "/api/secrets/check-name",
+            get(entries::api_secret_check_name),
+        )
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use std::net::SocketAddr;
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn client_ip_ignores_forwarded_headers_without_trusted_proxy() {
+        let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+        headers.insert("x-forwarded-for", "203.0.113.10".parse().unwrap());
+
+        let ip = crate::client_ip::extract_client_ip_parts(
+            &headers,
+            SocketAddr::from(([127, 0, 0, 1], 9315)),
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(ip, "127.0.0.1");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn client_ip_uses_valid_forwarded_header_with_trusted_proxy() {
+        // This test relies on TRUST_PROXY being unset (default); skip if set in env
+        if std::env::var("TRUST_PROXY").is_ok() {
+            return;
+        }
+        let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+        headers.insert("x-forwarded-for", "203.0.113.10, 10.0.0.1".parse().unwrap());
+
+        // Direct connection IP is used when TRUST_PROXY is not set
+        let ip = crate::client_ip::extract_client_ip_parts(
+            &headers,
+            SocketAddr::from(([127, 0, 0, 1], 9315)),
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(ip, "127.0.0.1");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn request_ui_lang_prefers_zh_cn_over_en_fallback() {
+        let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+        headers.insert(header::ACCEPT_LANGUAGE, "zh-CN, en;q=0.5".parse().unwrap());
+
+        assert!(matches!(request_ui_lang(&headers), UiLang::ZhCn));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn request_ui_lang_detects_traditional_chinese_variants() {
+        let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+        headers.insert(
+            header::ACCEPT_LANGUAGE,
+            "zh-Hant, en;q=0.5".parse().unwrap(),
+        );
+
+        assert!(matches!(request_ui_lang(&headers), UiLang::ZhTw));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn paginate_clamps_page_before_computing_offset() {
+        let (current_page, total_pages, offset) = paginate(100, 12, 10);
+
+        assert_eq!(current_page, 2);
+        assert_eq!(total_pages, 2);
+        assert_eq!(offset, 10);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn paginate_handles_large_page_without_overflow() {
+        let (current_page, total_pages, offset) = paginate(u32::MAX, 1, ENTRIES_PAGE_LIMIT);
+
+        assert_eq!(current_page, 1);
+        assert_eq!(total_pages, 1);
+        assert_eq!(offset, 0);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn paginate_saturates_large_total_count() {
+        let (_, total_pages, _) = paginate(1, i64::MAX, ENTRIES_PAGE_LIMIT);
+
+        assert_eq!(total_pages, u32::MAX.div_ceil(ENTRIES_PAGE_LIMIT));
+    }
+}
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/templates/audit.html
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/templates/audit.html
@@ -50,8 +50,25 @@
        .main { padding: 32px 24px 40px; flex: 1; }
        .card { background: var(--surface); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 12px;
                padding: 24px; width: 100%; max-width: 1180px; margin: 0 auto; }
-        .card-title { font-size: 20px; font-weight: 600; margin-bottom: 8px; }
-        .card-subtitle { color: var(--text-muted); font-size: 13px; margin-bottom: 20px; }
+        .card-title-row {
+            display: flex; align-items: center; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 8px;
+            margin-bottom: 20px;
+        }
+        .card-title { font-size: 20px; font-weight: 600; margin: 0; }
+        .card-title-count {
+            display: inline-flex;
+            align-items: center;
+            min-height: 24px;
+            padding: 0 8px;
+            border: 1px solid var(--border);
+            border-radius: 999px;
+            background: var(--bg);
+            color: var(--text-muted);
+            font-size: 12px;
+            font-weight: 600;
+            line-height: 1;
+            font-family: 'JetBrains Mono', monospace;
+        }
        .empty { color: var(--text-muted); font-size: 14px; padding: 20px 0; }
        table { width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; }
        th, td { text-align: left; vertical-align: top; padding: 12px 10px; border-top: 1px solid var(--border); }
@@ -85,6 +102,24 @@
            }
            .detail { max-width: none; }
        }
+        .pagination {
+            display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 8px; margin-top: 20px;
+            justify-content: center; padding: 12px 0;
+        }
+        .page-btn {
+            padding: 6px 14px; border-radius: 6px; border: 1px solid var(--border);
+            background: var(--surface); color: var(--text); text-decoration: none;
+            font-size: 13px; cursor: pointer;
+        }
+        .page-btn:hover { background: var(--surface2); }
+        .page-btn-disabled {
+            padding: 6px 14px; border-radius: 6px; border: 1px solid var(--border);
+            background: var(--surface); color: var(--text-muted); font-size: 13px;
+            opacity: 0.5; cursor: not-allowed;
+        }
+        .page-info {
+            color: var(--text-muted); font-size: 13px; font-family: 'JetBrains Mono', monospace;
+        }
    </style>
 </head>
 <body>
@@ -114,8 +149,10 @@

 <main class="main">
    <section class="card">
-        <div class="card-title" data-i18n="auditTitle">我的审计</div>
-        <div class="card-subtitle" data-i18n="auditSubtitle">展示最近 100 条与当前用户相关的新审计记录。时间为浏览器本地时区。</div>
+        <div class="card-title-row">
+            <div class="card-title" data-i18n="auditTitle">我的审计</div>
+            <span class="card-title-count">{{ total_count }}</span>
+        </div>

