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Author SHA1 Message Date
voson
b0fcb83592 release(secrets-mcp): 0.5.9 — users.key_version 与会话失效;Web 条目解密 API 与列表增强
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2026-04-06 17:23:20 +08:00
voson
8942718641 scripts: 添加基于 CSV 的 MCP secrets 重加密修复工具
通过读取 entry_id/secret_name/secret_value 调用 secrets_update 让服务端用当前密钥重加密。附带模板 CSV,.gitignore 忽略 *.pyc。
2026-04-06 16:38:37 +08:00
voson
53d53ff96a release(secrets-mcp): 0.5.8 — 修复更换密码短语流程
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- secrets-core: change_user_key() 事务内全量解密并重加密 secrets
- web: POST /api/key-change;已有密钥时拒绝 POST /api/key-setup(409)
- dashboard: 更换密码需当前密码,调用 key-change
- 同步 Cargo.lock
2026-04-06 12:04:35 +08:00
voson
cab234cfcb feat(secrets-mcp): 增强 MCP 请求日志与 encryption_key 参数支持
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logging.rs:
- 每条 MCP POST 日志新增 auth_key(Bearer token 前12字符掩码)、
  enc_key(X-Encryption-Key 前4后4字符指纹,如 146b…5516(64) 或 absent)、
  user_id、tool_args(白名单非敏感参数摘要)字段
- 新增辅助函数 mask_bearer / mask_enc_key / extract_tool_args / summarize_value

tools.rs:
- extract_enc_key 成功路径增加 debug 级指纹日志(raw_len/trimmed_len/prefix/suffix)
- 新增 extract_enc_key_or_arg / require_user_and_key_or_arg:优先使用参数传入的密钥,
  fallback 到 X-Encryption-Key 头,绕过 Cursor Chat MCP 头透传异常
- GetSecretInput / AddInput / UpdateInput / ExportInput / EnvMapInput 各增加可选
  encryption_key 字段,对应工具实现改用 require_user_and_key_or_arg
2026-04-06 11:03:01 +08:00
voson
e0fee639c1 release(secrets-mcp): 0.5.7
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2026-04-05 17:07:31 +08:00
voson
7c53bfb782 feat(core): entry 历史附带关联 secret 密文快照,rollback 可恢复 N:N 与密文
- db: metadata_with_secret_snapshot / strip / parse 辅助
- add/update/delete/rollback 在写 entries_history 前合并快照
- rollback: 按历史快照同步 entry_secrets、更新或插入 secrets
- 满足 clippy collapsible_if
2026-04-05 17:06:53 +08:00
voson
63cb3a8216 release(secrets-mcp): 0.5.6
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修复 OAuth 解绑时非法聚合 FOR UPDATE,Web OAuth 审计 IP 与 TRUST_PROXY 对齐并校验 IP,账号绑定写入 oauth_state 失败时回滚 bind 标记。回滚条目时恢复 folder/type,导入冲突检查在 DB 失败时传播错误,MCP delete/history 要求已登录用户,全局请求体 10MiB 限制。CI 部署支持 DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS,默认 accept-new;文档与 deploy 示例补充连接池、限流、TRUST_PROXY。移除含明文凭据的 sync-test-to-prod 脚本。
2026-04-05 15:29:03 +08:00
25 changed files with 1762 additions and 305 deletions

View File

@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ jobs:
DEPLOY_HOST: ${{ vars.DEPLOY_HOST }}
DEPLOY_USER: ${{ vars.DEPLOY_USER }}
DEPLOY_SSH_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_KEY }}
DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS: ${{ vars.DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS }}
run: |
if [ -z "$DEPLOY_HOST" ] || [ -z "$DEPLOY_USER" ] || [ -z "$DEPLOY_SSH_KEY" ]; then
echo "部署跳过:请配置 vars.DEPLOY_HOST、vars.DEPLOY_USER 与 secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_KEY"
@@ -216,19 +217,26 @@ jobs:
echo "$DEPLOY_SSH_KEY" > /tmp/deploy_key
chmod 600 /tmp/deploy_key
trap 'rm -f /tmp/deploy_key' EXIT
scp -i /tmp/deploy_key -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
if [ -n "$DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS" ]; then
echo "$DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS" > /tmp/deploy_known_hosts
ssh_opts="-o UserKnownHostsFile=/tmp/deploy_known_hosts -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes"
else
ssh_opts="-o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new"
fi
scp -i /tmp/deploy_key $ssh_opts \
"/tmp/artifact/${MCP_BINARY}" \
"${DEPLOY_USER}@${DEPLOY_HOST}:/tmp/secrets-mcp.new"
ssh -i /tmp/deploy_key -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no "${DEPLOY_USER}@${DEPLOY_HOST}" "
ssh -i /tmp/deploy_key $ssh_opts "${DEPLOY_USER}@${DEPLOY_HOST}" "
sudo mv /tmp/secrets-mcp.new /opt/secrets-mcp/secrets-mcp
sudo chmod +x /opt/secrets-mcp/secrets-mcp
sudo systemctl restart secrets-mcp
sleep 2
sudo systemctl is-active secrets-mcp && echo '服务启动成功' || (sudo journalctl -u secrets-mcp -n 20 && exit 1)
"
rm -f /tmp/deploy_key
- name: 飞书通知
if: always()

3
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -5,4 +5,5 @@
*.pem
tmp/
client_secret_*.apps.googleusercontent.com.json
node_modules/
node_modules/
*.pyc

3
.vscode/tasks.json vendored
View File

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
"label": "test: workspace",
"type": "shell",
"command": "cargo test --workspace --locked",
"dependsOn": "build",
"group": { "kind": "test", "isDefault": true }
},
{
@@ -35,7 +34,7 @@
"label": "clippy: workspace",
"type": "shell",
"command": "cargo clippy --workspace --locked -- -D warnings",
"dependsOn": "build"
"problemMatcher": []
},
{
"label": "ci: release-check",

2
Cargo.lock generated
View File

@@ -2066,7 +2066,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "secrets-mcp"
version = "0.5.5"
version = "0.5.9"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"askama",

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ cargo build --release -p secrets-mcp
| `SECRETS_MCP_BIND` | 监听地址,默认 `127.0.0.1:9315`。容器内或直接对外暴露端口时请改为 `0.0.0.0:9315`;反代时常为 `127.0.0.1:9315`。 |
| `GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID` / `GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET` | 可选;不配置则无 Google 登录入口。运行时从环境读取,勿写入 CI、勿打入二进制。 |
| `RUST_LOG` | 可选;日志级别,如 `secrets_mcp=debug`。 |
| `SECRETS_DATABASE_POOL_SIZE` | 可选。连接池最大连接数,默认 `10`。 |
| `SECRETS_DATABASE_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT` | 可选。获取连接超时秒数,默认 `5`。 |
| `RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_PER_SECOND` | 可选。全局限流速率,默认 `100` req/s。 |
| `RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_BURST` | 可选。全局限流突发量,默认 `200`。 |
| `RATE_LIMIT_IP_PER_SECOND` | 可选。单 IP 限流速率,默认 `20` req/s。 |
| `RATE_LIMIT_IP_BURST` | 可选。单 IP 限流突发量,默认 `40`。 |
| `TRUST_PROXY` | 可选。设为 `1`/`true`/`yes` 时从 `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP` 提取客户端 IP仅在反代环境下启用。 |
```bash
cargo run -p secrets-mcp

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
use std::str::FromStr;
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use serde_json::Value;
use serde_json::{Map, Value};
use sqlx::PgPool;
use sqlx::postgres::{PgConnectOptions, PgPoolOptions, PgSslMode};
@@ -428,6 +428,9 @@ async fn migrate_schema(pool: &PgPool) -> Result<()> {
-- ── Drop legacy actor columns ─────────────────────────────────────────────
ALTER TABLE secrets_history DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS actor;
ALTER TABLE audit_log DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS actor;
-- ── key_version: incremented on passphrase change to invalidate other sessions ──
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS key_version BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;
"#,
)
.execute(pool)
@@ -562,4 +565,75 @@ pub async fn snapshot_secret_history(
Ok(())
}
pub const ENTRY_HISTORY_SECRETS_KEY: &str = "__secrets_snapshot_v1";
#[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct EntrySecretSnapshot {
pub name: String,
#[serde(rename = "type")]
pub secret_type: String,
pub encrypted_hex: String,
}
pub async fn metadata_with_secret_snapshot(
tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'_, sqlx::Postgres>,
entry_id: uuid::Uuid,
metadata: &Value,
) -> Result<Value> {
#[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
struct Row {
name: String,
#[sqlx(rename = "type")]
secret_type: String,
encrypted: Vec<u8>,
}
let rows: Vec<Row> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT s.name, s.type, s.encrypted \
FROM entry_secrets es \
JOIN secrets s ON s.id = es.secret_id \
WHERE es.entry_id = $1 \
ORDER BY s.name ASC",
)
.bind(entry_id)
.fetch_all(&mut **tx)
.await?;
let snapshots: Vec<EntrySecretSnapshot> = rows
.into_iter()
.map(|r| EntrySecretSnapshot {
name: r.name,
secret_type: r.secret_type,
encrypted_hex: ::hex::encode(r.encrypted),
})
.collect();
let mut merged = match metadata.clone() {
Value::Object(obj) => obj,
_ => Map::new(),
};
merged.insert(
ENTRY_HISTORY_SECRETS_KEY.to_string(),
serde_json::to_value(snapshots)?,
);
Ok(Value::Object(merged))
}
pub fn strip_secret_snapshot_from_metadata(metadata: &Value) -> Value {
let mut m = match metadata.clone() {
Value::Object(obj) => obj,
_ => return metadata.clone(),
};
m.remove(ENTRY_HISTORY_SECRETS_KEY);
Value::Object(m)
}
pub fn entry_secret_snapshot_from_metadata(metadata: &Value) -> Option<Vec<EntrySecretSnapshot>> {
let Value::Object(map) = metadata else {
return None;
};
let raw = map.get(ENTRY_HISTORY_SECRETS_KEY)?;
serde_json::from_value(raw.clone()).ok()
}
// ── DB helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

View File

@@ -200,6 +200,8 @@ pub struct User {
pub key_params: Option<serde_json::Value>,
/// Plaintext API key for MCP Bearer authentication. Auto-created on first login.
pub api_key: Option<String>,
/// Incremented each time the passphrase is changed; used to invalidate sessions on other devices.
pub key_version: i64,
pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
pub updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
}

View File

@@ -223,8 +223,16 @@ pub async fn run(pool: &PgPool, params: AddParams<'_>, master_key: &[u8; 32]) ->
.await?