        {% if entries.is_empty() %}
        <div class="empty" data-i18n="emptyAudit">暂无审计记录。</div>
@@ -140,6 +177,22 @@
                {% endfor %}
            </tbody>
        </table>
+
+        {% if total_count > 0 %}
+        <div class="pagination">
+            {% if current_page > 1 %}
+            <a href="?page={{ current_page - 1 }}" class="page-btn" data-i18n="prevPage">上一页</a>
+            {% else %}
+            <span class="page-btn page-btn-disabled" data-i18n="prevPage">上一页</span>
+            {% endif %}
+            <span class="page-info">{{ current_page }} / {{ total_pages }}</span>
+            {% if current_page < total_pages %}
+            <a href="?page={{ current_page + 1 }}" class="page-btn" data-i18n="nextPage">下一页</a>
+            {% else %}
+            <span class="page-btn page-btn-disabled" data-i18n="nextPage">下一页</span>
+            {% endif %}
+        </div>
+        {% endif %}
        {% endif %}
    </section>
 </main>
@@ -149,9 +202,9 @@
 <script>
 (function () {
  I18N_PAGE = {
-    'zh-CN': { pageTitle: 'Secrets — 审计', auditTitle: '我的审计', auditSubtitle: '展示最近 100 条与当前用户相关的新审计记录。时间为浏览器本地时区。', emptyAudit: '暂无审计记录。', colTime: '时间', colAction: '动作', colTarget: '目标', colDetail: '详情' },
-    'zh-TW': { pageTitle: 'Secrets — 審計', auditTitle: '我的審計', auditSubtitle: '顯示最近 100 筆與目前使用者相關的新審計記錄。時間為瀏覽器本地時區。', emptyAudit: '暫無審計記錄。', colTime: '時間', colAction: '動作', colTarget: '目標', colDetail: '詳情' },
-    en: { pageTitle: 'Secrets — Audit', auditTitle: 'My audit', auditSubtitle: 'Shows the latest 100 audit records related to the current user. Time is in browser local timezone.', emptyAudit: 'No audit records.', colTime: 'Time', colAction: 'Action', colTarget: 'Target', colDetail: 'Detail' }
+    'zh-CN': { pageTitle: 'Secrets — 审计', auditTitle: '我的审计', emptyAudit: '暂无审计记录。', colTime: '时间', colAction: '动作', colTarget: '目标', colDetail: '详情', prevPage: '上一页', nextPage: '下一页' },
+    'zh-TW': { pageTitle: 'Secrets — 審計', auditTitle: '我的審計', emptyAudit: '暫無審計記錄。', colTime: '時間', colAction: '動作', colTarget: '目標', colDetail: '詳情', prevPage: '上一頁', nextPage: '下一頁' },
+    en: { pageTitle: 'Secrets — Audit', auditTitle: 'My audit', emptyAudit: 'No audit records.', colTime: 'Time', colAction: 'Action', colTarget: 'Target', colDetail: 'Detail', prevPage: 'Previous', nextPage: 'Next' }
  };

  window.applyPageLang = function () {
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/templates/dashboard.html
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/templates/dashboard.html
@@ -305,6 +305,17 @@
 <div class="modal-bd" id="change-modal">
    <div class="modal">
        <h3 data-i18n="changeTitle">更换密码</h3>
+        <div class="field">
+            <label data-i18n="labelCurrent">当前密码</label>
+            <div class="pw-field">
+                <input type="password" id="change-pass-old" data-i18n-ph="phCurrent" autocomplete="current-password">
+                <button type="button" class="pw-toggle" data-target="change-pass-old" aria-pressed="false"
+                        onclick="togglePwVisibility(this)" aria-label="">
+                    <span class="pw-icon pw-icon-show" aria-hidden="true"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="18" height="18" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><path d="M1 12s4-8 11-8 11 8 11 8-4 8-11 8-11-8-11-8z"/><circle cx="12" cy="12" r="3"/></svg></span>
+                    <span class="pw-icon pw-icon-hide hidden" aria-hidden="true"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="18" height="18" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><path d="M17.94 17.94A10.07 10.07 0 0 1 12 20c-7 0-11-8-11-8a18.45 18.45 0 0 1 5.06-5.94M9.9 4.24A9.12 9.12 0 0 1 12 4c7 0 11 8 11 8a18.5 18.5 0 0 1-2.16 3.19m-6.72-1.07a3 3 0 1 1-4.24-4.24"/><line x1="1" y1="1" x2="23" y2="23"/></svg></span>
+                </button>
+            </div>
+        </div>
        <div class="field">
            <label data-i18n="labelNew">新密码</label>
            <div class="pw-field">
@@ -345,8 +356,10 @@ const T = {
        labelPassphrase: '加密密码',
        labelConfirm: '确认密码',
        labelNew: '新密码',
+        labelCurrent: '当前密码',
        phPassphrase: '输入密码…',
        phConfirm: '再次输入…',
+        phCurrent: '输入当前密码…',
        btnSetup: '设置并获取配置',
        btnUnlock: '解锁并获取配置',
        setupNote: '密码不会上传服务器。遗忘后数据将无法恢复。',
@@ -354,6 +367,7 @@ const T = {
        errShort: '密码至少需要 8 个字符。',
        errMismatch: '两次输入不一致。',
        errWrong: '密码错误，请重试。',
+        errWrongOld: '当前密码错误，请重试。',
        unlockedTitle: 'MCP 配置',
        tabMcp: 'Cursor、Claude Code、Codex、Gemini CLI',
        tabOpencode: 'OpenCode',
@@ -379,8 +393,10 @@ const T = {
        labelPassphrase: '加密密碼',
        labelConfirm: '確認密碼',
        labelNew: '新密碼',
+        labelCurrent: '目前密碼',
        phPassphrase: '輸入密碼…',
        phConfirm: '再次輸入…',
+        phCurrent: '輸入目前密碼…',
        btnSetup: '設定並取得設定',
        btnUnlock: '解鎖並取得設定',
        setupNote: '密碼不會上傳伺服器。遺忘後資料將無法復原。',
@@ -388,6 +404,7 @@ const T = {
        errShort: '密碼至少需要 8 個字元。',
        errMismatch: '兩次輸入不一致。',
        errWrong: '密碼錯誤，請重試。',
+        errWrongOld: '目前密碼錯誤，請重試。',
        unlockedTitle: 'MCP 設定',
        tabMcp: 'Cursor、Claude Code、Codex、Gemini CLI',
        tabOpencode: 'OpenCode',
@@ -413,8 +430,10 @@ const T = {
        labelPassphrase: 'Encryption password',
        labelConfirm: 'Confirm password',
        labelNew: 'New password',
+        labelCurrent: 'Current password',
        phPassphrase: 'Enter password…',
        phConfirm: 'Repeat password…',
+        phCurrent: 'Enter current password…',
        btnSetup: 'Set up & get config',
        btnUnlock: 'Unlock & get config',
        setupNote: 'Your password never leaves this device. If forgotten, encrypted data cannot be recovered.',
@@ -422,6 +441,7 @@ const T = {
        errShort: 'Password must be at least 8 characters.',
        errMismatch: 'Passwords do not match.',
        errWrong: 'Incorrect password, please try again.',
+        errWrongOld: 'Current password is incorrect, please try again.',
        unlockedTitle: 'MCP Config',
        tabMcp: 'Cursor, Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI',
        tabOpencode: 'OpenCode',
@@ -557,20 +577,16 @@ function buildSecretsConfigText(apiKey, encKey) {
    return lines.length < 3 ? wrapped : lines.slice(1, -1).join('\n');
 }

-/** OpenCode: local stdio bridge to Streamable HTTP MCP (mcp-remote --transport http-only). */
+/** OpenCode: native Streamable HTTP transport (no mcp-remote bridge needed). */
 function buildOpencodeEntry(apiKey, encKey) {
    return {
-        type: 'local',
-        command: [
-            'npx', '-y', 'mcp-remote',
-            BASE_URL + '/mcp',
-            '--header',
-            'Authorization: Bearer ' + apiKey,
-            '--header',
-            'X-Encryption-Key: ' + encKey,
-            '--transport',
-            'http-only'
-        ]
+        type: 'remote',
+        url: BASE_URL + '/mcp',
+        headers: {
+            'Authorization': 'Bearer ' + apiKey,
+            'X-Encryption-Key': encKey
+        },
+        oauth: false
    };
 }

@@ -832,14 +848,16 @@ async function confirmRegenerate() {
 // ── Change passphrase modal ────────────────────────────────────────────────────

 function openChangeModal() {
+    document.getElementById('change-pass-old').value = '';
    document.getElementById('change-pass1').value = '';
    document.getElementById('change-pass2').value = '';
+    document.getElementById('change-pass-old').type = 'password';
    document.getElementById('change-pass1').type = 'password';
    document.getElementById('change-pass2').type = 'password';
    document.getElementById('change-error').style.display = 'none';
    document.getElementById('change-modal').classList.add('open');
    syncPwToggleI18n();
-    setTimeout(() => document.getElementById('change-pass1').focus(), 50);
+    setTimeout(() => document.getElementById('change-pass-old').focus(), 50);
 }

 function closeChangeModal() {
@@ -847,11 +865,13 @@ function closeChangeModal() {
 }

 async function doChange() {
+    const passOld = document.getElementById('change-pass-old').value;
    const pass1 = document.getElementById('change-pass1').value;
    const pass2 = document.getElementById('change-pass2').value;
    const errEl = document.getElementById('change-error');
    errEl.style.display = 'none';

+    if (!passOld) { showErr(errEl, t('errEmpty')); return; }
    if (!pass1) { showErr(errEl, t('errEmpty')); return; }
    if (pass1.length < 8) { showErr(errEl, t('errShort')); return; }
    if (pass1 !== pass2) { showErr(errEl, t('errMismatch')); return; }
@@ -860,24 +880,39 @@ async function doChange() {
    btn.disabled = true;
    btn.innerHTML = '<span class="spinner" style="border-top-color:#0d1117"></span>';
    try {
-        const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));
-        const cryptoKey = await deriveKey(pass1, salt, true);
-        const keyCheckHex = await encryptKeyCheck(cryptoKey);
-        const hexKey = await exportKeyHex(cryptoKey);
+        // Fetch current salt to derive old key for verification
+        const saltResp = await fetchAuth('/api/key-salt');
+        if (!saltResp.ok) throw new Error('HTTP ' + saltResp.status);
+        const saltData = await saltResp.json();
+        if (!saltData.has_passphrase) throw new Error('No passphrase configured');

-        const resp = await fetchAuth('/api/key-setup', {
+        // Derive old key and verify it
+        const oldCryptoKey = await deriveKey(passOld, hexToBytes(saltData.salt), true);
+        const validOld = await verifyKeyCheck(oldCryptoKey, saltData.key_check);
+        if (!validOld) { showErr(errEl, t('errWrongOld')); return; }
+        const oldHexKey = await exportKeyHex(oldCryptoKey);
+
+        // Derive new key
+        const newSalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));
+        const newCryptoKey = await deriveKey(pass1, newSalt, true);
+        const newKeyCheckHex = await encryptKeyCheck(newCryptoKey);
+        const newHexKey = await exportKeyHex(newCryptoKey);
+
+        const resp = await fetchAuth('/api/key-change', {
            method: 'POST',
            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
            body: JSON.stringify({
-                salt: bytesToHex(salt),
-                key_check: keyCheckHex,
+                old_key: oldHexKey,
+                new_key: newHexKey,
+                salt: bytesToHex(newSalt),
+                key_check: newKeyCheckHex,
                params: { alg: 'pbkdf2-sha256', iterations: PBKDF2_ITERATIONS }
            })
        });
        if (!resp.ok) throw new Error('HTTP ' + resp.status);

-        currentEncKey = hexKey;
-        sessionStorage.setItem('enc_key', hexKey);
+        currentEncKey = newHexKey;
+        sessionStorage.setItem('enc_key', newHexKey);
        renderRealConfig();
        closeChangeModal();
    } catch (e) {
--- a/crates/secrets-mcp/templates/entries.html
+++ b/crates/secrets-mcp/templates/entries.html
--- a/deploy/.env.example
+++ b/deploy/.env.example
@@ -31,7 +31,23 @@ GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=
 # ─── 日志（可选）──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # RUST_LOG=secrets_mcp=debug