};
if let Some(ref ex) = existing
&& let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
if let Some(ref ex) = existing {
let history_metadata =
match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(&mut tx, ex.id, &ex.metadata).await {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
ex.metadata.clone()
}
};
if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
&mut tx,
db::EntrySnapshotParams {
entry_id: ex.id,
@@ -235,12 +243,13 @@ pub async fn run(pool: &PgPool, params: AddParams<'_>, master_key: &[u8; 32]) ->
version: ex.version,
action: "add",
tags: &ex.tags,
metadata: &ex.metadata,
metadata: &history_metadata,
},
)
.await
{
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot entry history before upsert");
{
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot entry history before upsert");
}
}
// Upsert the entry row. On conflict (existing entry with same user_id+folder+name),
@@ -303,26 +312,6 @@ pub async fn run(pool: &PgPool, params: AddParams<'_>, master_key: &[u8; 32]) ->
.fetch_one(&mut *tx)
.await?;
if existing.is_none()
&& let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
&mut tx,
db::EntrySnapshotParams {
entry_id,
user_id: params.user_id,
folder: params.folder,
entry_type,
name: params.name,
version: current_entry_version,
action: "create",
tags: params.tags,
metadata: &metadata,
},
)
.await
{
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot entry history on create");
}
if existing.is_some() {
#[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
struct ExistingField {
@@ -432,6 +421,35 @@ pub async fn run(pool: &PgPool, params: AddParams<'_>, master_key: &[u8; 32]) ->
}
}
if existing.is_none() {
let history_metadata =
match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(&mut tx, entry_id, &metadata).await {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
metadata.clone()
}
};
if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
&mut tx,
db::EntrySnapshotParams {
entry_id,
user_id: params.user_id,
folder: params.folder,
entry_type,
name: params.name,
version: current_entry_version,
action: "create",
tags: params.tags,
metadata: &history_metadata,
},
)
.await
{
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot entry history on create");
}
}
crate::audit::log_tx(
&mut tx,
params.user_id,

View File

@@ -441,6 +441,15 @@ async fn snapshot_and_delete(
row: &EntryRow,
user_id: Option<Uuid>,
) -> Result<()> {
let history_metadata = match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(tx, row.id, &row.metadata).await
{
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
row.metadata.clone()
}
};
if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
tx,
db::EntrySnapshotParams {
@@ -452,7 +461,7 @@ async fn snapshot_and_delete(
version: row.version,
action: "delete",
tags: &row.tags,
metadata: &row.metadata,
metadata: &history_metadata,
},
)
.await

View File

@@ -31,8 +31,11 @@ pub async fn run(
let entry = resolve_entry(pool, name, folder, user_id).await?;
let rows: Vec<Row> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT version, action, created_at FROM entries_history \
WHERE entry_id = $1 ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT $2",
"SELECT DISTINCT ON (version) version, action, created_at \
FROM entries_history \
WHERE entry_id = $1 \
ORDER BY version DESC, id DESC \
LIMIT $2",
)
.bind(entry.id)
.bind(limit as i64)

View File

@@ -54,7 +54,13 @@ pub async fn run(
.bind(params.user_id)
.fetch_one(pool)
.await
.unwrap_or(false);
.map_err(|e| {
anyhow::anyhow!(
"Failed to check entry existence for '{}': {}",
entry.name,
e
)
})?;
if exists && !params.force {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
use std::collections::HashSet;
use anyhow::Result;
use serde_json::Value;
use sqlx::PgPool;
@@ -122,7 +124,7 @@ pub async fn run(
sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT folder, type, version, action, tags, metadata \
FROM entries_history \
WHERE entry_id = $1 AND version = $2 ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1",
WHERE entry_id = $1 AND version = $2 ORDER BY id ASC LIMIT 1",
)
.bind(entry_id)
.bind(ver)
@@ -149,6 +151,9 @@ pub async fn run(
)
})?;
let snap_secret_snapshot = db::entry_secret_snapshot_from_metadata(&snap.metadata);
let snap_metadata = db::strip_secret_snapshot_from_metadata(&snap.metadata);
let _ = master_key;
let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;
@@ -176,6 +181,15 @@ pub async fn run(
.await?;
let live_entry_id = if let Some(ref lr) = live {
let history_metadata =
match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(&mut tx, lr.id, &lr.metadata).await {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
lr.metadata.clone()
}
};
if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
&mut tx,
db::EntrySnapshotParams {
@@ -187,7 +201,7 @@ pub async fn run(
version: lr.version,
action: "rollback",
tags: &lr.tags,
metadata: &lr.metadata,
metadata: &history_metadata,
},
)
.await
@@ -228,11 +242,13 @@ pub async fn run(
}
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE entries SET tags = $1, metadata = $2, version = version + 1, \
updated_at = NOW() WHERE id = $3",
"UPDATE entries SET folder = $1, type = $2, tags = $3, metadata = $4, version = version + 1, \
updated_at = NOW() WHERE id = $5",
)
.bind(&snap.folder)
.bind(&snap.entry_type)
.bind(&snap.tags)
.bind(&snap.metadata)
.bind(&snap_metadata)
.bind(lr.id)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
@@ -250,7 +266,7 @@ pub async fn run(
.bind(&snap.entry_type)
.bind(name)
.bind(&snap.tags)
.bind(&snap.metadata)
.bind(&snap_metadata)
.bind(snap.version)
.fetch_one(&mut *tx)
.await?
@@ -264,16 +280,16 @@ pub async fn run(
.bind(&snap.entry_type)
.bind(name)
.bind(&snap.tags)
.bind(&snap.metadata)
.bind(&snap_metadata)
.bind(snap.version)
.fetch_one(&mut *tx)
.await?
}
};
// In N:N mode, rollback restores entry metadata/tags only.
// Secret snapshots are kept for audit but secret linkage/content is not rewritten here.
let _ = live_entry_id;
if let Some(secret_snapshot) = snap_secret_snapshot {
restore_entry_secrets(&mut tx, live_entry_id, user_id, &secret_snapshot).await?;
}
crate::audit::log_tx(
&mut tx,
@@ -298,3 +314,144 @@ pub async fn run(
restored_version: snap.version,
})
}
async fn restore_entry_secrets(
tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'_, sqlx::Postgres>,
entry_id: Uuid,
user_id: Option<Uuid>,
snapshot: &[db::EntrySecretSnapshot],
) -> Result<()> {
#[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
struct LinkedSecret {
id: Uuid,
name: String,
encrypted: Vec<u8>,
}
let linked: Vec<LinkedSecret> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT s.id, s.name, s.encrypted \
FROM entry_secrets es \
JOIN secrets s ON s.id = es.secret_id \
WHERE es.entry_id = $1",
)
.bind(entry_id)
.fetch_all(&mut **tx)
.await?;
let target_names: HashSet<&str> = snapshot.iter().map(|s| s.name.as_str()).collect();
for s in &linked {
if target_names.contains(s.name.as_str()) {
continue;
}
if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_secret_history(
tx,
db::SecretSnapshotParams {
secret_id: s.id,
name: &s.name,
encrypted: &s.encrypted,
action: "rollback",
},
)
.await
{
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot secret before rollback unlink");
}
sqlx::query("DELETE FROM entry_secrets WHERE entry_id = $1 AND secret_id = $2")
.bind(entry_id)
.bind(s.id)
.execute(&mut **tx)
.await?;
sqlx::query(
"DELETE FROM secrets s \
WHERE s.id = $1 \
AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM entry_secrets es WHERE es.secret_id = s.id)",
)
.bind(s.id)
.execute(&mut **tx)
.await?;
}
for snap in snapshot {
let encrypted = ::hex::decode(&snap.encrypted_hex).map_err(|e| {
anyhow::anyhow!("invalid secret snapshot data for '{}': {}", snap.name, e)
})?;
#[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
struct ExistingSecret {
id: Uuid,
encrypted: Vec<u8>,
}
let existing: Option<ExistingSecret> = if let Some(uid) = user_id {
sqlx::query_as("SELECT id, encrypted FROM secrets WHERE user_id = $1 AND name = $2")
.bind(uid)
.bind(&snap.name)
.fetch_optional(&mut **tx)
.await?
} else {
sqlx::query_as("SELECT id, encrypted FROM secrets WHERE user_id IS NULL AND name = $1")
.bind(&snap.name)
.fetch_optional(&mut **tx)
.await?
};
let secret_id = if let Some(ex) = existing {
if ex.encrypted != encrypted
&& let Err(e) = db::snapshot_secret_history(
tx,
db::SecretSnapshotParams {
secret_id: ex.id,
name: &snap.name,
encrypted: &ex.encrypted,
action: "rollback",
},
)
.await
{
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to snapshot secret before rollback restore");
}
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE secrets SET type = $1, encrypted = $2, version = version + 1, updated_at = NOW() \
WHERE id = $3",
)
.bind(&snap.secret_type)
.bind(&encrypted)
.bind(ex.id)
.execute(&mut **tx)
.await?;
ex.id
} else if let Some(uid) = user_id {
sqlx::query_scalar(
"INSERT INTO secrets (user_id, name, type, encrypted) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4) RETURNING id",
)
.bind(uid)
.bind(&snap.name)
.bind(&snap.secret_type)
.bind(&encrypted)
.fetch_one(&mut **tx)
.await?
} else {
sqlx::query_scalar(
"INSERT INTO secrets (user_id, name, type, encrypted) VALUES (NULL, $1, $2, $3) RETURNING id",
)
.bind(&snap.name)
.bind(&snap.secret_type)
.bind(&encrypted)
.fetch_one(&mut **tx)
.await?
};
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO entry_secrets (entry_id, secret_id) VALUES ($1, $2) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING",
)
.bind(entry_id)
.bind(secret_id)
.execute(&mut **tx)
.await?;
}
Ok(())
}

View File

@@ -112,6 +112,15 @@ pub async fn run(
}
};
let history_metadata =
match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(&mut tx, row.id, &row.metadata).await {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
row.metadata.clone()
}
};
if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
&mut tx,
db::EntrySnapshotParams {
@@ -123,7 +132,7 @@ pub async fn run(
version: row.version,
action: "update",
tags: &row.tags,
metadata: &row.metadata,
metadata: &history_metadata,
},
)
.await
@@ -481,6 +490,15 @@ pub async fn update_fields_by_id(
}
};
let history_metadata =
match db::metadata_with_secret_snapshot(&mut tx, row.id, &row.metadata).await {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to build secret snapshot for entry history");
row.metadata.clone()
}
};
if let Err(e) = db::snapshot_entry_history(
&mut tx,
db::EntrySnapshotParams {
@@ -492,7 +510,7 @@ pub async fn update_fields_by_id(
version: row.version,
action: "update",
tags: &row.tags,
metadata: &row.metadata,
metadata: &history_metadata,
},
)
.await

View File

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ pub async fn find_or_create_user(pool: &PgPool, profile: OAuthProfile) -> Result
if let Some(oa) = existing {
let user: User = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT id, email, name, avatar_url, key_salt, key_check, key_params, api_key, created_at, updated_at \
"SELECT id, email, name, avatar_url, key_salt, key_check, key_params, api_key, key_version, created_at, updated_at \
FROM users WHERE id = $1",
)
.bind(oa.user_id)
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ pub async fn find_or_create_user(pool: &PgPool, profile: OAuthProfile) -> Result
let user: User = sqlx::query_as(
"INSERT INTO users (email, name, avatar_url) \
VALUES ($1, $2, $3) \
RETURNING id, email, name, avatar_url, key_salt, key_check, key_params, api_key, created_at, updated_at",
RETURNING id, email, name, avatar_url, key_salt, key_check, key_params, api_key, key_version, created_at, updated_at",
)
.bind(&profile.email)
.bind(&display_name)
@@ -76,6 +76,53 @@ pub async fn find_or_create_user(pool: &PgPool, profile: OAuthProfile) -> Result
Ok((user, true))
}
/// Re-encrypt all of a user's secrets from `old_key` to `new_key` and update the key metadata.