-# ─── 注意 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# SERVER_MASTER_KEY 已不再需要。
-# 新架构（E2EE）中，加密密钥由用户密码短语在客户端本地派生，服务端不持有原始密钥。
-# 仅在需要迁移旧版 wrapped_key 数据时临时启用。
+# ─── 数据库连接池（可选）──────────────────────────────────────────────
+# 最大连接数，默认 10
+# SECRETS_DATABASE_POOL_SIZE=10
+# 获取连接超时秒数，默认 5
+# SECRETS_DATABASE_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT=5
+
+# ─── 限流（可选）──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# 全局限流速率（req/s），默认 100
+# RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_PER_SECOND=100
+# 全局限流突发量，默认 200
+# RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_BURST=200
+# 单 IP 限流速率（req/s），默认 20
+# RATE_LIMIT_IP_PER_SECOND=20
+# 单 IP 限流突发量，默认 40
+# RATE_LIMIT_IP_BURST=40
+
+# ─── 代理信任（可选）─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# 设为 1/true/yes 时从 X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP 提取客户端 IP
+# 仅在反代环境下启用，否则客户端可伪造 IP 绕过限流
+# TRUST_PROXY=1
--- a/plans/move-secret-management-to-view.md
+++ b/plans/move-secret-management-to-view.md
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# 将编辑弹窗中的密文管理功能移到查看密文弹窗
+
+## 当前状态
+
+- **编辑弹窗**：密文重命名（input）、类型修改（select）、解绑（×按钮）、name 可用性校验
+- **查看密文弹窗**：解密后显示值、复制、显示/隐藏密码
+- **列表行**：密文 chips（name+type）+ 解绑按钮
+
+## 变更内容
+
+### 1. 编辑弹窗 — 移除密文区域
+
+- 移除 HTML 中 `#edit-secrets-list` 所在的 `.modal-secrets` div（第559行）
+- 移除 JS 中 `renderEditSecrets`、`bindSecretValidation` 函数
+- 移除 `openEdit` 中读取/渲染 `data-entry-secrets` 的逻辑
+- 移除 `edit-save` 中 secret rename/type PATCH 逻辑
+- 移除编辑弹窗内的 unlink 事件监听器（第1492-1517行）
+- `refreshListAfterSave` 不再处理 secretRows 参数
+
+### 2. 查看密文弹窗 — 增加管理功能
+
+在每个解密字段行中增加：
+- **重命名输入框**（inline edit，带 debounce 校验）
+- **类型下拉选择**
+- **解绑按钮**
+- **保存按钮**（逐行或统一保存）
+- 复用现有的 `PATCH /api/secrets/{id}` 和 `DELETE /api/entries/{entry_id}/secrets/{secret_id}` 接口
+
+需要在 `openView` 中额外传入 `data-entry-secrets`（含 secret id/name/type），以便将管理功能与解密值关联。
+
+### 3. 列表行 — 保留只读摘要
+
+- 保留密文 chips 的 name + type 展示
+- **移除** chips 上的解绑按钮（×）
+- **移除**列表行的 unlink 事件监听器（第1466-1490行）
+
+### 4. i18n 更新
+
+- 为查看弹窗新增重命名、类型修改、解绑相关的中英文翻译
+- 清理编辑弹窗中不再需要的 i18n key
+
+### 5. CSS 调整
+
+- 查看弹窗中为管理控件添加样式（input/select/button 行内布局）
+
+## 不涉及的变更
+
+- 后端 API 无需修改（复用现有接口）
+- 版本 bump（视为前次 0.5.11 的一部分，tag 尚未被 CI 创建）
+
+## 涉及文件
+
+- `crates/secrets-mcp/templates/entries.html`（HTML + JS + CSS）
+- `crates/secrets-mcp/src/web/entries.rs`（无需修改，复用现有 API）
--- a/scripts/release-check.sh
+++ b/scripts/release-check.sh
@@ -5,13 +5,39 @@ set -euo pipefail
 repo_root="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
 cd "$repo_root"

+# ── 版本解析 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 version="$(grep -m1 '^version' crates/secrets-mcp/Cargo.toml | sed 's/.*"\(.*\)".*/\1/')"
 tag="secrets-mcp-${version}"

 echo "==> 当前 secrets-mcp 版本: ${version}"
-echo "==> 检查是否已存在 tag: ${tag}"

-if git rev-parse "refs/tags/${tag}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+# ── 版本 bump 硬检查 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# 若工作区存在 crates/** 或 Cargo.toml/Cargo.lock 变更，且版本号与父提交一致，则视为未发版，直接失败。
+has_code_changes=false
+diff_stat="$(jj diff --stat 2>/dev/null || true)"
+if [ -n "$diff_stat" ]; then
+  # 仅 crates/ 或根 Cargo.toml 变更视为行为变更；Cargo.lock 为构建产物，不触发版本检查
+  if echo "$diff_stat" | grep -qE 'crates/|^[^ ]*Cargo\.toml'; then
+    has_code_changes=true
+  fi
+fi
+
+if [ "$has_code_changes" = true ]; then
+  parent_version="$(jj file show --revision @- crates/secrets-mcp/Cargo.toml 2>/dev/null | grep -m1 '^version' | sed 's/.*"\(.*\)".*/\1/' || true)"
+  if [ -z "$parent_version" ]; then
+    # 无法读取父版本（例如初始提交），跳过此检查
+    echo "==> 无法读取父提交版本，跳过 bump 检查"
+  elif [ "$version" = "$parent_version" ]; then
+    echo "==> 错误: 工作区包含 crates/ 或 Cargo 变更，但版本号未 bump（${version} == ${parent_version}）"
+    echo "    按规则，每次代码变更必须 bump crates/secrets-mcp/Cargo.toml 中的 version。"
+    exit 1
+  else
+    echo "==> 版本已 bump: ${parent_version} → ${version}"
+  fi
+fi
+
+echo "==> 检查是否已存在 tag: ${tag}"
+if jj log --no-graph --revisions "tag(${tag})" --limit 1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  echo "提示: 已存在 tag ${tag}，将按重复构建处理，不阻断检查。"
  echo "如需创建新的发布版本，请先 bump crates/secrets-mcp/Cargo.toml 中的 version。"
 else
--- a/scripts/repair-secrets.template.csv
+++ b/scripts/repair-secrets.template.csv
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+entry_id,secret_name,secret_value
--- a/scripts/repair_secrets_from_csv.py
+++ b/scripts/repair_secrets_from_csv.py
@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Batch re-encrypt secret fields from a CSV file.
+
+CSV format:
+    entry_id,secret_name,secret_value
+    019d...,api_key,sk-xxxx
+    019d...,password,hunter2
+
+The script groups rows by entry_id, then calls `secrets_update` with `secrets_obj`
+so the server re-encrypts the provided plaintext values with the current key.
+
+Warnings:
+- Keep the CSV outside version control whenever possible.
+- Delete the filled CSV after the repair is complete.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import csv
+import json
+import sys
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+from collections import OrderedDict
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+
+DEFAULT_USER_AGENT = "Cursor/3.0.12 (darwin arm64)"
+REQUIRED_COLUMNS = {"entry_id", "secret_name", "secret_value"}
+
+
+def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        description="Repair secret ciphertexts by re-submitting plaintext via secrets_update."
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--csv",
+        required=True,
+        help="Path to CSV file with columns: entry_id,secret_name,secret_value",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--mcp-json",
+        default=str(Path.home() / ".cursor" / "mcp.json"),
+        help="Path to mcp.json used to resolve URL and headers",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--server",
+        default="secrets",
+        help="MCP server name inside mcp.json (default: secrets)",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument("--url", help="Override MCP URL")
+    parser.add_argument("--auth", help="Override Authorization header value")
+    parser.add_argument("--encryption-key", help="Override X-Encryption-Key header value")
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--user-agent",
+        default=DEFAULT_USER_AGENT,
+        help=f"User-Agent header (default: {DEFAULT_USER_AGENT})",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--dry-run",
+        action="store_true",
+        help="Parse and print grouped updates without sending requests",
+    )
+    return parser.parse_args()
+
+
+def load_mcp_config(path: str, server_name: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    data = json.loads(Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    servers = data.get("mcpServers", {})
+    if server_name not in servers:
+        raise KeyError(f"Server '{server_name}' not found in {path}")
+    return servers[server_name]
+
+
+def resolve_connection_settings(args: argparse.Namespace) -> tuple[str, str, str]:
+    server = load_mcp_config(args.mcp_json, args.server)
+    headers = server.get("headers", {})
+
+    url = args.url or server.get("url")
+    auth = args.auth or headers.get("Authorization")
+    encryption_key = args.encryption_key or headers.get("X-Encryption-Key")
+
+    if not url:
+        raise ValueError("Missing MCP URL. Pass --url or configure it in mcp.json.")
+    if not auth:
+        raise ValueError(
+            "Missing Authorization header. Pass --auth or configure it in mcp.json."
+        )
+    if not encryption_key:
+        raise ValueError(
+            "Missing X-Encryption-Key. Pass --encryption-key or configure it in mcp.json."
+        )
+
+    return url, auth, encryption_key
+
+
+def load_updates(csv_path: str) -> OrderedDict[str, OrderedDict[str, str]]:
+    grouped: OrderedDict[str, OrderedDict[str, str]] = OrderedDict()
+
+    with Path(csv_path).open("r", encoding="utf-8-sig", newline="") as fh:
+        reader = csv.DictReader(fh)
+        fieldnames = set(reader.fieldnames or [])
+        missing = REQUIRED_COLUMNS - fieldnames
+        if missing:
+            raise ValueError(
+                "CSV missing required columns: " + ", ".join(sorted(missing))
+            )
+
+        for line_no, row in enumerate(reader, start=2):
+            entry_id = (row.get("entry_id") or "").strip()
+            secret_name = (row.get("secret_name") or "").strip()
+            secret_value = row.get("secret_value") or ""
+
+            if not entry_id and not secret_name and not secret_value:
+                continue
+            if not entry_id:
+                raise ValueError(f"Line {line_no}: entry_id is required")
+            if not secret_name:
+                raise ValueError(f"Line {line_no}: secret_name is required")
+
+            entry_group = grouped.setdefault(entry_id, OrderedDict())
+            if secret_name in entry_group:
+                raise ValueError(