///
/// Runs entirely inside a single database transaction: if any secret fails to re-encrypt
/// the whole operation is rolled back, leaving the database unchanged.
pub async fn change_user_key(
pool: &PgPool,
user_id: Uuid,
old_key: &[u8; 32],
new_key: &[u8; 32],
new_salt: &[u8],
new_key_check: &[u8],
new_key_params: &Value,
) -> Result<()> {
let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;
let secrets: Vec<(uuid::Uuid, Vec<u8>)> =
sqlx::query_as("SELECT id, encrypted FROM secrets WHERE user_id = $1 FOR UPDATE")
.bind(user_id)
.fetch_all(&mut *tx)
.await?;
for (id, encrypted) in &secrets {
let plaintext = crate::crypto::decrypt(old_key, encrypted)?;
let new_encrypted = crate::crypto::encrypt(new_key, &plaintext)?;
sqlx::query("UPDATE secrets SET encrypted = $1, updated_at = NOW() WHERE id = $2")
.bind(&new_encrypted)
.bind(id)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
}
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE users SET key_salt = $1, key_check = $2, key_params = $3, \
key_version = key_version + 1, updated_at = NOW() \
WHERE id = $4",
)
.bind(new_salt)
.bind(new_key_check)
.bind(new_key_params)
.bind(user_id)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Store the PBKDF2 salt, key_check, and params for a user's passphrase setup.
pub async fn update_user_key_setup(
pool: &PgPool,
@@ -100,7 +147,7 @@ pub async fn update_user_key_setup(
/// Fetch a user by ID.
pub async fn get_user_by_id(pool: &PgPool, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<Option<User>> {
let user = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT id, email, name, avatar_url, key_salt, key_check, key_params, api_key, created_at, updated_at \
"SELECT id, email, name, avatar_url, key_salt, key_check, key_params, api_key, key_version, created_at, updated_at \
FROM users WHERE id = $1",
)
.bind(user_id)
@@ -200,10 +247,14 @@ pub async fn unbind_oauth_account(
);
}
let count: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1")
.bind(user_id)
.fetch_one(pool)
.await?;
let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;
let locked_accounts: Vec<(String,)> =
sqlx::query_as("SELECT provider FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1 FOR UPDATE")
.bind(user_id)
.fetch_all(&mut *tx)
.await?;
let count = locked_accounts.len();
if count <= 1 {
anyhow::bail!("Cannot unbind the last OAuth account. Please link another account first.");
@@ -212,8 +263,87 @@ pub async fn unbind_oauth_account(
sqlx::query("DELETE FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1 AND provider = $2")
.bind(user_id)
.bind(provider)
.execute(pool)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
async fn maybe_test_pool() -> Option<PgPool> {
let database_url = match std::env::var("SECRETS_DATABASE_URL") {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(_) => {
eprintln!("skip user service tests: SECRETS_DATABASE_URL not set");
return None;
}
};
let pool = match sqlx::PgPool::connect(&database_url).await {
Ok(pool) => pool,
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("skip user service tests: cannot connect to database: {e}");
return None;
}
};
if let Err(e) = crate::db::migrate(&pool).await {
eprintln!("skip user service tests: migrate failed: {e}");
return None;
}
Some(pool)
}
async fn cleanup_user_rows(pool: &PgPool, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<()> {
sqlx::query("DELETE FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1")
.bind(user_id)
.execute(pool)
.await?;
sqlx::query("DELETE FROM users WHERE id = $1")
.bind(user_id)
.execute(pool)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn unbind_oauth_account_removes_only_requested_provider() -> Result<()> {
let Some(pool) = maybe_test_pool().await else {
return Ok(());
};
let user_id = Uuid::from_u128(rand::random());
cleanup_user_rows(&pool, user_id).await?;
sqlx::query("INSERT INTO users (id, name) VALUES ($1, '')")
.bind(user_id)
.execute(&pool)
.await?;
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO oauth_accounts (user_id, provider, provider_id, email, name, avatar_url) \
VALUES ($1, 'google', $2, NULL, NULL, NULL), \
($1, 'github', $3, NULL, NULL, NULL)",
)
.bind(user_id)
.bind(format!("google-{user_id}"))
.bind(format!("github-{user_id}"))
.execute(&pool)
.await?;
unbind_oauth_account(&pool, user_id, "github", Some("google")).await?;
let remaining: Vec<(String,)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT provider FROM oauth_accounts WHERE user_id = $1 ORDER BY provider",
)
.bind(user_id)
.fetch_all(&pool)
.await?;
assert_eq!(remaining, vec![("google".to_string(),)]);
cleanup_user_rows(&pool, user_id).await?;
Ok(())
}
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "secrets-mcp"
version = "0.5.5"
version = "0.5.9"
edition.workspace = true
[[bin]]

View File

@@ -1,25 +1,28 @@
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::time::Instant;
use axum::{
body::{Body, Bytes, to_bytes},
extract::{ConnectInfo, Request},
extract::Request,
http::{
HeaderMap, Method, StatusCode,
header::{CONTENT_LENGTH, CONTENT_TYPE, USER_AGENT},
header::{AUTHORIZATION, CONTENT_LENGTH, CONTENT_TYPE, USER_AGENT},
},
middleware::Next,
response::{IntoResponse, Response},
};
use crate::auth::AuthUser;
/// Axum middleware that logs structured info for every HTTP request.
///
/// All requests: method, path, status, latency_ms, client_ip, user_agent.
/// POST /mcp requests: additionally parses JSON-RPC body for jsonrpc_method,
/// tool_name, jsonrpc_id, mcp_session, batch_size.
/// tool_name, jsonrpc_id, mcp_session, batch_size, tool_args (non-sensitive
/// arguments only), plus masked auth_key / enc_key fingerprints and user_id
/// for diagnosing header forwarding issues.
///
/// Sensitive headers (Authorization, X-Encryption-Key) and secret values
/// are never logged.
/// Sensitive headers (Authorization, X-Encryption-Key) are never logged in
/// full — only short fingerprints are emitted.
pub async fn request_logging_middleware(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
let method = req.method().clone();
let path = req.uri().path().to_string();
@@ -33,6 +36,10 @@ pub async fn request_logging_middleware(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(|s| s.to_string());
// Capture header fingerprints before consuming the request.
let auth_key = mask_bearer(req.headers());
let enc_key = mask_enc_key(req.headers());
let is_mcp_post = path.starts_with("/mcp") && method == Method::POST;
let is_json = header_str(req.headers(), CONTENT_TYPE)
.map(|ct| ct.contains("application/json"))
@@ -46,6 +53,11 @@ pub async fn request_logging_middleware(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
let cap = content_len.unwrap_or(0);
if cap <= 512 * 1024 {
let (parts, body) = req.into_parts();
// user_id is available after auth middleware has run (injected into extensions).
let user_id = parts
.extensions
.get::<AuthUser>()
.map(|a| a.user_id.to_string());
match to_bytes(body, 512 * 1024).await {
Ok(bytes) => {
let rpc = parse_jsonrpc_meta(&bytes);
@@ -62,6 +74,9 @@ pub async fn request_logging_middleware(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
ua.as_deref(),
content_len,
mcp_session.as_deref(),
auth_key.as_deref(),
&enc_key,
user_id.as_deref(),
&rpc,
);
return resp;
@@ -78,6 +93,9 @@ pub async fn request_logging_middleware(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
ua = ua.as_deref(),
content_length = content_len,
mcp_session = mcp_session.as_deref(),
auth_key = auth_key.as_deref(),
enc_key = enc_key.as_str(),
user_id = user_id.as_deref(),
"mcp request",
);
return (
@@ -160,6 +178,9 @@ fn log_mcp_request(
ua: Option<&str>,
content_length: Option<u64>,
mcp_session: Option<&str>,
auth_key: Option<&str>,
enc_key: &str,
user_id: Option<&str>,
rpc: &JsonRpcMeta,
) {
tracing::info!(
@@ -175,18 +196,94 @@ fn log_mcp_request(
tool = rpc.tool_name.as_deref(),
jsonrpc_id = rpc.request_id.as_deref(),
batch_size = rpc.batch_size,
tool_args = rpc.tool_args.as_deref(),
auth_key,
enc_key,
user_id,
"mcp request",
);
}
// ── Sensitive header masking ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Mask a Bearer token: emit only the first 12 characters followed by `…`.
/// Returns `None` if the Authorization header is absent or not a Bearer token.
/// Example: `sk_90c88844e4e5…`
fn mask_bearer(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Option<String> {
let val = headers.get(AUTHORIZATION)?.to_str().ok()?;
let token = val.strip_prefix("Bearer ")?.trim();
if token.is_empty() {
return None;
}
if token.len() > 12 {
Some(format!("{}", &token[..12]))
} else {
Some(token.to_string())
}
}
/// Fingerprint the X-Encryption-Key header.
///
/// Emits first 4 chars, last 4 chars, and raw byte length, e.g. `146b…5516(64)`.
/// Returns `"absent"` when the header is missing. Reveals enough to confirm
/// which key arrived and whether it was truncated or padded, without revealing
/// the full value.
fn mask_enc_key(headers: &HeaderMap) -> String {
match headers
.get("x-encryption-key")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
{
Some(val) => {
let raw_len = val.len();
let t = val.trim();
let len = t.len();
if len >= 8 {
let prefix = &t[..4];
let suffix = &t[len - 4..];
if raw_len != len {
// Trailing/leading whitespace detected — extra diagnostic.
format!("{prefix}{suffix}({len}, raw={raw_len})")
} else {
format!("{prefix}{suffix}({len})")
}
} else {
format!("…({len})")
}
}
None => "absent".to_string(),
}
}
// ── JSON-RPC body parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Safe (non-sensitive) argument keys that may be included verbatim in logs.
/// Keys NOT in this list (e.g. `secrets`, `secrets_obj`, `meta_obj`,
/// `encryption_key`) are silently dropped.
const SAFE_ARG_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
"id",
"name",
"name_query",
"folder",
"type",
"entry_type",
"field",
"query",
"tags",
"limit",
"offset",
"format",
"dry_run",
"prefix",
];
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct JsonRpcMeta {
request_id: Option<String>,
rpc_method: Option<String>,
tool_name: Option<String>,
batch_size: Option<usize>,
/// Non-sensitive tool call arguments for diagnostic logging.
tool_args: Option<String>,
}
fn parse_jsonrpc_meta(bytes: &Bytes) -> JsonRpcMeta {
@@ -216,12 +313,47 @@ fn parse_single(value: &serde_json::Value) -> JsonRpcMeta {
.pointer("/params/name")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.map(|s| s.to_string());
let tool_args = extract_tool_args(value);
JsonRpcMeta {
request_id,
rpc_method,
tool_name,
batch_size: None,
tool_args,
}
}
/// Extract a compact summary of non-sensitive tool arguments for logging.
/// Only keys listed in `SAFE_ARG_KEYS` are included.
fn extract_tool_args(value: &serde_json::Value) -> Option<String> {
let args = value.pointer("/params/arguments")?;
let obj = args.as_object()?;
let pairs: Vec<String> = obj
.iter()
.filter(|(k, v)| SAFE_ARG_KEYS.contains(&k.as_str()) && !v.is_null())
.map(|(k, v)| format!("{}={}", k, summarize_value(v)))
.collect();
if pairs.is_empty() {
None
} else {
Some(pairs.join(" "))
}
}
/// Produce a short, log-safe representation of a JSON value.
fn summarize_value(v: &serde_json::Value) -> String {
match v {
serde_json::Value::String(s) => {
if s.len() > 64 {
format!("\"{}\"", &s[..64])
} else {
format!("\"{s}\"")
}
}
serde_json::Value::Array(arr) => format!("[…{}]", arr.len()),
serde_json::Value::Object(_) => "{…}".to_string(),
other => other.to_string(),
}
}
@@ -245,18 +377,5 @@ fn header_str(headers: &HeaderMap, name: impl axum::http::header::AsHeaderName)
}
fn client_ip(req: &Request) -> Option<String> {
if let Some(first) = req
.headers()
.get("x-forwarded-for")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|s| s.split(',').next())
{
let s = first.trim();
if !s.is_empty() {
return Some(s.to_string());
}
}
req.extensions()
.get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
.map(|c| c.ip().to_string())
crate::client_ip::extract_client_ip(req).into()
}

View File

@@ -187,6 +187,9 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
))
.layer(session_layer)
.layer(cors)
.layer(tower_http::limit::RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(
10 * 1024 * 1024,
))
.with_state(app_state);
// ── Start server ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

View File

@@ -230,15 +230,6 @@ impl SecretsService {
}
}
/// Extract user_id from the HTTP request parts injected by auth middleware.
fn user_id_from_ctx(ctx: &RequestContext<RoleServer>) -> Result<Option<Uuid>, rmcp::ErrorData> {
let parts = ctx
.extensions
.get::<http::request::Parts>()
.ok_or_else(mcp_err_missing_http_parts)?;
Ok(parts.extensions.get::<AuthUser>().map(|a| a.user_id))
}
/// Get the authenticated user_id (returns error if not authenticated).
fn require_user_id(ctx: &RequestContext<RoleServer>) -> Result<Uuid, rmcp::ErrorData> {
let parts = ctx
@@ -274,6 +265,18 @@ impl SecretsService {
rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_request("Invalid X-Encryption-Key header value", None)
})?;
let trimmed = hex_str.trim();
// Debug-level fingerprint: helps diagnose header forwarding issues
// (e.g. Cursor Chat MCP truncating or transforming the key value)
// without revealing the full secret.
tracing::debug!(
raw_len = hex_str.len(),
trimmed_len = trimmed.len(),
key_prefix = trimmed.get(..8).unwrap_or(trimmed),
key_suffix = trimmed
.get(trimmed.len().saturating_sub(8)..)