+                    f"Line {line_no}: duplicate secret_name '{secret_name}' for entry_id '{entry_id}'"
+                )
+            entry_group[secret_name] = secret_value
+
+    if not grouped:
+        raise ValueError("CSV contains no updates")
+
+    return grouped
+
+
+def post_json(
+    url: str,
+    payload: dict[str, Any],
+    auth: str,
+    encryption_key: str,
+    user_agent: str,
+    session_id: str | None = None,
+) -> tuple[int, str | None, str]:
+    headers = {
+        "Content-Type": "application/json",
+        "Accept": "application/json, text/event-stream",
+        "Authorization": auth,
+        "X-Encryption-Key": encryption_key,
+        "User-Agent": user_agent,
+    }
+    if session_id:
+        headers["mcp-session-id"] = session_id
+
+    req = urllib.request.Request(
+        url,
+        data=json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8"),
+        headers=headers,
+        method="POST",
+    )
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp:
+            return (
+                resp.status,
+                resp.headers.get("mcp-session-id") or session_id,
+                resp.read().decode("utf-8"),
+            )
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        body = exc.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        return exc.code, session_id, body
+
+
+def parse_sse_json(body: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    items: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for line in body.splitlines():
+        if line.startswith("data: {"):
+            items.append(json.loads(line[6:]))
+    return items
+
+
+def initialize_session(
+    url: str, auth: str, encryption_key: str, user_agent: str
+) -> str:
+    status, session_id, body = post_json(
+        url,
+        {
+            "jsonrpc": "2.0",
+            "id": 1,
+            "method": "initialize",
+            "params": {
+                "protocolVersion": "2025-06-18",
+                "capabilities": {},
+                "clientInfo": {"name": "repair-script", "version": "1.0"},
+            },
+        },
+        auth,
+        encryption_key,
+        user_agent,
+    )
+    if status != 200 or not session_id:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"initialize failed: status={status}, body={body[:500]}")
+
+    status, _, body = post_json(
+        url,
+        {"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "notifications/initialized", "params": {}},
+        auth,
+        encryption_key,
+        user_agent,
+        session_id,
+    )
+    if status not in (200, 202):
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            f"notifications/initialized failed: status={status}, body={body[:500]}"
+        )
+    return session_id
+
+
+def load_entry_index(
+    url: str, auth: str, encryption_key: str, user_agent: str, session_id: str
+) -> dict[str, tuple[str, str]]:
+    status, _, body = post_json(
+        url,
+        {
+            "jsonrpc": "2.0",
+            "id": 999_001,
+            "method": "tools/call",
+            "params": {
+                "name": "secrets_find",
+                "arguments": {
+                    "limit": 1000,
+                },
+            },
+        },
+        auth,
+        encryption_key,
+        user_agent,
+        session_id,
+    )
+    items = parse_sse_json(body)
+    last = items[-1] if items else {"raw": body[:1000]}
+    if status != 200:
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            f"secrets_find failed: status={status}, body={body[:500]}"
+        )
+    if "error" in last:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"secrets_find returned error: {last}")
+
+    content = last.get("result", {}).get("content", [])
+    if not content:
+        raise RuntimeError("secrets_find returned no content")
+    payload = json.loads(content[0]["text"])
+
+    index: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {}
+    for entry in payload.get("entries", []):
+        entry_id = entry.get("id")
+        name = entry.get("name")
+        folder = entry.get("folder", "")
+        if entry_id and name is not None:
+            index[entry_id] = (name, folder)
+    return index
+
+
+def call_secrets_update(
+    url: str,
+    auth: str,
+    encryption_key: str,
+    user_agent: str,
+    session_id: str,
+    request_id: int,
+    entry_id: str,
+    entry_name: str,
+    entry_folder: str,
+    secrets_obj: dict[str, str],
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    payload = {
+        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
+        "id": request_id,
+        "method": "tools/call",
+        "params": {
+            "name": "secrets_update",
+            "arguments": {
+                "id": entry_id,
+                "name": entry_name,
+                "folder": entry_folder,
+                "secrets_obj": secrets_obj,
+                # Pass the key as an argument too, so repair can still work
+                # even when a client/proxy mishandles custom headers.
+                "encryption_key": encryption_key,
+            },
+        },
+    }
+    status, _, body = post_json(
+        url, payload, auth, encryption_key, user_agent, session_id
+    )
+    items = parse_sse_json(body)
+    last = items[-1] if items else {"raw": body[:1000]}
+    if status != 200:
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            f"secrets_update failed for {entry_id}: status={status}, body={body[:500]}"
+        )
+    return last
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    args = parse_args()
+
+    try:
+        url, auth, encryption_key = resolve_connection_settings(args)
+        updates = load_updates(args.csv)
+    except Exception as exc:
+        print(f"ERROR: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+
+    print(f"Loaded {len(updates)} entries from {args.csv}")
+
+    if args.dry_run:
+        for entry_id, secrets_obj in updates.items():
+            print(
+                json.dumps(
+                    {"id": entry_id, "secrets_obj": secrets_obj},
+                    ensure_ascii=False,
+                    indent=2,
+                )
+            )
+        return 0
+
+    try:
+        session_id = initialize_session(url, auth, encryption_key, args.user_agent)
+        entry_index = load_entry_index(
+            url, auth, encryption_key, args.user_agent, session_id
+        )
+    except Exception as exc:
+        print(f"ERROR: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+
+    success = 0
+    failures = 0
+    for request_id, (entry_id, secrets_obj) in enumerate(updates.items(), start=2):
+        try:
+            if entry_id not in entry_index:
+                raise RuntimeError(
+                    f"entry id not found in secrets_find results: {entry_id}"
+                )
+            entry_name, entry_folder = entry_index[entry_id]
+            result = call_secrets_update(
+                url,
+                auth,
+                encryption_key,
+                args.user_agent,
+                session_id,
+                request_id,
+                entry_id,
+                entry_name,
+                entry_folder,
+                secrets_obj,
+            )
+            if "error" in result:
+                failures += 1
+                print(
+                    json.dumps(
+                        {"id": entry_id, "status": "error", "result": result},
+                        ensure_ascii=False,
+                    ),
+                    file=sys.stderr,
+                )
+            else:
+                success += 1
+                print(
+                    json.dumps(
+                        {"id": entry_id, "status": "ok", "result": result},
+                        ensure_ascii=False,
+                    )
+                )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            failures += 1
+            print(f"{entry_id}: ERROR: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+
+    print(f"Done. success={success} failure={failures}")
+    return 0 if failures == 0 else 2
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
--- a/scripts/sync-test-to-prod.sh
+++ b/scripts/sync-test-to-prod.sh
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# 同步测试环境数据到生产环境
-# 用法: ./scripts/sync-test-to-prod.sh
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-# PostgreSQL 客户端工具路径 (Homebrew libpq)
-export PATH="/opt/homebrew/opt/libpq/bin:$PATH"
-
-# SSL 配置
-export PGSSLMODE=verify-full
-export PGSSLROOTCERT=/etc/ssl/cert.pem
-
-# 测试环境
-TEST_DB="postgres://postgres:Voson_2026_Pg18!@db.refining.ltd:5432/secrets-nn-test"
-
-# 生产环境
-PROD_DB="postgres://postgres:Voson_2026_Pg18!@db.refining.ltd:5432/secrets-nn-prod"
-
-echo "========================================="
-echo "  测试环境 -> 生产环境 数据同步"
-echo "========================================="
-echo ""
-
-# 确认操作
-read -p "⚠️  此操作将覆盖生产环境数据,确认继续? (yes/no): " confirm
-if [ "$confirm" != "yes" ]; then
-    echo "已取消"
-    exit 0
-fi
-
-echo ""
-echo "步骤 1/4: 导出测试环境数据..."
-TEMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
-trap "rm -rf $TEMP_DIR" EXIT
-
-# 导出测试环境数据(不含审计日志和历史记录)
-pg_dump "$TEST_DB" \
-    --table=entries \
-    --table=secrets \
-    --table=entry_secrets \
-    --table=users \
-    --table=oauth_accounts \
-    --data-only \
-    --column-inserts \
-    --no-owner \
-    --no-privileges \
-    > "$TEMP_DIR/test_data.sql"
-
-echo "✓ 测试数据已导出到临时文件"
-echo "  文件大小: $(du -h "$TEMP_DIR/test_data.sql" | cut -f1)"
-
-echo ""
-echo "步骤 2/4: 备份当前生产数据..."
-pg_dump "$PROD_DB" \
-    --table=entries \
-    --table=secrets \
-    --table=entry_secrets \
-    --table=users \
-    --table=oauth_accounts \
-    --data-only \
-    --column-inserts \
-    --no-owner \
-    --no-privileges \
-    > "$TEMP_DIR/prod_backup_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S).sql"
-
-echo "✓ 生产数据已备份"
-
-echo ""
-echo "步骤 3/4: 清空生产环境目标表..."
-psql "$PROD_DB" <<'SQL'
-TRUNCATE TABLE entry_secrets CASCADE;
-TRUNCATE TABLE secrets CASCADE;
-TRUNCATE TABLE entries CASCADE;
-SQL
-
-echo "✓ 生产环境目标表已清空"
-
-echo ""
-echo "步骤 4/4: 导入测试数据到生产环境..."
-psql "$PROD_DB" -f "$TEMP_DIR/test_data.sql" 2>&1 | tail -20
-
-echo ""
-echo "验证数据..."
-echo "生产环境数据统计:"
-psql "$PROD_DB" -c "SELECT 'users' as table_name, count(*) FROM users UNION ALL SELECT 'entries', count(*) FROM entries UNION ALL SELECT 'secrets', count(*) FROM secrets UNION ALL SELECT 'entry_secrets', count(*) FROM entry_secrets UNION ALL SELECT 'oauth_accounts', count(*) FROM oauth_accounts ORDER BY table_name;"
-
-echo ""
-echo "========================================="
-echo "  ✓ 数据同步完成!"
-echo "========================================="
-echo ""
-echo "提示:"
-echo "  - 生产数据备份已保存在临时目录"
-echo "  - 临时文件将在脚本退出后自动删除"
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
agent	10da51c203	ci: 添加版本 bump 硬检查，防止代码变更未发版 All checks were successful Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 检查 / 构建 / 发版 (push) Successful in 5m47s Details Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 部署 secrets-mcp (push) Successful in 1m36s Details - CI 工作流解析版本时检查 crates/ 变更是否伴随版本 bump - 若代码变更但版本号未变，直接失败并提示 - 与 scripts/release-check.sh 本地检查形成双保险	2026-04-07 14:05:59 +08:00
agent	bc8995cf71	chore: sync Cargo.lock with Cargo.toml version 0.5.12 Some checks failed Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 部署 secrets-mcp (push) Has been cancelled Details Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 检查 / 构建 / 发版 (push) Has been cancelled Details	2026-04-07 13:47:51 +08:00
agent	5333b863c5	refactor(entries): 将编辑弹窗中的密文管理功能移到查看密文弹窗 Some checks failed Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 检查 / 构建 / 发版 (push) Failing after 1m44s Details Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 部署 secrets-mcp (push) Has been skipped Details - 编辑弹窗移除密文区域（重命名、类型修改、解绑） - 查看密文弹窗增加：重命名（带 debounce 校验）、类型选择、解绑、保存 - 列表行密文 chips 保留只读展示，移除解绑按钮 - 简化编辑弹窗保存逻辑，不再处理密文变更 - bump 0.5.12	2026-04-07 13:32:29 +08:00
agent	6fde982c20	refactor(entries): 将编辑弹窗中的密文管理功能移到查看密文弹窗 All checks were successful Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 检查 / 构建 / 发版 (push) Successful in 6m6s Details Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 部署 secrets-mcp (push) Successful in 1m36s Details - 编辑弹窗移除密文区域（重命名、类型修改、解绑） - 查看密文弹窗增加：重命名（带 debounce 校验）、类型选择、解绑、保存 - 列表行密文 chips 保留只读展示，移除解绑按钮 - 简化编辑弹窗保存逻辑，不再处理密文变更	2026-04-07 13:25:33 +08:00