.unwrap_or(trimmed),
"X-Encryption-Key received",
);
if trimmed.len() != 64 {
tracing::warn!(
got_len = trimmed.len(),
@@ -298,7 +301,51 @@ impl SecretsService {
.map_err(mcp_err_invalid_encryption_key_logged)
}
/// Require both user_id and encryption key.
/// Extract the encryption key, preferring an explicit argument value over
/// the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header.
///
/// `arg_key` is the optional `encryption_key` field from the tool's input
/// struct. When present, it is used directly and the header is ignored.
/// This allows MCP clients that cannot reliably forward custom HTTP headers
/// (e.g. Cursor Chat) to pass the key as a normal tool argument.
fn extract_enc_key_or_arg(
ctx: &RequestContext<RoleServer>,
arg_key: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<[u8; 32], rmcp::ErrorData> {
if let Some(hex_str) = arg_key {
let trimmed = hex_str.trim();
tracing::debug!(
source = "argument",
raw_len = hex_str.len(),
trimmed_len = trimmed.len(),
key_prefix = trimmed.get(..8).unwrap_or(trimmed),
key_suffix = trimmed
.get(trimmed.len().saturating_sub(8)..)
.unwrap_or(trimmed),
"X-Encryption-Key received",
);
if trimmed.len() != 64 {
return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_request(
format!(
"encryption_key must be exactly 64 hex characters (32-byte key), got {}.",
trimmed.len()
),
None,
));
}
if !trimmed.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
return Err(rmcp::ErrorData::invalid_request(
"encryption_key contains non-hexadecimal characters.",
None,
));
}
return secrets_core::crypto::extract_key_from_hex(trimmed)
.map_err(mcp_err_invalid_encryption_key_logged);
}
Self::extract_enc_key(ctx)
}
/// Require both user_id and encryption key (header only, no arg fallback).
fn require_user_and_key(
ctx: &RequestContext<RoleServer>,
) -> Result<(Uuid, [u8; 32]), rmcp::ErrorData> {
@@ -306,6 +353,17 @@ impl SecretsService {
let key = Self::extract_enc_key(ctx)?;
Ok((user_id, key))
}
/// Require both user_id and encryption key, preferring an explicit argument
/// value over the X-Encryption-Key header.
fn require_user_and_key_or_arg(
ctx: &RequestContext<RoleServer>,
arg_key: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<(Uuid, [u8; 32]), rmcp::ErrorData> {
let user_id = Self::require_user_id(ctx)?;
let key = Self::extract_enc_key_or_arg(ctx, arg_key)?;
Ok((user_id, key))
}
}
// ── Tool parameter types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -379,6 +437,10 @@ struct GetSecretInput {
id: String,
#[schemars(description = "Specific field to retrieve. If omitted, returns all fields.")]
field: Option<String>,
#[schemars(description = "Encryption key as a 64-char hex string. \
If provided, takes priority over the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header. \
Use this when the MCP client cannot reliably forward custom headers.")]
encryption_key: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
@@ -425,6 +487,10 @@ struct AddInput {
)]
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
link_secret_names: Option<Vec<String>>,
#[schemars(description = "Encryption key as a 64-char hex string. \
If provided, takes priority over the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header. \
Use this when the MCP client cannot reliably forward custom headers.")]
encryption_key: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
@@ -486,6 +552,10 @@ struct UpdateInput {
)]
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deser::option_vec_string_from_string")]
unlink_secret_names: Option<Vec<String>>,
#[schemars(description = "Encryption key as a 64-char hex string. \
If provided, takes priority over the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header. \
Use this when the MCP client cannot reliably forward custom headers.")]
encryption_key: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
@@ -558,6 +628,10 @@ struct ExportInput {
query: Option<String>,
#[schemars(description = "Export format: 'json' (default), 'toml', 'yaml'")]
format: Option<String>,
#[schemars(description = "Encryption key as a 64-char hex string. \
If provided, takes priority over the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header. \
Use this when the MCP client cannot reliably forward custom headers.")]
encryption_key: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
@@ -581,6 +655,10 @@ struct EnvMapInput {
Example: entry 'aliyun', field 'access_key_id' → ALIYUN_ACCESS_KEY_ID \
(or PREFIX_ALIYUN_ACCESS_KEY_ID with prefix set).")]
prefix: Option<String>,
#[schemars(description = "Encryption key as a 64-char hex string. \
If provided, takes priority over the X-Encryption-Key HTTP header. \
Use this when the MCP client cannot reliably forward custom headers.")]
encryption_key: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
@@ -885,7 +963,8 @@ impl SecretsService {
ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
let t = Instant::now();
let (user_id, user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
let (user_id, user_key) =
Self::require_user_and_key_or_arg(&ctx, input.encryption_key.as_deref())?;
let entry_id = parse_uuid(&input.id)?;
tracing::info!(
tool = "secrets_get",
@@ -939,7 +1018,8 @@ impl SecretsService {
ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
let t = Instant::now();
let (user_id, user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
let (user_id, user_key) =
Self::require_user_and_key_or_arg(&ctx, input.encryption_key.as_deref())?;
tracing::info!(
tool = "secrets_add",
?user_id,
@@ -1033,7 +1113,8 @@ impl SecretsService {
ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
let t = Instant::now();
let (user_id, user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
let (user_id, user_key) =
Self::require_user_and_key_or_arg(&ctx, input.encryption_key.as_deref())?;
tracing::info!(
tool = "secrets_update",
?user_id,
@@ -1142,7 +1223,7 @@ impl SecretsService {
ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
let t = Instant::now();
let user_id = Self::user_id_from_ctx(&ctx)?;
let user_id = Self::require_user_id(&ctx)?;
// Safety: require at least one filter.
if input.id.is_none()
@@ -1172,9 +1253,9 @@ impl SecretsService {
if let Some(ref id_str) = input.id {
let eid = parse_uuid(id_str)?;
let uid = user_id;
let entry = resolve_entry_by_id(&self.pool, eid, uid)
let entry = resolve_entry_by_id(&self.pool, eid, Some(uid))
.await
.map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_delete", uid, e))?;
.map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_delete", Some(uid), e))?;
(Some(entry.name), Some(entry.folder))
} else {
(input.name.clone(), input.folder.clone())
@@ -1187,11 +1268,11 @@ impl SecretsService {
folder: effective_folder.as_deref(),
entry_type: input.entry_type.as_deref(),
dry_run: input.dry_run.unwrap_or(false),
user_id,
user_id: Some(user_id),
},
)
.await
.map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_delete", user_id, e))?;
.map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_delete", Some(user_id), e))?;
tracing::info!(
tool = "secrets_delete",
@@ -1218,7 +1299,7 @@ impl SecretsService {
ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
let t = Instant::now();
let user_id = Self::user_id_from_ctx(&ctx)?;
let user_id = Self::require_user_id(&ctx)?;
tracing::info!(
tool = "secrets_history",
?user_id,
@@ -1230,9 +1311,9 @@ impl SecretsService {
let (resolved_name, resolved_folder): (String, Option<String>) =
if let Some(ref id_str) = input.id {
let eid = parse_uuid(id_str)?;
let entry = resolve_entry_by_id(&self.pool, eid, user_id)
let entry = resolve_entry_by_id(&self.pool, eid, Some(user_id))
.await
.map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_history", user_id, e))?;
.map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_history", Some(user_id), e))?;
(entry.name, Some(entry.folder))
} else {
(input.name.clone(), input.folder.clone())
@@ -1243,10 +1324,10 @@ impl SecretsService {
&resolved_name,
resolved_folder.as_deref(),
input.limit.unwrap_or(20),
user_id,
Some(user_id),
)
.await
.map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_history", user_id, e))?;
.map_err(|e| mcp_err_internal_logged("secrets_history", Some(user_id), e))?;
tracing::info!(
tool = "secrets_history",
@@ -1327,7 +1408,8 @@ impl SecretsService {
ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
let t = Instant::now();
let (user_id, user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
let (user_id, user_key) =
Self::require_user_and_key_or_arg(&ctx, input.encryption_key.as_deref())?;
let tags = input.tags.unwrap_or_default();
let format = input.format.as_deref().unwrap_or("json");
tracing::info!(
@@ -1396,7 +1478,8 @@ impl SecretsService {
ctx: RequestContext<RoleServer>,
) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
let t = Instant::now();
let (user_id, user_key) = Self::require_user_and_key(&ctx)?;
let (user_id, user_key) =
Self::require_user_and_key_or_arg(&ctx, input.encryption_key.as_deref())?;
let tags = input.tags.unwrap_or_default();
let only_fields = input.only_fields.unwrap_or_default();
tracing::info!(

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
use askama::Template;
use chrono::SecondsFormat;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr};
use axum::{
Json, Router,
@@ -22,10 +22,11 @@ use secrets_core::service::{
api_key::{ensure_api_key, regenerate_api_key},
audit_log::{count_for_user, list_for_user},
delete::delete_by_id,
get_secret::get_all_secrets_by_id,
search::{SearchParams, count_entries, fetch_secret_schemas, ilike_pattern, list_entries},
update::{UpdateEntryFieldsByIdParams, update_fields_by_id},
user::{
OAuthProfile, bind_oauth_account, find_or_create_user, get_user_by_id,
OAuthProfile, bind_oauth_account, change_user_key, find_or_create_user, get_user_by_id,
unbind_oauth_account, update_user_key_setup,
},
};
@@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ const SESSION_USER_ID: &str = "user_id";
const SESSION_OAUTH_STATE: &str = "oauth_state";
const SESSION_OAUTH_BIND_MODE: &str = "oauth_bind_mode";
const SESSION_LOGIN_PROVIDER: &str = "login_provider";
const SESSION_KEY_VERSION: &str = "key_version";
// ── Template types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -175,15 +177,85 @@ async fn current_user_id(session: &Session) -> Option<Uuid> {
}
}
fn request_client_ip(headers: &HeaderMap, connect_info: ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>) -> Option<String> {
if let Some(first) = headers
.get("x-forwarded-for")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|s| s.split(',').next())
/// Load and validate the current user from session and DB.
///
/// Returns the user if the session is valid. Flushes the session and returns
/// `Err(Redirect::to("/login"))` when:
/// - the session has no `user_id`,
/// - the user no longer exists in the database, or
/// - the stored `key_version` does not match the DB value (passphrase changed on
/// another device since this session was created).
async fn require_valid_user(
pool: &sqlx::PgPool,
session: &Session,
context: &str,
) -> Result<secrets_core::models::User, Response> {
let Some(user_id) = current_user_id(session).await else {
return Err(Redirect::to("/login").into_response());
};
let user = match secrets_core::service::user::get_user_by_id(pool, user_id).await {
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, context, "failed to load user");
return Err(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR.into_response());
}
Ok(None) => {
if let Err(e) = session.flush().await {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to flush stale session");
}
return Err(Redirect::to("/login").into_response());
}
Ok(Some(u)) => u,
};
let session_kv: Option<i64> = match session.get::<i64>(SESSION_KEY_VERSION).await {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to read key_version from session; treating as missing");
None
}
};
if let Some(kv) = session_kv
&& kv != user.key_version
{
let value = first.trim();
if !value.is_empty() {
return Some(value.to_string());
tracing::info!(%user_id, session_kv = kv, db_kv = user.key_version, "key_version mismatch; invalidating session");
if let Err(e) = session.flush().await {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to flush outdated session");
}
return Err(Redirect::to("/login").into_response());
}
Ok(user)
}
fn request_client_ip(headers: &HeaderMap, connect_info: ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>) -> Option<String> {
let trust_proxy = std::env::var("TRUST_PROXY")
.as_deref()
.is_ok_and(|v| matches!(v, "1" | "true" | "yes"));
request_client_ip_with_trust_proxy(headers, connect_info, trust_proxy)
}
fn request_client_ip_with_trust_proxy(
headers: &HeaderMap,
connect_info: ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
trust_proxy: bool,
) -> Option<String> {
if trust_proxy {
if let Some(first) = headers
.get("x-forwarded-for")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|s| s.split(',').next())
{
let value = first.trim();
if let Ok(ip) = value.parse::<IpAddr>() {
return Some(ip.to_string());
}
}
if let Some(value) = headers.get("x-real-ip").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()) {
let value = value.trim();
if let Ok(ip) = value.parse::<IpAddr>() {
return Some(ip.to_string());
}
}
}
@@ -234,13 +306,10 @@ pub fn web_router() -> Router<AppState> {
.route("/entries", get(entries_page))
.route("/audit", get(audit_page))
.route("/account/bind/google", get(account_bind_google))
.route(
"/account/bind/google/callback",
get(account_bind_google_callback),
)
.route("/account/unbind/{provider}", post(account_unbind))
.route("/api/key-salt", get(api_key_salt))
.route("/api/key-setup", post(api_key_setup))
.route("/api/key-change", post(api_key_change))
.route("/api/apikey", get(api_apikey_get))
.route("/api/apikey/regenerate", post(api_apikey_regenerate))
.route(
@@ -251,6 +320,10 @@ pub fn web_router() -> Router<AppState> {
"/api/entries/{entry_id}/secrets/{secret_id}",
axum::routing::delete(api_entry_secret_unlink),
)
.route(
"/api/entries/{id}/secrets/decrypt",
get(api_entry_secrets_decrypt),
)
.route("/api/secrets/{secret_id}", patch(api_secret_patch))
.route("/api/secrets/check-name", get(api_secret_check_name))
}
@@ -526,6 +599,9 @@ where
);
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
})?;
if let Err(e) = session.insert(SESSION_KEY_VERSION, user.key_version).await {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, user_id = %user.id, "failed to insert key_version into session after OAuth");
}
log_login(
&state.pool,
@@ -555,16 +631,9 @@ async fn dashboard(
State(state): State<AppState>,
session: Session,
) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
let Some(user_id) = current_user_id(&session).await else {
return Ok(Redirect::to("/login").into_response());
};
let user = match get_user_by_id(&state.pool, user_id).await.map_err(|e| {
tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to load user for dashboard");
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
})? {
Some(u) => u,
None => return Ok(Redirect::to("/login").into_response()),
let user = match require_valid_user(&state.pool, &session, "dashboard").await {
Ok(u) => u,
Err(r) => return Ok(r),
};
let tmpl = DashboardTemplate {
@@ -583,17 +652,11 @@ async fn entries_page(
session: Session,
Query(q): Query<EntriesQuery>,
) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
let Some(user_id) = current_user_id(&session).await else {
return Ok(Redirect::to("/login").into_response());
};
let user = match get_user_by_id(&state.pool, user_id).await.map_err(|e| {
tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to load user for entries page");
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
})? {
Some(u) => u,
None => return Ok(Redirect::to("/login").into_response()),
let user = match require_valid_user(&state.pool, &session, "entries_page").await {
Ok(u) => u,
Err(r) => return Ok(r),
};
let user_id = user.id;
let folder_filter = q
.folder
@@ -839,17 +902,11 @@ async fn audit_page(
session: Session,
Query(aq): Query<AuditQuery>,
) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
let Some(user_id) = current_user_id(&session).await else {
return Ok(Redirect::to("/login").into_response());
};
let user = match get_user_by_id(&state.pool, user_id).await.map_err(|e| {
tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to load user for audit page");
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
})? {
Some(u) => u,
None => return Ok(Redirect::to("/login").into_response()),
let user = match require_valid_user(&state.pool, &session, "audit_page").await {
Ok(u) => u,
Err(r) => return Ok(r),
};
let user_id = user.id;
let page = aq.page.unwrap_or(1).max(1);
@@ -909,14 +966,9 @@ async fn account_bind_google(
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
})?;
let redirect_uri = format!("{}/account/bind/google/callback", state.base_url);
let mut cfg = state
.google_config
.clone()
.ok_or(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE)?;
cfg.redirect_uri = redirect_uri;
let st = random_state();
if let Err(e) = session.insert(SESSION_OAUTH_STATE, &st).await {
let config = google_cfg(&state).ok_or(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE)?;
let oauth_state = random_state();
if let Err(e) = session.insert(SESSION_OAUTH_STATE, &oauth_state).await {
tracing::error!(error = %e, "failed to insert oauth_state for account bind flow");
if let Err(rm) = session.remove::<bool>(SESSION_OAUTH_BIND_MODE).await {
tracing::warn!(error = %rm, "failed to roll back oauth_bind_mode after oauth_state insert failure");
@@ -924,34 +976,8 @@ async fn account_bind_google(
return Err(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR);
}
Ok(Redirect::to(&google_auth_url(&cfg, &st)).into_response())
}
async fn account_bind_google_callback(
State(state): State<AppState>,
connect_info: ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
headers: HeaderMap,
session: Session,
Query(params): Query<OAuthCallbackQuery>,
) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
let client_ip = request_client_ip(&headers, connect_info);
let user_agent = request_user_agent(&headers);
handle_oauth_callback(
&state,
&session,
params,
"google",
client_ip.as_deref(),
user_agent.as_deref(),
|s, cfg, code| {
Box::pin(crate::oauth::google::exchange_code(
&s.http_client,
cfg,
code,
))
},
)
.await
let url = google_auth_url(config, &oauth_state);
Ok(Redirect::to(&url).into_response())
}
async fn account_unbind(
@@ -1056,6 +1082,20 @@ async fn api_key_setup(
.await
.ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
// Guard: if a passphrase is already configured, reject and direct to /api/key-change
let user = get_user_by_id(&state.pool, user_id)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to load user for key-setup guard");
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
})?
.ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
if user.key_salt.is_some() {
tracing::warn!(%user_id, "key-setup called but passphrase already configured; use /api/key-change");
return Err(StatusCode::CONFLICT);
}
let salt = hex::decode_hex(&body.salt).map_err(|e| {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid hex in key-setup salt");
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
@@ -1080,6 +1120,122 @@ async fn api_key_setup(
Ok(Json(KeySetupResponse { ok: true }))
}
// ── Change passphrase (re-encrypts all secrets) ───────────────────────────────
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct KeyChangeRequest {
/// Old derived key as 64-char hex — used to decrypt existing secrets
old_key: String,
/// New derived key as 64-char hex — used to re-encrypt secrets
new_key: String,
/// New 32-byte hex salt
salt: String,
/// New key_check: AES-256-GCM of KEY_CHECK_PLAINTEXT with the new key (hex)
key_check: String,
/// New key derivation parameters
params: serde_json::Value,
}
async fn api_key_change(
State(state): State<AppState>,
session: Session,
Json(body): Json<KeyChangeRequest>,
) -> Result<Json<KeySetupResponse>, StatusCode> {
let user_id = current_user_id(&session)
.await
.ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
let user = get_user_by_id(&state.pool, user_id)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to load user for key-change");
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
})?
.ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
// Must have an existing passphrase to change
let existing_key_check = user.key_check.ok_or_else(|| {
tracing::warn!(%user_id, "key-change called but no passphrase configured; use /api/key-setup");
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
})?;
// Validate and decode old key
let old_key_bytes = secrets_core::crypto::extract_key_from_hex(&body.old_key).map_err(|e| {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid old_key hex in key-change");
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
})?;
// Verify old_key against the stored key_check
let plaintext = secrets_core::crypto::decrypt(&old_key_bytes, &existing_key_check).map_err(|_| {
tracing::warn!(%user_id, "key-change rejected: old_key does not match stored key_check");
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
})?;
if plaintext != b"secrets-mcp-key-check" {
tracing::warn!(%user_id, "key-change rejected: decrypted key_check content mismatch");
return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
}
// Validate and decode new key
let new_key_bytes = secrets_core::crypto::extract_key_from_hex(&body.new_key).map_err(|e| {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid new_key hex in key-change");
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
})?;
// Decode new salt and key_check
let new_salt = hex::decode_hex(&body.salt).map_err(|e| {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid hex in key-change salt");
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
})?;
if new_salt.len() != 32 {
tracing::warn!(
salt_len = new_salt.len(),
"key-change salt must be 32 bytes"
);
return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
}
let new_key_check = hex::decode_hex(&body.key_check).map_err(|e| {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "invalid hex in key-change key_check");
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
})?;
change_user_key(
&state.pool,
user_id,
&old_key_bytes,
&new_key_bytes,
&new_salt,
&new_key_check,
&body.params,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
tracing::error!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to change user key");
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
})?;
// Refresh the session's key_version so the current session is not immediately
// invalidated by require_valid_user on the next page load.
match get_user_by_id(&state.pool, user_id).await {
Ok(Some(updated_user)) => {
if let Err(e) = session
.insert(SESSION_KEY_VERSION, updated_user.key_version)
.await
{
tracing::warn!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to update key_version in session after key change");
}
}
Ok(None) => {
tracing::warn!(%user_id, "user not found after key change; session not updated");
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, %user_id, "failed to reload user after key change; session not updated");
}
}
tracing::info!(%user_id, secrets_count = "(see service log)", "passphrase changed and secrets re-encrypted");
Ok(Json(KeySetupResponse { ok: true }))
}
// ── API Key management ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[derive(Serialize)]