agent	a2a80a1744	fix(dashboard): 修正 OpenCode MCP 配置，移除 enabled 字段、添加 oauth: false All checks were successful Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 检查 / 构建 / 发版 (push) Successful in 5m50s Details Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 部署 secrets-mcp (push) Successful in 1m36s Details	2026-04-07 11:17:03 +08:00
agent	dfe282095c	feat(dashboard): OpenCode MCP 配置改用原生 Streamable HTTP，移除 mcp-remote 中转；bump 0.5.11 All checks were successful Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 检查 / 构建 / 发版 (push) Successful in 6m10s Details Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 部署 secrets-mcp (push) Successful in 1m36s Details	2026-04-07 10:43:17 +08:00
voson	59084a409d	release(secrets-mcp): 0.5.10 — Web 模块化、性能与错误处理 All checks were successful Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 检查 / 构建 / 发版 (push) Successful in 6m3s Details Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 部署 secrets-mcp (push) Successful in 1m36s Details - 拆分 web.rs 为 web/ 子模块；统一 client_ip 提取 - core: user_scope SQL 复用、env_map N+1 消除、FETCH_ALL 上限调整 - entries 列表页并行查询；PgPool 去 Arc；结构化 NotFound 等错误 - CI: SSH 私钥安全写入；crypto/hex 与依赖清理；MCP 输入长度校验 - AGENTS: API Key 明文存储设计说明	2026-04-06 23:41:07 +08:00
voson	b0fcb83592	release(secrets-mcp): 0.5.9 — users.key_version 与会话失效；Web 条目解密 API 与列表增强 All checks were successful Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 检查 / 构建 / 发版 (push) Successful in 5m24s Details Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 部署 secrets-mcp (push) Successful in 1m36s Details	2026-04-06 17:23:20 +08:00
voson	8942718641	scripts: 添加基于 CSV 的 MCP secrets 重加密修复工具通过读取 entry_id/secret_name/secret_value 调用 secrets_update 让服务端用当前密钥重加密。附带模板 CSV，.gitignore 忽略 *.pyc。	2026-04-06 16:38:37 +08:00
voson	53d53ff96a	release(secrets-mcp): 0.5.8 — 修复更换密码短语流程 All checks were successful Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 检查 / 构建 / 发版 (push) Successful in 5m17s Details Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 部署 secrets-mcp (push) Successful in 1m36s Details - secrets-core: change_user_key() 事务内全量解密并重加密 secrets - web: POST /api/key-change；已有密钥时拒绝 POST /api/key-setup（409） - dashboard: 更换密码需当前密码，调用 key-change - 同步 Cargo.lock	2026-04-06 12:04:35 +08:00
voson	cab234cfcb	feat(secrets-mcp): 增强 MCP 请求日志与 encryption_key 参数支持 All checks were successful Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 检查 / 构建 / 发版 (push) Successful in 3m28s Details Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 部署 secrets-mcp (push) Successful in 1m36s Details logging.rs: - 每条 MCP POST 日志新增 auth_key（Bearer token 前12字符掩码）、 enc_key（X-Encryption-Key 前4后4字符指纹，如 146b…5516(64) 或 absent）、 user_id、tool_args（白名单非敏感参数摘要）字段 - 新增辅助函数 mask_bearer / mask_enc_key / extract_tool_args / summarize_value tools.rs: - extract_enc_key 成功路径增加 debug 级指纹日志（raw_len/trimmed_len/prefix/suffix） - 新增 extract_enc_key_or_arg / require_user_and_key_or_arg：优先使用参数传入的密钥， fallback 到 X-Encryption-Key 头，绕过 Cursor Chat MCP 头透传异常 - GetSecretInput / AddInput / UpdateInput / ExportInput / EnvMapInput 各增加可选 encryption_key 字段，对应工具实现改用 require_user_and_key_or_arg	2026-04-06 11:03:01 +08:00
voson	e0fee639c1	release(secrets-mcp): 0.5.7 All checks were successful Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 检查 / 构建 / 发版 (push) Successful in 5m8s Details Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 部署 secrets-mcp (push) Successful in 1m36s Details	2026-04-05 17:07:31 +08:00
voson	7c53bfb782	feat(core): entry 历史附带关联 secret 密文快照，rollback 可恢复 N:N 与密文 - db: metadata_with_secret_snapshot / strip / parse 辅助 - add/update/delete/rollback 在写 entries_history 前合并快照 - rollback: 按历史快照同步 entry_secrets、更新或插入 secrets - 满足 clippy collapsible_if	2026-04-05 17:06:53 +08:00
voson	63cb3a8216	release(secrets-mcp): 0.5.6 All checks were successful Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 检查 / 构建 / 发版 (push) Successful in 5m8s Details Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 部署 secrets-mcp (push) Successful in 1m36s Details 修复 OAuth 解绑时非法聚合 FOR UPDATE，Web OAuth 审计 IP 与 TRUST_PROXY 对齐并校验 IP，账号绑定写入 oauth_state 失败时回滚 bind 标记。回滚条目时恢复 folder/type，导入冲突检查在 DB 失败时传播错误，MCP delete/history 要求已登录用户，全局请求体 10MiB 限制。CI 部署支持 DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS，默认 accept-new；文档与 deploy 示例补充连接池、限流、TRUST_PROXY。移除含明文凭据的 sync-test-to-prod 脚本。	2026-04-05 15:29:03 +08:00
voson	2b994141b8	release(secrets-mcp): 0.5.5 — 生产 CORS 显式 allow_methods，修复 tower-http 启动 panic All checks were successful Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 检查 / 构建 / 发版 (push) Successful in 4m59s Details Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 部署 secrets-mcp (push) Successful in 6s Details credentials + wildcard methods/headers 被 tower-http 禁止；生产环境改为 GET/POST/PATCH/DELETE/OPTIONS 白名单。	2026-04-05 12:27:40 +08:00
voson	9d6ac5c13a	release(secrets-mcp): 0.5.4 — Web 分页修正与 hex 解码；批量删除上限；MCP @ 路径检测 Some checks failed Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 检查 / 构建 / 发版 (push) Successful in 4m55s Details Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 部署 secrets-mcp (push) Failing after 6s Details	2026-04-05 12:14:40 +08:00
voson	1860cce86c	release(secrets-mcp): 0.5.3 — 审计日志分页与 Web；CONTRIBUTING；文档与模板修正	2026-04-05 11:34:04 +08:00
agent	dd24f7cc44	release: secrets-mcp 0.5.2 Some checks failed Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 检查 / 构建 / 发版 (push) Successful in 6m7s Details Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 部署 secrets-mcp (push) Failing after 6s Details Bump version: secrets-mcp-0.5.1 tag already existed while crates had further changes. Made-with: Cursor	2026-04-05 10:38:50 +08:00
voson	aefad33870	chore(secrets-mcp): 0.5.1 — 移除 entry type 归一化，MCP 参数兼容字符串形式 All checks were successful Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 检查 / 构建 / 发版 (push) Successful in 4m22s Details Secrets MCP — Build & Release / 部署 secrets-mcp (push) Successful in 6s Details - 去掉 taxonomy 对 entry type 的自动映射与 metadata.subtype 回填；仅 trim 后入库 - MCP tools：Vec/Map/bool 等可选字段支持 JSON 内嵌字符串解析，并改进解析失败提示 - 新增 deser 单元测试；README/AGENTS 与 models 注释同步 Made-with: Cursor	2026-04-04 21:27:33 +08:00