@@ -1715,6 +1871,65 @@ async fn oauth_protected_resource_metadata(State(state): State<AppState>) -> imp
)
}
// ── Decrypt entry secrets (Web UI) ───────────────────────────────────────────
async fn api_entry_secrets_decrypt(
State(state): State<AppState>,
session: Session,
headers: HeaderMap,
Path(entry_id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, EntryApiError> {
let lang = request_ui_lang(&headers);
let user_id = current_user_id(&session).await.ok_or((
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "未登录", "尚未登入", "Not logged in") })),
))?;
let enc_key_hex = headers
.get("x-encryption-key")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.ok_or_else(|| {
(
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "缺少 X-Encryption-Key 请求头", "缺少 X-Encryption-Key 請求標頭", "Missing X-Encryption-Key header") })),
)
})?;
let master_key =
secrets_core::crypto::extract_key_from_hex(enc_key_hex).map_err(|_| {
(
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "X-Encryption-Key 格式无效", "X-Encryption-Key 格式無效", "Invalid X-Encryption-Key format") })),
)
})?;
let secrets =
get_all_secrets_by_id(&state.pool, entry_id, &master_key, Some(user_id))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
let msg = e.to_string();
if msg.contains("DecryptionFailed") || msg.contains("decryption") {
(
StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "解密失败,请确认密码短语正确", "解密失敗,請確認密碼短語正確", "Decryption failed, please verify your passphrase") })),
)
} else if msg.contains("not found") {
(
StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "条目不存在或无权访问", "條目不存在或無權存取", "Entry not found or no access") })),
)
} else {
tracing::error!(error = %e, %entry_id, "decrypt entry secrets failed");
(
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
Json(json!({ "error": tr(lang, "操作失败,请稍后重试", "操作失敗,請稍後重試", "Operation failed, please try again later") })),
)
}
})?;
Ok(Json(json!({ "ok": true, "secrets": secrets })))
}
// ── Helper ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
fn render_template<T: Template>(tmpl: T) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
@@ -1742,6 +1957,34 @@ fn format_audit_target(folder: &str, entry_type: &str, name: &str) -> String {
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn request_client_ip_ignores_forwarded_headers_without_trusted_proxy() {
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert("x-forwarded-for", "203.0.113.10".parse().unwrap());
let ip = request_client_ip_with_trust_proxy(
&headers,
ConnectInfo(SocketAddr::from(([127, 0, 0, 1], 9315))),
false,
);
assert_eq!(ip.as_deref(), Some("127.0.0.1"));
}
#[test]
fn request_client_ip_uses_valid_forwarded_header_with_trusted_proxy() {
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert("x-forwarded-for", "203.0.113.10, 10.0.0.1".parse().unwrap());
let ip = request_client_ip_with_trust_proxy(
&headers,
ConnectInfo(SocketAddr::from(([127, 0, 0, 1], 9315))),
true,
);
assert_eq!(ip.as_deref(), Some("203.0.113.10"));
}
#[test]
fn request_ui_lang_prefers_zh_cn_over_en_fallback() {
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();

View File

@@ -305,6 +305,17 @@
<div class="modal-bd" id="change-modal">
<div class="modal">
<h3 data-i18n="changeTitle">更换密码</h3>
<div class="field">
<label data-i18n="labelCurrent">当前密码</label>
<div class="pw-field">
<input type="password" id="change-pass-old" data-i18n-ph="phCurrent" autocomplete="current-password">
<button type="button" class="pw-toggle" data-target="change-pass-old" aria-pressed="false"
onclick="togglePwVisibility(this)" aria-label="">
<span class="pw-icon pw-icon-show" aria-hidden="true"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="18" height="18" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><path d="M1 12s4-8 11-8 11 8 11 8-4 8-11 8-11-8-11-8z"/><circle cx="12" cy="12" r="3"/></svg></span>
<span class="pw-icon pw-icon-hide hidden" aria-hidden="true"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="18" height="18" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><path d="M17.94 17.94A10.07 10.07 0 0 1 12 20c-7 0-11-8-11-8a18.45 18.45 0 0 1 5.06-5.94M9.9 4.24A9.12 9.12 0 0 1 12 4c7 0 11 8 11 8a18.5 18.5 0 0 1-2.16 3.19m-6.72-1.07a3 3 0 1 1-4.24-4.24"/><line x1="1" y1="1" x2="23" y2="23"/></svg></span>
</button>
</div>
</div>
<div class="field">
<label data-i18n="labelNew">新密码</label>
<div class="pw-field">
@@ -345,8 +356,10 @@ const T = {
labelPassphrase: '加密密码',
labelConfirm: '确认密码',
labelNew: '新密码',
labelCurrent: '当前密码',
phPassphrase: '输入密码…',
phConfirm: '再次输入…',
phCurrent: '输入当前密码…',
btnSetup: '设置并获取配置',
btnUnlock: '解锁并获取配置',
setupNote: '密码不会上传服务器。遗忘后数据将无法恢复。',
@@ -354,6 +367,7 @@ const T = {
errShort: '密码至少需要 8 个字符。',
errMismatch: '两次输入不一致。',
errWrong: '密码错误,请重试。',
errWrongOld: '当前密码错误,请重试。',
unlockedTitle: 'MCP 配置',
tabMcp: 'Cursor、Claude Code、Codex、Gemini CLI',
tabOpencode: 'OpenCode',
@@ -379,8 +393,10 @@ const T = {
labelPassphrase: '加密密碼',
labelConfirm: '確認密碼',
labelNew: '新密碼',
labelCurrent: '目前密碼',
phPassphrase: '輸入密碼…',
phConfirm: '再次輸入…',
phCurrent: '輸入目前密碼…',
btnSetup: '設定並取得設定',
btnUnlock: '解鎖並取得設定',
setupNote: '密碼不會上傳伺服器。遺忘後資料將無法復原。',
@@ -388,6 +404,7 @@ const T = {
errShort: '密碼至少需要 8 個字元。',
errMismatch: '兩次輸入不一致。',
errWrong: '密碼錯誤,請重試。',
errWrongOld: '目前密碼錯誤,請重試。',
unlockedTitle: 'MCP 設定',
tabMcp: 'Cursor、Claude Code、Codex、Gemini CLI',
tabOpencode: 'OpenCode',
@@ -413,8 +430,10 @@ const T = {
labelPassphrase: 'Encryption password',
labelConfirm: 'Confirm password',
labelNew: 'New password',
labelCurrent: 'Current password',
phPassphrase: 'Enter password…',
phConfirm: 'Repeat password…',
phCurrent: 'Enter current password…',
btnSetup: 'Set up & get config',
btnUnlock: 'Unlock & get config',
setupNote: 'Your password never leaves this device. If forgotten, encrypted data cannot be recovered.',
@@ -422,6 +441,7 @@ const T = {
errShort: 'Password must be at least 8 characters.',
errMismatch: 'Passwords do not match.',
errWrong: 'Incorrect password, please try again.',
errWrongOld: 'Current password is incorrect, please try again.',
unlockedTitle: 'MCP Config',
tabMcp: 'Cursor, Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI',
tabOpencode: 'OpenCode',
@@ -832,14 +852,16 @@ async function confirmRegenerate() {
// ── Change passphrase modal ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function openChangeModal() {
document.getElementById('change-pass-old').value = '';
document.getElementById('change-pass1').value = '';
document.getElementById('change-pass2').value = '';
document.getElementById('change-pass-old').type = 'password';
document.getElementById('change-pass1').type = 'password';
document.getElementById('change-pass2').type = 'password';
document.getElementById('change-error').style.display = 'none';
document.getElementById('change-modal').classList.add('open');
syncPwToggleI18n();
setTimeout(() => document.getElementById('change-pass1').focus(), 50);
setTimeout(() => document.getElementById('change-pass-old').focus(), 50);
}
function closeChangeModal() {
@@ -847,11 +869,13 @@ function closeChangeModal() {
}
async function doChange() {
const passOld = document.getElementById('change-pass-old').value;
const pass1 = document.getElementById('change-pass1').value;
const pass2 = document.getElementById('change-pass2').value;
const errEl = document.getElementById('change-error');
errEl.style.display = 'none';
if (!passOld) { showErr(errEl, t('errEmpty')); return; }
if (!pass1) { showErr(errEl, t('errEmpty')); return; }
if (pass1.length < 8) { showErr(errEl, t('errShort')); return; }
if (pass1 !== pass2) { showErr(errEl, t('errMismatch')); return; }
@@ -860,24 +884,39 @@ async function doChange() {
btn.disabled = true;
btn.innerHTML = '<span class="spinner" style="border-top-color:#0d1117"></span>';
try {
const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));
const cryptoKey = await deriveKey(pass1, salt, true);
const keyCheckHex = await encryptKeyCheck(cryptoKey);
const hexKey = await exportKeyHex(cryptoKey);
// Fetch current salt to derive old key for verification
const saltResp = await fetchAuth('/api/key-salt');
if (!saltResp.ok) throw new Error('HTTP ' + saltResp.status);
const saltData = await saltResp.json();
if (!saltData.has_passphrase) throw new Error('No passphrase configured');
const resp = await fetchAuth('/api/key-setup', {
// Derive old key and verify it
const oldCryptoKey = await deriveKey(passOld, hexToBytes(saltData.salt), true);
const validOld = await verifyKeyCheck(oldCryptoKey, saltData.key_check);
if (!validOld) { showErr(errEl, t('errWrongOld')); return; }
const oldHexKey = await exportKeyHex(oldCryptoKey);
// Derive new key
const newSalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));
const newCryptoKey = await deriveKey(pass1, newSalt, true);
const newKeyCheckHex = await encryptKeyCheck(newCryptoKey);
const newHexKey = await exportKeyHex(newCryptoKey);
const resp = await fetchAuth('/api/key-change', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
salt: bytesToHex(salt),
key_check: keyCheckHex,
old_key: oldHexKey,
new_key: newHexKey,
salt: bytesToHex(newSalt),
key_check: newKeyCheckHex,
params: { alg: 'pbkdf2-sha256', iterations: PBKDF2_ITERATIONS }
})
});
if (!resp.ok) throw new Error('HTTP ' + resp.status);
currentEncKey = hexKey;
sessionStorage.setItem('enc_key', hexKey);
currentEncKey = newHexKey;
sessionStorage.setItem('enc_key', newHexKey);
renderRealConfig();
closeChangeModal();
} catch (e) {

View File

@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@
border-collapse: separate;
border-spacing: 0;
}
th, td { text-align: left; vertical-align: top; padding: 12px 10px; border-top: 1px solid var(--border); }
th, td { text-align: left; vertical-align: middle; padding: 12px 10px; border-top: 1px solid var(--border); }
th {
color: var(--text-muted);
font-size: 12px;
@@ -138,24 +138,28 @@
top: 0;
z-index: 2;
background: var(--surface);
text-align: center;
vertical-align: middle;
}
td { font-size: 13px; line-height: 1.45; }
tbody tr:nth-child(2n) td { background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.01); }
.mono { font-family: 'JetBrains Mono', monospace; }
.col-type { min-width: 108px; width: 1%; }
.col-name { min-width: 180px; max-width: 260px; }
.col-type { min-width: 108px; width: 1%; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle; }
.col-name { min-width: 180px; max-width: 260px; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle; }
.col-tags { min-width: 160px; max-width: 220px; }
.col-secrets { min-width: 220px; max-width: 420px; vertical-align: top; }
.col-secrets { min-width: 220px; max-width: 420px; vertical-align: middle; }
.col-secrets .secret-list { max-height: 120px; overflow: auto; }
.col-actions { min-width: 132px; width: 1%; }
.col-actions { min-width: 132px; width: 1%; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle; }
.cell-name, .cell-tags-val {
overflow-wrap: anywhere;
word-break: break-word;
}
.cell-notes { min-width: 260px; max-width: 360px; }
.notes-scroll {
max-height: 120px;
height: calc(1.5em * 2 + 16px);
min-height: calc(1.5em * 2 + 16px);
overflow: auto;
resize: vertical;
white-space: pre-wrap;
word-break: break-word;
padding: 8px;
@@ -170,7 +174,7 @@
max-width: 360px; max-height: 120px; overflow: auto;
}
.col-actions { white-space: nowrap; }
.row-actions { display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 6px; }
.row-actions { display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 6px; justify-content: center; align-items: center; }
.secret-list { display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 6px; max-width: 100%; }
.secret-chip {
display: inline-flex;
@@ -312,7 +316,11 @@
color: var(--text); padding: 8px 10px; font-size: 13px; font-family: 'JetBrains Mono', monospace;
outline: none;
}
.modal-field textarea { min-height: 72px; resize: vertical; }
.modal-field textarea { resize: vertical; }
#edit-notes {
height: calc(1.5em * 2 + 16px);
min-height: calc(1.5em * 2 + 16px);
}
.modal-field textarea.metadata-edit { min-height: 140px; }
.modal-readonly-value {
background: var(--bg); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 6px;
@@ -348,6 +356,9 @@
margin-bottom: 4px; text-transform: uppercase;
content: attr(data-label);
}
.col-name, .col-type, .col-actions { text-align: left; }
th, td { vertical-align: top; }
.row-actions { justify-content: flex-start; }
.detail, .notes-scroll, .secret-list { max-width: none; }
}
.pagination {
@@ -368,6 +379,43 @@
.page-info {
color: var(--text-muted); font-size: 13px; font-family: 'JetBrains Mono', monospace;
}
.view-secret-row {
display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 4px; padding: 8px 0;
border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border);
}
.view-secret-row:last-child { border-bottom: none; }
.view-secret-header {
display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 8px; flex-wrap: wrap;
}
.view-secret-name {
font-family: 'JetBrains Mono', monospace; font-size: 12px;
color: var(--text); font-weight: 600;
}
.view-secret-type {
font-family: 'JetBrains Mono', monospace; font-size: 11px;
color: var(--text-muted); background: var(--surface2);
border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 4px; padding: 1px 6px;
}
.view-secret-actions { margin-left: auto; display: flex; gap: 6px; }
.view-secret-value-wrap { position: relative; }
.view-secret-value {
font-family: 'JetBrains Mono', monospace; font-size: 12px;
background: var(--bg); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 6px;
padding: 7px 10px; word-break: break-all; white-space: pre-wrap;
max-height: 140px; overflow: auto; color: var(--text); line-height: 1.5;
}
.view-secret-value.masked { letter-spacing: 2px; user-select: none; filter: blur(4px); }
.btn-icon {
padding: 3px 8px; border-radius: 5px; font-size: 11px; cursor: pointer;
border: 1px solid var(--border); background: var(--surface2); color: var(--text-muted);
font-family: inherit;
}
.btn-icon:hover { color: var(--text); border-color: var(--text-muted); }
.view-locked-msg {
font-size: 13px; color: var(--text-muted); padding: 16px 0;
line-height: 1.6; text-align: center;
}
.view-locked-msg a { color: var(--accent); }
</style>
</head>
<body>
@@ -465,7 +513,8 @@
</td>
<td class="col-actions" data-label="操作">
<div class="row-actions">
<button type="button" class="btn-row btn-edit" data-i18n="rowEdit">编辑</button>
<button type="button" class="btn-row btn-view-secrets" data-i18n="rowView">查看密文</button>
<button type="button" class="btn-row btn-edit" data-i18n="rowEdit">编辑条目</button>
<button type="button" class="btn-row danger btn-del" data-i18n="rowDelete">删除</button>
</div>
</td>
@@ -498,7 +547,7 @@
<div id="edit-overlay" class="modal-overlay" hidden>
<div class="modal modal-wide" role="dialog" aria-modal="true" aria-labelledby="edit-title">
<div class="modal-title" id="edit-title" data-i18n="modalTitle">编辑条目</div>
<div class="modal-title" id="edit-title" data-i18n="modalTitle">编辑条目信息</div>
<div id="edit-error" class="modal-error"></div>
<div class="modal-field"><label for="edit-name" data-i18n="modalName">名称</label><input id="edit-name" type="text" autocomplete="off"></div>
<div class="modal-field"><label for="edit-type" data-i18n="modalType">类型</label><input id="edit-type" type="text" autocomplete="off"></div>
@@ -528,6 +577,17 @@
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div id="view-overlay" class="modal-overlay" hidden>
<div class="modal modal-wide" role="dialog" aria-modal="true" aria-labelledby="view-title">
<div class="modal-title" id="view-title" data-i18n="viewTitle">查看条目密文</div>
<div id="view-entry-name" style="font-size:13px;color:var(--text-muted);margin-bottom:14px;font-family:'JetBrains Mono',monospace;"></div>
<div id="view-body"></div>
<div class="modal-footer">
<button type="button" class="btn-modal" id="view-close" data-i18n="modalCancel">关闭</button>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<script src="/static/i18n.js"></script>
<script id="secret-type-options" type="application/json">{{ secret_type_options_json|safe }}</script>
<script>
@@ -551,9 +611,9 @@ var SECRET_TYPE_OPTIONS = JSON.parse(document.getElementById('secret-type-option
colTags: '标签',
colSecrets: '密文',
colActions: '操作',
rowEdit: '编辑',
rowEdit: '编辑条目',
rowDelete: '删除',
modalTitle: '编辑条目',
modalTitle: '编辑条目信息',
modalName: '名称',
modalType: '类型',
modalFolder: '文件夹',
@@ -591,6 +651,16 @@ var SECRET_TYPE_OPTIONS = JSON.parse(document.getElementById('secret-type-option
secretTypeInvalid: '类型不能为空',
prevPage: '上一页',
nextPage: '下一页',
rowView: '查看密文',
viewTitle: '查看条目密文',
viewNoSecrets: '该条目没有关联的密文字段。',
viewLockedMsg: '请先前往 <a href="/dashboard">MCP 配置页</a> 解锁密码短语,然后再查看密文。',
viewDecryptError: '解密失败,请确认密码短语与加密时一致。',
viewCopy: '复制',
viewCopied: '已复制',
viewShow: '显示',
viewHide: '隐藏',
viewLoading: '解密中…',
},
'zh-TW': {
pageTitle: 'Secrets — 條目',
@@ -609,9 +679,9 @@ var SECRET_TYPE_OPTIONS = JSON.parse(document.getElementById('secret-type-option
colTags: '標籤',
colSecrets: '密文',
colActions: '操作',
rowEdit: '編輯',
rowEdit: '編輯條目',
rowDelete: '刪除',
modalTitle: '編輯條目',
modalTitle: '編輯條目資訊',
modalName: '名稱',
modalType: '類型',
modalFolder: '資料夾',
@@ -649,6 +719,16 @@ var SECRET_TYPE_OPTIONS = JSON.parse(document.getElementById('secret-type-option
secretTypeInvalid: '類型不能為空',
prevPage: '上一頁',
nextPage: '下一頁',
rowView: '查看密文',
viewTitle: '查看條目密文',
viewNoSecrets: '該條目沒有關聯的密文欄位。',
viewLockedMsg: '請先前往 <a href="/dashboard">MCP 設定頁</a> 解鎖密碼短語,再查看密文。',
viewDecryptError: '解密失敗,請確認密碼短語與加密時一致。',
viewCopy: '複製',
viewCopied: '已複製',
viewShow: '顯示',
viewHide: '隱藏',
viewLoading: '解密中…',
},
en: {
pageTitle: 'Secrets — Entries',
@@ -667,9 +747,9 @@ var SECRET_TYPE_OPTIONS = JSON.parse(document.getElementById('secret-type-option
colTags: 'Tags',
colSecrets: 'Secrets',
colActions: 'Actions',
rowEdit: 'Edit',
rowEdit: 'Edit entry',
rowDelete: 'Delete',
modalTitle: 'Edit entry',
modalTitle: 'Edit entry details',
modalName: 'Name',
modalType: 'Type',
modalFolder: 'Folder',
@@ -706,7 +786,17 @@ var SECRET_TYPE_OPTIONS = JSON.parse(document.getElementById('secret-type-option
secretTypePlaceholder: 'Select type',
secretTypeInvalid: 'Type cannot be empty',
prevPage: 'Previous',
nextPage: 'Next'
nextPage: 'Next',
rowView: 'View secrets',
viewTitle: 'View entry secrets',
viewNoSecrets: 'This entry has no associated secret fields.',
viewLockedMsg: 'Please go to the <a href="/dashboard">MCP config page</a> to unlock your passphrase first.',
viewDecryptError: 'Decryption failed. Please verify your passphrase matches the one used when encrypting.',
viewCopy: 'Copy',
viewCopied: 'Copied',
viewShow: 'Show',
viewHide: 'Hide',
viewLoading: 'Decrypting…',
}
};
@@ -757,6 +847,137 @@ var SECRET_TYPE_OPTIONS = JSON.parse(document.getElementById('secret-type-option
var currentEntryId = null;
var pendingDeleteId = null;
// ── View secrets modal ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
var viewOverlay = document.getElementById('view-overlay');
var viewEntryName = document.getElementById('view-entry-name');
var viewBody = document.getElementById('view-body');
function closeView() {
viewOverlay.hidden = true;
viewBody.innerHTML = '';
viewEntryName.textContent = '';
}
document.getElementById('view-close').addEventListener('click', closeView);
viewOverlay.addEventListener('click', function (e) {
if (e.target === viewOverlay) closeView();
});
function renderViewSecrets(secrets) {
viewBody.innerHTML = '';
var names = Object.keys(secrets);
if (names.length === 0) {
var msg = document.createElement('div');
msg.className = 'view-locked-msg';
msg.textContent = t('viewNoSecrets');
viewBody.appendChild(msg);
return;
}
names.forEach(function (name) {
var raw = secrets[name];
var valueStr = (raw === null || raw === undefined) ? '' :
(typeof raw === 'object') ? JSON.stringify(raw, null, 2) : String(raw);
var isPassword = (name === 'password' || name === 'passwd' || name === 'secret');
var masked = isPassword;
var row = document.createElement('div');
row.className = 'view-secret-row';
var header = document.createElement('div');
header.className = 'view-secret-header';
var nameSpan = document.createElement('span');
nameSpan.className = 'view-secret-name';
nameSpan.textContent = name;
header.appendChild(nameSpan);
var actions = document.createElement('div');
actions.className = 'view-secret-actions';
if (isPassword) {
var toggleBtn = document.createElement('button');
toggleBtn.type = 'button';
toggleBtn.className = 'btn-icon btn-toggle-mask';
toggleBtn.textContent = t('viewShow');
toggleBtn.addEventListener('click', function () {
masked = !masked;
valueEl.classList.toggle('masked', masked);
toggleBtn.textContent = masked ? t('viewShow') : t('viewHide');
});
actions.appendChild(toggleBtn);
}
var copyBtn = document.createElement('button');
copyBtn.type = 'button';
copyBtn.className = 'btn-icon';
copyBtn.textContent = t('viewCopy');
copyBtn.addEventListener('click', function () {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(valueStr).then(function () {
copyBtn.textContent = t('viewCopied');
setTimeout(function () { copyBtn.textContent = t('viewCopy'); }, 1800);
}).catch(function () {});
});
actions.appendChild(copyBtn);
header.appendChild(actions);
row.appendChild(header);
var valueWrap = document.createElement('div');
valueWrap.className = 'view-secret-value-wrap';
var valueEl = document.createElement('div');
valueEl.className = 'view-secret-value' + (masked ? ' masked' : '');
valueEl.textContent = valueStr;
valueWrap.appendChild(valueEl);
row.appendChild(valueWrap);
viewBody.appendChild(row);
});
}
function openView(tr) {
var entryId = tr.getAttribute('data-entry-id');
var nameEl = tr.querySelector('.cell-name');
var entryName = nameEl ? nameEl.textContent.trim() : '';
var encKey = sessionStorage.getItem('enc_key');
viewEntryName.textContent = entryName;
viewBody.innerHTML = '';
viewOverlay.hidden = false;
if (!encKey) {
var msg = document.createElement('div');
msg.className = 'view-locked-msg';
msg.innerHTML = t('viewLockedMsg');
viewBody.appendChild(msg);
return;
}
var loadingMsg = document.createElement('div');
loadingMsg.className = 'view-locked-msg';
loadingMsg.textContent = t('viewLoading');
viewBody.appendChild(loadingMsg);
fetch('/api/entries/' + encodeURIComponent(entryId) + '/secrets/decrypt', {
credentials: 'same-origin',
headers: { 'X-Encryption-Key': encKey }
}).then(function (r) {
return r.json().then(function (data) {
if (!r.ok) throw new Error(data.error || ('HTTP ' + r.status));
return data;
});
}).then(function (data) {
renderViewSecrets(data.secrets || {});
}).catch(function (e) {
viewBody.innerHTML = '';
var errMsg = document.createElement('div');
errMsg.className = 'view-locked-msg';
errMsg.style.color = '#f85149';
errMsg.textContent = e.message || t('viewDecryptError');
viewBody.appendChild(errMsg);
});
}
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function showEditErr(msg) {
editError.textContent = msg || '';
editError.classList.toggle('visible', !!msg);
@@ -981,6 +1202,7 @@ var SECRET_TYPE_OPTIONS = JSON.parse(document.getElementById('secret-type-option
document.addEventListener('keydown', function (e) {
if (e.key === 'Escape' && !editOverlay.hidden) closeEdit();
if (e.key === 'Escape' && !deleteOverlay.hidden) closeDelete();
if (e.key === 'Escape' && !viewOverlay.hidden) closeView();
});
function showDeleteErr(msg) {
@@ -1295,6 +1517,12 @@ var SECRET_TYPE_OPTIONS = JSON.parse(document.getElementById('secret-type-option
});
document.querySelectorAll('tr[data-entry-id]').forEach(function (tr) {
var viewBtn = tr.querySelector('.btn-view-secrets');
if (viewBtn) {
var hasSecrets = tr.querySelectorAll('.secret-chip').length > 0;
if (!hasSecrets) viewBtn.disabled = true;
viewBtn.addEventListener('click', function () { openView(tr); });
}
tr.querySelector('.btn-edit').addEventListener('click', function () { openEdit(tr); });
tr.querySelector('.btn-del').addEventListener('click', function () {
var id = tr.getAttribute('data-entry-id');

View File

@@ -30,3 +30,24 @@ GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=
# ─── 日志(可选)──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# RUST_LOG=secrets_mcp=debug
# ─── 数据库连接池(可选)──────────────────────────────────────────────
# 最大连接数,默认 10
# SECRETS_DATABASE_POOL_SIZE=10
# 获取连接超时秒数,默认 5
# SECRETS_DATABASE_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT=5
# ─── 限流(可选)──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# 全局限流速率req/s默认 100
# RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_PER_SECOND=100
# 全局限流突发量,默认 200
# RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_BURST=200
# 单 IP 限流速率req/s默认 20
# RATE_LIMIT_IP_PER_SECOND=20
# 单 IP 限流突发量,默认 40
# RATE_LIMIT_IP_BURST=40
# ─── 代理信任(可选)─────────────────────────────────────────────────
# 设为 1/true/yes 时从 X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP 提取客户端 IP
# 仅在反代环境下启用,否则客户端可伪造 IP 绕过限流
# TRUST_PROXY=1

View File

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
entry_id,secret_name,secret_value
1 entry_id secret_name secret_value

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Batch re-encrypt secret fields from a CSV file.
CSV format:
entry_id,secret_name,secret_value
019d...,api_key,sk-xxxx
019d...,password,hunter2
The script groups rows by entry_id, then calls `secrets_update` with `secrets_obj`
so the server re-encrypts the provided plaintext values with the current key.
Warnings:
- Keep the CSV outside version control whenever possible.
- Delete the filled CSV after the repair is complete.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import csv
import json
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
from collections import OrderedDict
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
DEFAULT_USER_AGENT = "Cursor/3.0.12 (darwin arm64)"
REQUIRED_COLUMNS = {"entry_id", "secret_name", "secret_value"}
def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="Repair secret ciphertexts by re-submitting plaintext via secrets_update."
)
parser.add_argument(
"--csv",
required=True,
help="Path to CSV file with columns: entry_id,secret_name,secret_value",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--mcp-json",
default=str(Path.home() / ".cursor" / "mcp.json"),
help="Path to mcp.json used to resolve URL and headers",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--server",
default="secrets",
help="MCP server name inside mcp.json (default: secrets)",
)
parser.add_argument("--url", help="Override MCP URL")
parser.add_argument("--auth", help="Override Authorization header value")
parser.add_argument("--encryption-key", help="Override X-Encryption-Key header value")
parser.add_argument(
"--user-agent",
default=DEFAULT_USER_AGENT,
help=f"User-Agent header (default: {DEFAULT_USER_AGENT})",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--dry-run",
action="store_true",
help="Parse and print grouped updates without sending requests",
)
return parser.parse_args()
def load_mcp_config(path: str, server_name: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
data = json.loads(Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
servers = data.get("mcpServers", {})
if server_name not in servers:
raise KeyError(f"Server '{server_name}' not found in {path}")
return servers[server_name]
def resolve_connection_settings(args: argparse.Namespace) -> tuple[str, str, str]:
server = load_mcp_config(args.mcp_json, args.server)
headers = server.get("headers", {})
url = args.url or server.get("url")
auth = args.auth or headers.get("Authorization")
encryption_key = args.encryption_key or headers.get("X-Encryption-Key")
if not url:
raise ValueError("Missing MCP URL. Pass --url or configure it in mcp.json.")
if not auth:
raise ValueError(
"Missing Authorization header. Pass --auth or configure it in mcp.json."
)
if not encryption_key:
raise ValueError(
"Missing X-Encryption-Key. Pass --encryption-key or configure it in mcp.json."
)
return url, auth, encryption_key
def load_updates(csv_path: str) -> OrderedDict[str, OrderedDict[str, str]]:
grouped: OrderedDict[str, OrderedDict[str, str]] = OrderedDict()
with Path(csv_path).open("r", encoding="utf-8-sig", newline="") as fh:
reader = csv.DictReader(fh)
fieldnames = set(reader.fieldnames or [])
missing = REQUIRED_COLUMNS - fieldnames
if missing:
raise ValueError(
"CSV missing required columns: " + ", ".join(sorted(missing))
)
for line_no, row in enumerate(reader, start=2):
entry_id = (row.get("entry_id") or "").strip()
secret_name = (row.get("secret_name") or "").strip()
secret_value = row.get("secret_value") or ""
if not entry_id and not secret_name and not secret_value:
continue
if not entry_id:
raise ValueError(f"Line {line_no}: entry_id is required")
if not secret_name:
raise ValueError(f"Line {line_no}: secret_name is required")
entry_group = grouped.setdefault(entry_id, OrderedDict())
if secret_name in entry_group:
raise ValueError(
f"Line {line_no}: duplicate secret_name '{secret_name}' for entry_id '{entry_id}'"
)
entry_group[secret_name] = secret_value
if not grouped:
raise ValueError("CSV contains no updates")
return grouped
def post_json(
url: str,
payload: dict[str, Any],
auth: str,
encryption_key: str,
user_agent: str,
session_id: str | None = None,
) -> tuple[int, str | None, str]:
headers = {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Accept": "application/json, text/event-stream",
"Authorization": auth,
"X-Encryption-Key": encryption_key,
"User-Agent": user_agent,
}
if session_id:
headers["mcp-session-id"] = session_id
req = urllib.request.Request(
url,
data=json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8"),
headers=headers,
method="POST",
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp:
return (
resp.status,
resp.headers.get("mcp-session-id") or session_id,
resp.read().decode("utf-8"),
)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
body = exc.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
return exc.code, session_id, body
def parse_sse_json(body: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
items: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
for line in body.splitlines():
if line.startswith("data: {"):
items.append(json.loads(line[6:]))
return items
def initialize_session(
url: str, auth: str, encryption_key: str, user_agent: str
) -> str:
status, session_id, body = post_json(
url,
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"method": "initialize",
"params": {
"protocolVersion": "2025-06-18",
"capabilities": {},
"clientInfo": {"name": "repair-script", "version": "1.0"},
},
},
auth,
encryption_key,
user_agent,
)
if status != 200 or not session_id:
raise RuntimeError(f"initialize failed: status={status}, body={body[:500]}")
status, _, body = post_json(
url,
{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "notifications/initialized", "params": {}},
auth,
encryption_key,
user_agent,
session_id,
)
if status not in (200, 202):
raise RuntimeError(
f"notifications/initialized failed: status={status}, body={body[:500]}"
)
return session_id
def load_entry_index(
url: str, auth: str, encryption_key: str, user_agent: str, session_id: str
) -> dict[str, tuple[str, str]]:
status, _, body = post_json(
url,
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 999_001,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "secrets_find",
"arguments": {
"limit": 1000,
},
},
},
auth,
encryption_key,
user_agent,
session_id,
)
items = parse_sse_json(body)
last = items[-1] if items else {"raw": body[:1000]}
if status != 200:
raise RuntimeError(
f"secrets_find failed: status={status}, body={body[:500]}"
)
if "error" in last:
raise RuntimeError(f"secrets_find returned error: {last}")
content = last.get("result", {}).get("content", [])
if not content:
raise RuntimeError("secrets_find returned no content")
payload = json.loads(content[0]["text"])
index: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {}
for entry in payload.get("entries", []):
entry_id = entry.get("id")
name = entry.get("name")
folder = entry.get("folder", "")
if entry_id and name is not None:
index[entry_id] = (name, folder)
return index
def call_secrets_update(
url: str,
auth: str,
encryption_key: str,
user_agent: str,
session_id: str,
request_id: int,
entry_id: str,
entry_name: str,
entry_folder: str,
secrets_obj: dict[str, str],
) -> dict[str, Any]:
payload = {
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": request_id,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "secrets_update",
"arguments": {
"id": entry_id,
"name": entry_name,
"folder": entry_folder,
"secrets_obj": secrets_obj,
# Pass the key as an argument too, so repair can still work
# even when a client/proxy mishandles custom headers.
"encryption_key": encryption_key,
},
},
}
status, _, body = post_json(
url, payload, auth, encryption_key, user_agent, session_id
)
items = parse_sse_json(body)
last = items[-1] if items else {"raw": body[:1000]}
if status != 200:
raise RuntimeError(
f"secrets_update failed for {entry_id}: status={status}, body={body[:500]}"
)
return last
def main() -> int:
args = parse_args()
try:
url, auth, encryption_key = resolve_connection_settings(args)
updates = load_updates(args.csv)
except Exception as exc:
print(f"ERROR: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
print(f"Loaded {len(updates)} entries from {args.csv}")
if args.dry_run:
for entry_id, secrets_obj in updates.items():
print(
json.dumps(
{"id": entry_id, "secrets_obj": secrets_obj},
ensure_ascii=False,
indent=2,
)
)
return 0
try:
session_id = initialize_session(url, auth, encryption_key, args.user_agent)
entry_index = load_entry_index(
url, auth, encryption_key, args.user_agent, session_id
)
except Exception as exc:
print(f"ERROR: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
success = 0
failures = 0
for request_id, (entry_id, secrets_obj) in enumerate(updates.items(), start=2):
try:
if entry_id not in entry_index:
raise RuntimeError(
f"entry id not found in secrets_find results: {entry_id}"
)
entry_name, entry_folder = entry_index[entry_id]
result = call_secrets_update(
url,
auth,
encryption_key,
args.user_agent,
session_id,
request_id,
entry_id,
entry_name,
entry_folder,
secrets_obj,
)
if "error" in result:
failures += 1
print(
json.dumps(
{"id": entry_id, "status": "error", "result": result},
ensure_ascii=False,
),
file=sys.stderr,
)
else:
success += 1
print(
json.dumps(
{"id": entry_id, "status": "ok", "result": result},
ensure_ascii=False,
)
)
except Exception as exc:
failures += 1
print(f"{entry_id}: ERROR: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
print(f"Done. success={success} failure={failures}")
return 0 if failures == 0 else 2
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())

View File

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# 同步测试环境数据到生产环境
# 用法: ./scripts/sync-test-to-prod.sh
set -euo pipefail
# PostgreSQL 客户端工具路径 (Homebrew libpq)
export PATH="/opt/homebrew/opt/libpq/bin:$PATH"
# SSL 配置
export PGSSLMODE=verify-full
export PGSSLROOTCERT=/etc/ssl/cert.pem
# 测试环境
TEST_DB="postgres://postgres:Voson_2026_Pg18!@db.refining.ltd:5432/secrets-nn-test"
# 生产环境
PROD_DB="postgres://postgres:Voson_2026_Pg18!@db.refining.ltd:5432/secrets-nn-prod"
echo "========================================="
echo " 测试环境 -> 生产环境 数据同步"
echo "========================================="
echo ""
# 确认操作
read -p "⚠️ 此操作将覆盖生产环境数据,确认继续? (yes/no): " confirm
if [ "$confirm" != "yes" ]; then
echo "已取消"
exit 0
fi
echo ""
echo "步骤 1/4: 导出测试环境数据..."
TEMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
trap "rm -rf $TEMP_DIR" EXIT
# 导出测试环境数据(不含审计日志和历史记录)
pg_dump "$TEST_DB" \
--table=entries \
--table=secrets \
--table=entry_secrets \
--table=users \
--table=oauth_accounts \
--data-only \
--column-inserts \
--no-owner \
--no-privileges \
> "$TEMP_DIR/test_data.sql"
echo "✓ 测试数据已导出到临时文件"
echo " 文件大小: $(du -h "$TEMP_DIR/test_data.sql" | cut -f1)"
echo ""
echo "步骤 2/4: 备份当前生产数据..."
pg_dump "$PROD_DB" \
--table=entries \
--table=secrets \
--table=entry_secrets \
--table=users \
--table=oauth_accounts \
--data-only \
--column-inserts \
--no-owner \
--no-privileges \
> "$TEMP_DIR/prod_backup_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S).sql"
echo "✓ 生产数据已备份"
echo ""
echo "步骤 3/4: 清空生产环境目标表..."
psql "$PROD_DB" <<'SQL'
TRUNCATE TABLE entry_secrets CASCADE;
TRUNCATE TABLE secrets CASCADE;
TRUNCATE TABLE entries CASCADE;
SQL
echo "✓ 生产环境目标表已清空"
echo ""
echo "步骤 4/4: 导入测试数据到生产环境..."
psql "$PROD_DB" -f "$TEMP_DIR/test_data.sql" 2>&1 | tail -20
echo ""
echo "验证数据..."
echo "生产环境数据统计:"
psql "$PROD_DB" -c "SELECT 'users' as table_name, count(*) FROM users UNION ALL SELECT 'entries', count(*) FROM entries UNION ALL SELECT 'secrets', count(*) FROM secrets UNION ALL SELECT 'entry_secrets', count(*) FROM entry_secrets UNION ALL SELECT 'oauth_accounts', count(*) FROM oauth_accounts ORDER BY table_name;"
echo ""
echo "========================================="
echo " ✓ 数据同步完成!"
echo "========================================="
echo ""
echo "提示:"
echo " - 生产数据备份已保存在临时目录"
echo " - 临时文件将在脚本退出后自动删除"